Difference between revisions of "David Hume"

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By the time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of religious belief. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The term '''atheism''' was coined by Sir John Cheke almost two hundred years earlier in 1540, to refer to a lack of belief in divine providence. The term assumed its modern meaning of disbelief in the existence of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth century. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]] Although Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, it was nonetheless a challenge to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This methodology stressed the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of reliance on divine revelation and the text of the Bible. Descartes instead stressed the human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. Descartes' rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire. It eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Though they held non-standard beliefs, both Newton and Locke were devoutly religious. Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they rejected traditional rationalist proofs of God's existence and instead espoused the '''design argument''', supposing that the experimental method could demonstrate that the universe was an artifact crafted by a cosmic Designer. Hume's ''Dialogues on Natural Theology'' (1779) was a response to such hopes, and was to raise devastating objections to them. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]
 
By the time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of religious belief. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The term '''atheism''' was coined by Sir John Cheke almost two hundred years earlier in 1540, to refer to a lack of belief in divine providence. The term assumed its modern meaning of disbelief in the existence of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth century. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]] Although Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, it was nonetheless a challenge to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This methodology stressed the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of reliance on divine revelation and the text of the Bible. Descartes instead stressed the human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. Descartes' rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire. It eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Though they held non-standard beliefs, both Newton and Locke were devoutly religious. Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they rejected traditional rationalist proofs of God's existence and instead espoused the '''design argument''', supposing that the experimental method could demonstrate that the universe was an artifact crafted by a cosmic Designer. Hume's ''Dialogues on Natural Theology'' (1779) was a response to such hopes, and was to raise devastating objections to them. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]
 
|Major Contributions==== Hume and moral philosophy ===
 
|Major Contributions==== Hume and moral philosophy ===
Hume's main philosophical contributions were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, ''concerning the Principles of Morals'' published in 1751, and ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his death.
+
Hume's main philosophical contributions were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, ''concerning the Principles of Morals'' published in 1751, and ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his death. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)]] His basic philosophical project is indicated by the subtitle of the ''Treatise''; 'an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects'. An admirer of the Newtonian experimental philosophy, Hume sought to extend it from natural philosophy into what was then called '''moral philosophy''', which he defines as the 'science of human nature'. Natural philosophers, he maintains, had cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems"
  
  

Revision as of 21:06, 14 November 2017

David Hume (7 May 1711 – 25 August 1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist; he is widely considered the most important philosopher to write in the English language. Hume’s contributions to our understanding of scientific knowledge and scientific change come from his two major philosophical works: A Treatise of Human Nature (1738) and Enquiries concerning Human Understanding (1748). He is most noted for his skeptical views on a variety of topics including human identity, the powers of human reason, metaphysics, and the existence of God.1 He is perhaps best known, first, for rejecting Aristotle’s epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief and replacing it with his own distinction between matters of fact (which depend on the way the world is) and relations of ideas (that are discoverable by thought, such as mathematical truths). This new distinction is known as Hume's Fork. Secondly, he is known for questioning the justifiability of knowledge derived from inductive reasoning. The problem he posed is known as Hume's Problem of Induction. 2 The impact of these skeptical arguments is still felt to this day.

Historical Context

David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1711. His family had a modest estate and was socially connected, but not wealthy.3 They recognized that Hume was precocious, and sent him to Edinburgh University two years early (at the age of 10 or 11) with his older brother (who was 12). He studied Latin and Greek, read widely in history, literature, and ancient and modern philosophy, as well as some mathematics and natural philosophy. 24p. 35-65 Both at home and at the university, Hume was raised in the stern Calvinist faith, with prayers and sermons as prominent features of his home and university life. 2 Following the completion of his studies, Hume rejected his family's plan that he become a lawyer, and instead determined to become a scholar and philosopher, engaging in three years of intensive personal study.

Although little is known of his activities during his schooling and afterwards, he would have spent the fourth year of the curriculum at Edinburgh studying natural philosophy, and would have been exposed to experimental natural philosophy, including the theories of Isaac Newton (1643-1727). 4p. 38-40 Newton had published his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) in which he put forth his laws of motion, law of universal gravitation, and his inductive experimental philosophy more than thirty years earlier in 1687. 56 By about 1700 Newton's theory had become accepted in Britain. 7p. 210 Like many of his times, Hume revered Newton, calling him "the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of the species". 8 The works of other experimental philosophers were also available to the young Hume. The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume is known to have contributed, contained an extensive collection of the works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), as well as the works of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and John Locke's (1632-1704) Essay Concerning Human Understanding. This work, published in 1689, more than twenty years before Hume was born, propounded Locke's empiricist view of human knowledge. The library included some controversial works, such as those of the materialist Thomas Hobbs (1588-1679). 4p. 38-409 Boyle, Newton, and Locke were all associated with the Royal Society of London, which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's birth, and sought to promote the experimental method and the new natural philosophy. 910

By Hume's time, Aristotle's (384 BC-322 BC) teleological account of causation had been rejected in favor of the corpuscular mechanistic view of causation espoused by Descartes, Locke, and the Royal Society. In this view, derived from ancient atomism, material bodies are made of invisibly small particles, called corpuscles. The only form of causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of bodies or their constituent corpuscles 8 Natural philosophers continued to accept Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and belief. Scientific knowledge was taken to be knowledge of causes and consisted of demonstration; proving the necessary connection between cause and effect. Locke supported this view of knowledge and made the popular notion of a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the associated notion of a metaphysically necessary connection between cause and effect central to his system. He nonetheless viewed demonstrative knowledge as seldom attainable because of the unobservability of corpuscles 811 Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and Locke's empiricism to constitute a unified system, there was a distinct tension between them, which Hume recognized. Newton had been unable to explain his gravitational force in terms of a corpuscular mechanism. He saw his inductive method as an alternative to the demands of a corpuscularism that stood in the way of the acceptance of a mathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. Hume's Newton inspired skepticism of speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to reject corpuscularism, and his enthusiastic championing of Newton's inductive method led him to challenge Locke's concept of causation, and Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge and opinion. Hume translated this latter distinction into a distinction between relations of ideas, which are discoverable by thought (for example, mathematical truths), and matters of fact, which depend on how the world actually is. This distinction became known as Hume's Fork. Rejecting necessary causation, his careful analysis of Newton's inductive method led him to identify Hume's Problem of Induction, questioning our ability to rationally justify knowledge of causation obtained by induction. 122

By the time he started work on A Treatise of Human Nature at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of religious belief. 2 The term atheism was coined by Sir John Cheke almost two hundred years earlier in 1540, to refer to a lack of belief in divine providence. The term assumed its modern meaning of disbelief in the existence of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth century. 13 Although Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, it was nonetheless a challenge to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This methodology stressed the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of reliance on divine revelation and the text of the Bible. Descartes instead stressed the human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. Descartes' rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. 1314 It was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire. It eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. 10 Though they held non-standard beliefs, both Newton and Locke were devoutly religious. Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they rejected traditional rationalist proofs of God's existence and instead espoused the design argument, supposing that the experimental method could demonstrate that the universe was an artifact crafted by a cosmic Designer. Hume's Dialogues on Natural Theology (1779) was a response to such hopes, and was to raise devastating objections to them. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. 13 Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). 1315

Major Contributions

Hume and moral philosophy

Hume's main philosophical contributions were made via several works. The first was A Treatise of Human Nature published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. Enquiries concerning Human Understanding, published in 1748, concerning the Principles of Morals published in 1751, and Dialogs concerning Natural Religion published posthumously in 1779, three years after his death. 23 His basic philosophical project is indicated by the subtitle of the Treatise; 'an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects'. An admirer of the Newtonian experimental philosophy, Hume sought to extend it from natural philosophy into what was then called moral philosophy, which he defines as the 'science of human nature'. Natural philosophers, he maintains, had cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems"


Hume wrote that the work fell "deadborn from the press". He lamented that "I was carry'd away by the Heat of Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately So vast an Undertaking, plan’d before I was one and twenty, & compos’d before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times”. While this work was not a success in its own times, it is today regarded as Hume's most important work

Hume and Scientific Methodology

Hume’s Fork

In Hume’s entrance to the debate of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean distinction between scientific knowledge and belief into his own terms. These are:

  • Relations of ideas.
  • Matters of fact.

Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain through either demonstration or purely through intuition. They are a priori, in that they are discoverable independent of experience. This categorization does not necessitate ideas to carry information dependent on the world and thus ideas falling into this category are independent of any existing thing. They are universal constants in that they hold true in all worlds. It should be noted, relations of ideas cannot provide any new information about the world. These types of propositions are simply a means used to help understand more complex ideas. They can be thought of as symbols or a series of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex idea. Common examples usually include geometry or math as formal sciences fall within this categorization. Examples of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees' or '1 + 1 = 2'. Alternatively, a worded proposition may look something like 'when you run, you move your body,' or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations of ideas can never be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in the very definition of the terms within the proposition.12

Matters of fact are the complete opposite of relations of ideas. Matters of fact are a posteriori statements and thus based on experience. Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds. The contrary of matters of fact imply no contradiction and such statements cannot be established by demonstration. Matters of fact can show new information about the world but rely on the experience of the world. Examples of such statements include 'the sky is blue', or 'water is odourless', or 'all guitars have 6 frets.' It should be noted that false statements, such as the last example, can still be matters of fact. The level of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this sense, contrasting statements are, too, matters of facts.12

The reason behind this distinction was simple; it was to provide criteria by which to organize scientific statements. Through this distinction, all statements were categorized into either matters of fact or relations of ideas. This also ultimately meant that there was no type of idea which was certain and provided information about the world. In the case of matters of fact, propositions are reliant on senses and due to the fallibility of the senses, have no certainty. In the case of relations of ideas, propositions can be proven with absolute certainty through the use of other relations of ideas. Unfortunately, however, these statements cannot give any new information about the world. This distinction was often taken by the scientific community as a strike at Newton’s theory of motion. 16 Such a distinction has large consequences in the fields of science, religion, and even philosophy due to its prevention of certain real world statements. As an example this distinction would make useless the attempt to try to prove non physical entities as matters of fact.

  1. α is a non-physical entity.
  2. It has no observable effect on the world and its not made up of a physical thing.
  3. α is a relation of ideas.
  4. Relations of ideas are just assigned symbols helping to explain more complex symbols.
  5. The statement ‘α exists’ proven or otherwise doesn’t say anything about the world; it is just a play on words.

Much akin to the reasoning the analytic/synthetic distinction uses, it is impossible, according to Hume, for a proposition not to fall within the distinction. In Hume’s eyes, such a proposition would be completely meaningless in that it would simply not be a rational or reasonable endeavour. It is in this binary categorization, that this distinction is historically important. Philosophers at the time were heavily reliant on innate meaningful ideas (synthetic a priori statements), but Hume’s distinction of the types of proposition did not allow for such ideas. Hume believed that innate ideas cannot be meaningful in that they never contain real world statements. This meant most axiomatic schemes were immediately broken down with Hume’s skepticism. 8

Problem of Induction

The problem of induction stems from the reasoning behind causal inference. This is a very important problem Hume brings up because the methodology of the time called for axiomatic schemes. These schemes were based largely on causal inferences. As such, Hume’s Problem of Induction threatened science at the time as it proved causal inferences were irrational.

Given the previous distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, the connection within causal inference should fall under one of those categories. With this in mind, Hume found that causal inference cannot be a relation of ideas, and so must be a matter of fact.

The reason he came to this conclusion was that each cause is independent of its effect. The two are not associated with each other. For example, never having seen an anti-biotic, and without being told of its effects, would a person be able to establish its effect through sole means of reasoning and senses? Quite simply, no. Without experience, a person would have no understanding to what the purpose of the medicine is, or that it is medicine at all. And herein, Hume concludes, since a priori reasoning cannot be the source of connection between causes and effects, the inference must be a matter of fact.12

Describing causal inferences as a matter of fact provides leeway to use experience to determine the effects of a cause. Using the example from before, if that same person had tried anti-biotics in the past and had been cured, they begin to infer the reason for their getting better was the anti-biotic. Grasping this chain of events Hume attempts to formulate that person’s argument for their inference and states it as such:

  1. In the past x has resulted in y.
  2. Therefore, in the future x will result in y.

Here however, Hume notices a gap in logic. How does (1) infer (2)? Hume sees that demonstrative reasoning cannot fill this gap, because a complete contrast where x does not result in y implies no contradiction within the inference. Herein, it seems that there is an underlying assumption within the first premise: the future will be like the past. This assumption is more commonly known as the uniformity principle. Using such an assumption would fill the logical gap within the current argument, however before it can be used, it must be established that the principle is either intuitive or demonstrable. Nonetheless, the only way to formulate an argument for the principle is to rely on the principle itself.12 With reliance on the uniformity principle the full argument would follow like this:

  1. In the past, the future has been like the past.
  2. Therefore, the future will be like the past.

Within this argument, the premise assumes the conclusion and, as such, the argument is circular. In this sense, the first example shows an irrational train of thought. It seems then, that Hume established there is no way that reason could be the connection between cause and effect. Thus, Hume sought another connection between cause and effect. He eventually recognized this connection to be custom or habit. This is more commonly known today as induction. As a person experiences something repeatedly, they grow to expect it to happen again. However, despite being an adequate connection, this solution forces the abandonment of reason within causal inference. 8 As previously mentioned, such a conclusion yields grave consequences for science of the time, which was heavily dependent on causal inferences.12

Skepticism about theological knowledge

Criticism

Historically, due to the threatening nature of Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, particularly to Newtonian physics, as well as his problem of induction there have been many critics of Hume. One of the most prominent critics to criticize Hume on the account of his distinction between the types of propositions was Immanuel Kant. Kant criticized Hume, seeking to validate Newton’s propositions about the world which could never be meaningful under Hume’s distinction. Kant theorized that the world was interpreted through sensory and intellect and thus there must exist some sort of a priori synthetic proposition.4 The existence of such a proposition would of course result in a proposition that fit both categories of Hume’s distinction. Unfortunately, Kant’s a priori synthetic proposition was debunked with the arrival of probabilistic determinism.

As for criticisms on Hume's Problem of Induction, there are quite a few cases. One of the more notable cases was the critique Karl Popper had towards Hume, stating that induction is a myth.17 Popper argued science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than reference to the past, and that the main purpose of observations wasn’t to make inferences about the future but to refute present existing theories. Popper was committed to the idea that Hume had incorrectly orientated himself towards a means of justifying knowledge. Popper, instead, preferred to look for a process by which to correct errors.18

Wesley Salmon responded to this criticism in Hume’s place, stating theories still need predictions to be tested. When Popperians have multiple theories, each sharing the same quantity of empirical content, Popperians would choose the theories which were better corroborated but lack any justification in this decision. The Popperians either make an inductive claim:

  1. A theory was reliable in the past.
  2. It will be reliable in the future having survived falsification.

Or they admit corroboration is not an indication of predictive power.19

Publications

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References

  1. ^  Fieser, James. (2016) David Hume. In Fieser and Dowden (Ed.) (2017). Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hume/.
  2. a b c d e f  Morris, William Edward and Brown, Charlotte. (2016) David Hume. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/hume/.
  3. a b  Norton, David. (2009) An Introduction to Hume's Thought. In Norton and Taylor (Eds.) (2009), 1-39.
  4. a b c  Harris, James. (2015) Hume: An Intellectual Biography. Cambridge University Press.
  5. ^  Westfall, Richard. (1999) Sir Isaac Newton. In Encyclopedia Britannica (2016). Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Isaac-Newton.
  6. ^  Janiak, Andrew. (2016) Newton's Philosophy. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/.
  7. ^  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
  8. a b c d e  De Pierris, Graciella. (2006) Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology: The Newtonian Legacy. Stanford University.
  9. a b  Uzgalis, William. (2016) John Locke. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/.
  10. a b  Rogers, John. (1982) The System of Locke and Newton. In Bechler (1982), 215-238.
  11. ^  Kochiras, Hylarie. (2014) Locke's Philosophy of Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-philosophy-science/.
  12. a b c d e f  Hume, David. (1975) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford University Press.
  13. a b c d  Hyman, Gavin. (2007) Atheism in Modern History. In Martin (Ed.) (2007), 27-46.
  14. ^  Cottingham, John. (1992) Introduction. In Cottingham (Ed.) (1992), 1-20.
  15. ^  Bristow, William. (2017) Enlightenment. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/enlightenment/.
  16. ^  Kant, Immanuel. (2007) Critique of Pure Reason. London: Penguin.
  17. ^  Popper, Karl. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.
  18. ^  Popper, Karl. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge.
  19. ^  Salmon, Wesley. (1967) The Foundations of Scientific Inference. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh.