Difference between revisions of "Larry Laudan"
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| − | Larry Laudan is an American philosopher who contributed to the | + | Larry Laudan is an American philosopher who contributed to the philosophy of science in the 1970s and 80s. He wrote many works, including ''Progress and its Problems'' (1977), ''Science and Hypothesis'' (1981) and ''Science and Values'' (1984). Laudan’s most notable contribution to the study of scientific change is the idea that scientific methods change, representing a departure from the tradition of [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhnian]] “paradigms.” Laudan presented his reticulated model as an explanation for how methods can change and he defended this view from criticisms by prominent colleagues like [[John Worrall]]. |
== Historical Context == | == Historical Context == | ||
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==== Early views ==== | ==== Early views ==== | ||
| − | Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part | + | Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part of the changing nature of science. |
==== Later views ==== | ==== Later views ==== | ||
| − | Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. | + | Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. He first subscribes to this view in his 1984 work Science and Values, wherein he describes his reticulated model. He believed that methods change because he viewed an individual scientist’s goals as being a major contributing force to the formulation of scientific methods. This view was against beliefs commonly held among philosophers of science that methods do not change. By 1988, his beliefs on method change became slightly less clear. In Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (1988), it appears as though he is defending a static view of methods. Laudan co-authored a series of papers which described a static method, however, the view of unchanging methods is nonetheless present in this work. As such, one can draw two conclusions: either he changed his view on dynamic methods, or he merely did not object to the static method being assumed in the work. Judging by how closely his 1988 work is dated to Science and Values, it is in all likelihood the latter option. |
=== Laudan on Scientific Rationality === | === Laudan on Scientific Rationality === | ||
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==== The Covariance Fallacy ==== | ==== The Covariance Fallacy ==== | ||
| − | The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that | + | The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states the assumption that “the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”
The Covariance Fallacy comes in two forms. |
| − | Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between | + | Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientific beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, if two scientists disagree in the Kuhnian tradition, where each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards, it stands to reason that the scientists belong to different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe. |
| − | Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals. | + | Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given set of scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals. |
==== The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates: A Model of Rational Consensus Formation ==== | ==== The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates: A Model of Rational Consensus Formation ==== | ||
| − | This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a | + | This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a scientific phenomenon to what constitutes evidence for a theory. An example of a disagreement at the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, with Newton believing in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also different levels of resolution: Methodological for Factual, Axiological for Methodological and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve a dispute, the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can be resolved there. Laudan suggests that this is the model according to which it is understood how scientists resolve disputes prior to positing his reticulated model. |
==== Goal Evaluation ==== | ==== Goal Evaluation ==== | ||
| − | Laudan’s first distinct reason for refuting a goal is that the goal is seen as | + | Laudan’s first distinct reason for refuting a goal is that the goal is seen as utopian and unrealizable. He gives three types of utopianism: demonstrable utopianism, semantic utopianism, and epistemic utopianism. |
| − | * Demonstrable: The Demonstrable utopianism amounts to when | + | * Demonstrable: The Demonstrable utopianism amounts to when cognitive goals are not possibly achievable because of the laws of nature or our understanding of logic. |
| − | * Semantic: Semantic Utopianism is exemplified when scientists state goals that cannot be characterized in “succinct and cogent way”; that is to say the goals they state can be imprecise and ambiguous. | + | * Semantic: Semantic Utopianism is exemplified when scientists state goals that cannot be characterized in a “succinct and cogent way”; that is to say, the goals they state can be imprecise and ambiguous. |
| − | * Epistemic: Epistemic Utopianism is adhered to when those | + | * Epistemic: Epistemic Utopianism is adhered to when those seeking a goal can clearly define that goal, but cannot show it is not utopian. |
| − | Laudan’s second reason for refuting a goal is when it is not congruent with its implicit and explicit components. | + | Laudan’s second reason for refuting a goal is when it is not congruent with its implicit and explicit components. Such a discontinuity can occur when a person creating a theory fails to recognize certain consequences of the theory. As such, what is assumed to be his goal is actually an unrecognized consequence. Laudan elaborates, “Since virtually any action has indefinitely many consequences…[t]here is always some doubt about which, if any, of these consequences were the one the agent intended to bring about and which were in effect, just incidental or inadvertent side effects of his actions.” The fact that an agent can be unaware of unseen goals is further compounded by the fact that in some cases the agent is simply unaware of what their goals are, or they may seek to hide their goals from the community. |
=== Laudan's Reticulated Model === | === Laudan's Reticulated Model === | ||
| − | The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where methods | + | The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where the theories, methods and aims of science are all changeable. One aspect of having changeable theories, methods and aims is that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for engaging in scientific inquiry. Accordingly, there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of having multiple goals is that the goals which meet the requirements of the model may be mutually incompatible. |
| − | To demonstrate | + | To demonstrate incompatibility between two goals, consider the following example of Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Though Goal 2 is rather extreme, it makes the claim that nature is not real. Goal 1, on the other hand, implicitly assumes nature's existence. The two goals are incompatible as they strive to prove opposite claims: one cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is assumed nature does exist. |
| − | The model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore the reticulated model allows for progress in science. | + | The reticulated model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore, the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Here, progress means “a certain sequence of theories [that] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal.” As long as scientists are moving closer to their goals, then science can be said to be progressing. However, science does not require progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing that compels us to make our judgements of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are various. An implication that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science is that the apparent progressiveness of science depends on the value metric of the scientific community in question. |
== Criticisms & New Directions == | == Criticisms & New Directions == | ||
| − | In 1988, [[John Worrall]] responded to Laudan’s ''Science and Values'' in a paper titled "The Value of Fixed Methodology" (1988.) | + | In 1988, [[John Worrall]] responded to Laudan’s ''Science and Values'' in a paper titled "The Value of Fixed Methodology" (1988.), attempting to demonstrate how the reticulated model was incorrect. In the paper, Worrall argued that when Laudan claims methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change is real. Implicit methodology to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary. |
| − | In 1989 Laudan | + | In 1989 Laudan replied to Worrall’s criticism in "If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it" (1989). There, Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable. |
| − | Worrall | + | In turn, Worrall replied to Laudan in his "Fix it and be Damned" (1989). Worrall claimed that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science. |
| − | The idea that methods of science change but do so in a rational fashion is one of Laudan's lasting contributions. | + | The idea that methods of science change but do so in a rational fashion is one of Laudan's lasting contributions to the philosophy of science. |
== Related Articles == | == Related Articles == | ||
Revision as of 02:06, 2 March 2016
Larry Laudan is an American philosopher who contributed to the philosophy of science in the 1970s and 80s. He wrote many works, including Progress and its Problems (1977), Science and Hypothesis (1981) and Science and Values (1984). Laudan’s most notable contribution to the study of scientific change is the idea that scientific methods change, representing a departure from the tradition of Kuhnian “paradigms.” Laudan presented his reticulated model as an explanation for how methods can change and he defended this view from criticisms by prominent colleagues like John Worrall.
Contents
Historical Context
Prior to Laudan’s contribution to the discourse on scientific change, the Kuhnian tradition was the prevailing approach to the topic. In this preceding tradition, methods were seen as fixed to the paradigm in which they were utilized. Theories were also seemingly fixed to the paradigm in which they were discovered.
Main Contributions to the Philosophy of Science
Laudan on the Changeability of Method
Early views
Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part of the changing nature of science.
Later views
Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. He first subscribes to this view in his 1984 work Science and Values, wherein he describes his reticulated model. He believed that methods change because he viewed an individual scientist’s goals as being a major contributing force to the formulation of scientific methods. This view was against beliefs commonly held among philosophers of science that methods do not change. By 1988, his beliefs on method change became slightly less clear. In Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (1988), it appears as though he is defending a static view of methods. Laudan co-authored a series of papers which described a static method, however, the view of unchanging methods is nonetheless present in this work. As such, one can draw two conclusions: either he changed his view on dynamic methods, or he merely did not object to the static method being assumed in the work. Judging by how closely his 1988 work is dated to Science and Values, it is in all likelihood the latter option.
Laudan on Scientific Rationality
The Covariance Fallacy
The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states the assumption that “the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.” The Covariance Fallacy comes in two forms. Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientific beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, if two scientists disagree in the Kuhnian tradition, where each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards, it stands to reason that the scientists belong to different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe. Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given set of scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.
The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates: A Model of Rational Consensus Formation
This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a scientific phenomenon to what constitutes evidence for a theory. An example of a disagreement at the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, with Newton believing in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also different levels of resolution: Methodological for Factual, Axiological for Methodological and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve a dispute, the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can be resolved there. Laudan suggests that this is the model according to which it is understood how scientists resolve disputes prior to positing his reticulated model.
Goal Evaluation
Laudan’s first distinct reason for refuting a goal is that the goal is seen as utopian and unrealizable. He gives three types of utopianism: demonstrable utopianism, semantic utopianism, and epistemic utopianism.
- Demonstrable: The Demonstrable utopianism amounts to when cognitive goals are not possibly achievable because of the laws of nature or our understanding of logic.
- Semantic: Semantic Utopianism is exemplified when scientists state goals that cannot be characterized in a “succinct and cogent way”; that is to say, the goals they state can be imprecise and ambiguous.
- Epistemic: Epistemic Utopianism is adhered to when those seeking a goal can clearly define that goal, but cannot show it is not utopian.
Laudan’s second reason for refuting a goal is when it is not congruent with its implicit and explicit components. Such a discontinuity can occur when a person creating a theory fails to recognize certain consequences of the theory. As such, what is assumed to be his goal is actually an unrecognized consequence. Laudan elaborates, “Since virtually any action has indefinitely many consequences…[t]here is always some doubt about which, if any, of these consequences were the one the agent intended to bring about and which were in effect, just incidental or inadvertent side effects of his actions.” The fact that an agent can be unaware of unseen goals is further compounded by the fact that in some cases the agent is simply unaware of what their goals are, or they may seek to hide their goals from the community.
Laudan's Reticulated Model
The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where the theories, methods and aims of science are all changeable. One aspect of having changeable theories, methods and aims is that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for engaging in scientific inquiry. Accordingly, there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of having multiple goals is that the goals which meet the requirements of the model may be mutually incompatible.
To demonstrate incompatibility between two goals, consider the following example of Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Though Goal 2 is rather extreme, it makes the claim that nature is not real. Goal 1, on the other hand, implicitly assumes nature's existence. The two goals are incompatible as they strive to prove opposite claims: one cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is assumed nature does exist.
The reticulated model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore, the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Here, progress means “a certain sequence of theories [that] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal.” As long as scientists are moving closer to their goals, then science can be said to be progressing. However, science does not require progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing that compels us to make our judgements of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are various. An implication that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science is that the apparent progressiveness of science depends on the value metric of the scientific community in question.
Criticisms & New Directions
In 1988, John Worrall responded to Laudan’s Science and Values in a paper titled "The Value of Fixed Methodology" (1988.), attempting to demonstrate how the reticulated model was incorrect. In the paper, Worrall argued that when Laudan claims methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change is real. Implicit methodology to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary.
In 1989 Laudan replied to Worrall’s criticism in "If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it" (1989). There, Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.
In turn, Worrall replied to Laudan in his "Fix it and be Damned" (1989). Worrall claimed that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science.
The idea that methods of science change but do so in a rational fashion is one of Laudan's lasting contributions to the philosophy of science.
Related Articles
Notes
Donovan, Arthur L., ed. Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Laudan, Larry. "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 3 (1989): 369-75. Laudan, Larry. Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Laudan, Larry. Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Worrall, John. "The Value of a Fixed Method." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 2 (1988): 263-75. Worrall, John. "Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 3 (1989): 376-88.
Authors
Stephen Watt, 2015
