Larry Laudan

Larry Laudan is an American philosopher who contributed to the study of philosophy of science in the 1970s and 80s. He wrote many works notably, Progress and its Problems (1977), Science and Hypothesis (1981) and Science and Values (1984). Larry Laudan’s most notable contribution is the idea that scientific methods change, representing a departure from the tradition of Kuhnian “paradigms.” Laudan presents his reticulated model as an explanation for how methods can change and he defended this view from the criticisms made by notable colleagues like John Worrall.

Historical Context

Prior to Laudan’s contribution to the discourse on scientific change, the Kuhnian tradition was the prevailing approach to the topic. In this preceding tradition, methods were seen as fixed to the paradigm in which they were utilized. Theories were also seemingly fixed to the paradigm in which they were discovered.

Main Contributions to the Philosophy of Science

Laudan on the Changeability of Method

Early views

Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part to the changing nature of science.

Later views

Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. In his 1984 work Science and Values he describes his reticulated model, which serves as a demonstration of his belief that scientific methods change. He believed this because he viewed individual scientist’s goals as being a major contributing force to the formulation of scientific methods. This view was against the commonly held belief in the community that methods of science do not change. By 1988, his beliefs on method change became slightly less clear. In Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (1988), it appears as though he is defending a static method. Laudan was a co-author of a series of papers which stated belef in this static method, however, the view of unchanging methods is nonetheless present in this work. As such, one can draw two conclusions: either, he changed his view on dynamic methods or he merely did not object to the static method being assumed in the work. Judging by how closely his 1988 work is dated to Science and Values, it is in all likelihood the latter option.

Laudan on Scientific Rationality

The Covariance Fallacy

The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that it, “[…] assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”
 Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, in the Kuhnian tradition, each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are in different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe. Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.

The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates: A Model of Rational Consensus Formation

This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a given scientific phenomena to what constitutes evidence of a theory. An example of a disagreement of the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, in where Newton believed in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also levels of resolution: Methodological for Factual, Axiological for Methodological and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve the disputes the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can work in the higher level. Laudan posits that this is the structure for how scientists resolve disputes prior to his reticulated method.

Goal Evaluation

Laudan’s first distinct reason for refuting a goal is that the goal is seen as being utopian and unrealizable. He gives three types of utopianism: demonstrable utopianism, semantic utopianism, and epistemic utopianism.

• Demonstrable: The Demonstrable utopianism amounts to when the cognitive goals are not possible to achieve due to the laws of nature or our understanding of logic.
• Semantic: Semantic Utopianism is exemplified when scientists state goals that cannot be characterized in “succinct and cogent way”; that is to say the goals they state can be imprecise and ambiguous.
• Epistemic: Epistemic Utopianism is adhered to when those who are seeking the goal can give a clear definition of their goal but they cannot show it is not utopian.

Laudan’s second reason for refuting a goal is when it is not congruent with its implicit and explicit components. This discontinuity can result when a person creating a theory fails to recognize certain consequences of the theory. As such, what is assumed to be his goal is actually an unrecognized consequence. Laudan elaborates, “Since virtually any action has indefinitely many consequences…[t]here is always some doubt about which, if any, of these consequences were the one the agent intended to bring about and which were in effect, just incidental or inadvertent side effects of his actions.” The fact that an agent can be unaware of unseen goals is further compounded by the fact that in some cases the agent is simply unaware of what their goals are, or they may seek to hide their goals from the community.

Laudan's Reticulated Model

The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where methods, theories and aims of science are all changeable. One aspect of having changeable; theories, methods and aims is that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for why someone would want to engage in scientific inquiry and because of this there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of having multiple goals is that the goals which meet the requirements of the model may be mutually incompatible.

To demonstrate the incompatibility that two goals can have let, consider two scientists possessing different goals, Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Now Goal 2 is obviously rather extreme but Goal 2 suggests that nature is not real, where Goal 1 assumes natures existence. These two views are incompatible as they both strive to prove opposite claims. One cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is assumed nature does exist.

The model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Progress being, “a certain sequence of theories [that] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal states.” As long as progress, relative to goals, occurs then it can be said to progressing. However, science does not have to progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing that compels us to make our judgements of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are various. Implications that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science are the apparent progressiveness of science is dependent on the value metric of the given scientific community in question.

Criticisms & New Directions

In 1988, John Worrall responded to Laudan’s Science and Values in a paper titled "The Value of Fixed Methodology" (1988.) Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that when Laudan claims, methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change is real. Implicit methodology to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary.

In 1989 Laudan replies to Worrall’s criticism in "If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it" (1989). Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.

Worrall replies to Laudan in his "Fix it and be Damned" (1989). Worrall claims that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science.

The idea that methods of science change but do so in a rational fashion is one of Laudan's lasting contributions.

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Notes

Donovan, Arthur L., ed. Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Laudan, Larry. "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 3 (1989): 369-75. Laudan, Larry. Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Laudan, Larry. Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Worrall, John. "The Value of a Fixed Method." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 2 (1988): 263-75. Worrall, John. "Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 3 (1989): 376-88.

Authors

Stephen Watt, 2015