List of Open Questions

Seminar 2016

TODO: These questions should be incorporated in their respective articles.

• It is a historical fact that methods and methodologies can be present in the same mosaic despite being inconsistent. This is not a problem for the TSC, since the Zeroth Law (reformulated as the Law of Compatibility) allows for inconsistent elements to exist in the same mosaic. However, a historical question remains as to how the compatibility criteria of a given mosaic allows of the co-existence of inconsistent methods and methodologies. How example, how is the hypothetico-deductive method compatible with an inductivist methodology?
• Has our criteria of compatibility, which accepts inconsistencies, become vacuous or trivial? (Jennifer Whyte, 2016)
• There is currently an open question regarding the status of technological knowledge in the mosaic, and whether they should be formulated as “accepted” or “useful” beliefs. (Sean Cohmer, 2015). In addition, we can ask how technological research tools relate to employed methods. Currently, according to the TSC, knowledge concerning technical tools takes the forms of accepted beliefs, of the kind “telescopes are useful tools for examining distant celestial bodies”. This in turn leads to the employment of telescopes as a method for examining celestial bodies. However, are there technological tools that are used independently of any method? (Paul Patton, 2016) One possibility might be the technique of brainstorming: we commonly use it as a research technique, but don’t seem to formulate it as a method. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• What is the relationship between individuals and mosaics? Can an individual ever be considered the bearer of a mosaic? (Kevin Zheng, 2016) If so, then we are presented with two possibilities: either the definition of “community” is reformulated to allow for a community to be comprised of only one person, or the definition of “mosaic” should be changed to include the possibility that an individual can bear a mosaic. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• How should we define the term “law” in the context of the TSC? Barseghyan loosely defines “law” as a regularity that applies to everything in a given ontology. However, this seems to differ from current usage of the term. For instance, Evolutionary Biology is not considered a law, and yet it does explain regularities in nature. Is this a problem? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• If something like Evolutionary Biology has predictive power in virtue of explaining past regularities, does this imply that the TSC, which also explains past regularities, does or should as well? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• Are there in fact philosophical communities, or is there always too much disagreement? Are these disagreements the result of acceptance criteria which are too strict, or too vague? The answer to this question would require historical analysis. (Jennifer Whyte, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• The TSC states that the choice of relevant facts is guided by our existing theories. Is it also the case that questions/problems in science become relevant because of existing theories? (Nick Overgaard, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016) Before we answer this question, it is important to note that a prior question exists concerning the status of questions/problems in the mosaic: are they separate entities, or can they be formulated as beliefs?
• In what circumstances can the views of an individual scientist be indicative of the views of their community? For example, can a historical analysis of Giordano Bruno’s belief in heliocentricism and the opposition he received from other natural philosophers shed light on the geocentric beliefs of his community? (Jennifer Whyte, Jacob MacKinnon, Joshua Payne Smith, 2016)
• Is it possible for a community to say that they do not accept a theory, but in reality they do? In other words, what is the status of ‘tacit knowledge’ in the TSC? Can we find historical cases of situations like this? (Jaqueline Sereda, 2016)
• Can we apply the "accepted/used/pursued" distinction to methods? If so, this might help us in our analysis of how normative propositions (especially ethical propositions) affect method employment. For example, a method deemed unethical may not be used, but still accepted as being effective for theory assessment.
• The Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem says that employment of methods is not always necessarily a result of the acceptance of new theories. But surely all methods (even concrete implementations of abstract requirements) are employed simultaneously with the acceptance of a descriptive proposition which states that that method is effective. Does this poses a challenge towards the Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
• The TSC currently states that the employment of a new concrete method cannot lead to the rejection of another employed method. However, it seems conceivable that method X might cease to be employed when a new method is employed which is thought to be more effective than X. Are there any examples of this happening in the history of science? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
• Scientists often seem to rely on practical propositions when conduction research— e.g “when conducting an experiment, chose the cheapest technique capable of producing acceptable results”. What is the status of practical propositions like these in the mosaic? Are they normative theories, or a separate entity? How are they accepted into the mosaic, and how do they change through time? How do they affect other elements of the mosaic? Do they affect method employment? (Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, 2016)
• Currently, the existence of a mosaic split is the only way for us as historians of science to identify a case of inconclusive theory assessment. However, it is logically possible (given the Laws of Scientific Change) for the result of theory assessment to be inconclusive and yet the entire community chooses to accept the theory. In this case, no mosaic split would occur. Is it possible to identify these cases in our historical analysis? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• Are there really instances of necessary theory acceptance, or is ever case of theory assessment inconclusive to a degree? If there are necessary cases, is it possible for us as historians to show decisively that a theory was necessarily accepted rather than accepted after an inconclusive assessment? We can ask the same question with regard to mosaic splits: are necessary splits theoretically possible, or are all mosaic splits the result of inconclusive assessment? And if they are possible, can we ever as historians detect them? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• Given two geographically isolated communities with different sets of beliefs that then undergo change and end up with the same set of beliefs (without any inter-communication between the communities), do they become one community? (Jennifer Whyte, Hakob Barseghyan)