List of Open Questions

Seminar 2016

TODO: These questions should be incorporated in their respective articles.

• It is a historical fact that methods and methodologies can be present in the same mosaic despite being inconsistent. This is not a problem for the TSC, since the Zeroth Law (reformulated as the Law of Compatibility) allows for inconsistent elements to exist in the same mosaic. However, a historical question remains as to how the compatibility criteria of a given mosaic allows of the co-existence of inconsistent methods and methodologies. For example, how is the hypothetico-deductive method compatible with an inductivist methodology?
• Has our criteria of compatibility, which accepts inconsistencies, become vacuous or trivial? (Jennifer Whyte, 2016)
• There is currently an open question regarding the status of technological knowledge in the mosaic, and whether they should be formulated as “accepted” or “useful” beliefs. (Sean Cohmer, 2015). In addition, we can ask how technological research tools relate to employed methods. Currently, according to the TSC, knowledge concerning technical tools takes the forms of accepted beliefs, of the kind “telescopes are useful tools for examining distant celestial bodies”. This in turn leads to the employment of telescopes as a method for examining celestial bodies. However, are there technological tools that are used independently of any method? (Paul Patton, 2016) One possibility might be the technique of brainstorming: we commonly use it as a research technique, but don’t seem to formulate it as a method. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• What is the relationship between individuals and mosaics? Can an individual ever be considered the bearer of a mosaic? (Kevin Zheng, 2016) If so, then we are presented with two possibilities: either the definition of “community” is reformulated to allow for a community to be comprised of only one person, or the definition of “mosaic” should be changed to include the possibility that an individual can bear a mosaic. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• How should we define the term “law” in the context of the TSC? Barseghyan loosely defines “law” as a regularity that applies to everything in a given ontology. However, this seems to differ from current usage of the term. For instance, Evolutionary Biology is not considered a law, and yet it does explain regularities in nature. Is this a problem? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• If something like Evolutionary Biology has predictive power in virtue of explaining past regularities, does this imply that the TSC, which also explains past regularities, does or should as well? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• Are there in fact philosophical communities, or is there always too much disagreement? Are these disagreements the result of acceptance criteria which are too strict, or too vague? The answer to this question would require historical analysis. (Jennifer Whyte, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• The TSC states that the choice of relevant facts is guided by our existing theories. Is it also the case that questions/problems in science become relevant because of existing theories? (Nick Overgaard, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016) Before we answer this question, it is important to note that a prior question exists concerning the status of questions/problems in the mosaic: are they separate entities, or can they be formulated as beliefs?
• In what circumstances can the views of an individual scientist be indicative of the views of their community? For example, can a historical analysis of Giordano Bruno’s belief in heliocentricism and the opposition he received from other natural philosophers shed light on the geocentric beliefs of his community? (Jennifer Whyte, Jacob MacKinnon, Joshua Payne Smith, 2016)
• Is it possible for a community to say that they do not accept a theory, but in reality they do? In other words, what is the status of ‘tacit knowledge’ in the TSC? Can we find historical cases of situations like this? (Jaqueline Sereda, 2016)
• Can we apply the "accepted/used/pursued" distinction to methods? If so, this might help us in our analysis of how normative propositions (especially ethical propositions) affect method employment. For example, a method deemed unethical may not be used, but still accepted as being effective for theory assessment.
• The Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem says that employment of methods is not always necessarily a result of the acceptance of new theories. But surely all methods (even concrete implementations of abstract requirements) are employed simultaneously with the acceptance of a descriptive proposition which states that that method is effective. Does this poses a challenge towards the Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
• The TSC currently states that the employment of a new concrete method cannot lead to the rejection of another employed method. However, it seems conceivable that method X might cease to be employed when a new method is employed which is thought to be more effective than X. Are there any examples of this happening in the history of science? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
• Scientists often seem to rely on practical propositions when conduction research— e.g “when conducting an experiment, chose the cheapest technique capable of producing acceptable results”. What is the status of practical propositions like these in the mosaic? Are they normative theories, or a separate entity? How are they accepted into the mosaic, and how do they change through time? How do they affect other elements of the mosaic? Do they affect method employment? (Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, 2016)
• Currently, the existence of a mosaic split is the only way for us as historians of science to identify a case of inconclusive theory assessment. However, it is logically possible (given the Laws of Scientific Change) for the result of theory assessment to be inconclusive and yet the entire community chooses to accept the theory. In this case, no mosaic split would occur. Is it possible to identify these cases in our historical analysis? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• Are there really instances of necessary theory acceptance, or is ever case of theory assessment inconclusive to a degree? If there are necessary cases, is it possible for us as historians to show decisively that a theory was necessarily accepted rather than accepted after an inconclusive assessment? We can ask the same question with regard to mosaic splits: are necessary splits theoretically possible, or are all mosaic splits the result of inconclusive assessment? And if they are possible, can we ever as historians detect them? (Paul Patton, 2016)
• Imagine two geographically isolated communities with different sets of beliefs. If these communities were to undergo change (without any inter-communication between them) and end up with the same set of beliefs, would they become a single community? (Jennifer Whyte, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• We define a knowledge-producing community as being an epistemic community. Does a community such as a football team— which does not have a collective intentionality to produce knowledge, but may produce some as a by-product (e.g knowledge on the best strategies to win a football game)— count as an epistemic community?
• Is there a difference between producing knowledge and acquiring knowledge? If there is a difference, then is a community that holds a mosaic a knowledge-producing community or a knowledge-acquiring community, or do both kinds of communities hold mosaics?
• Currently, the Necessary Element theorem states that the method “only accept the best available theories” is a necessary element for any mosaic. Are there any necessary theories in addition to this method? It seems as though there must be some necessary analytic theories, because any scientific enterprise assumes a whole network of analytic propositions. Are there any necessary synthetic propositions? If so, this could mean that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• Although not explicitly stated by the TSC, it seems obvious that in order to become a contender for acceptance, a theory must meet the requirements of the demarcation criteria outlined by the employed method of the time. Given this, is it possible for employed methods to shape theory construction? In addition, it seems as though other elements of the mosaic play a part in shaping theory construction. For example, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics could not have been built without prior acceptance of the formalism of Hilbert Spaces in mathematics. In what way does our mosaic impose constraints on theory construction? (Jennifer Whyte, 2016)
• The TSC currently relies on a vague and intuitive notion of what constitutes a socio-cultural factor; e.g, personal interests, political motivations, economic factors, etc. However, in order to properly analyze the effect of socio-cultural factors on scientific change, a more rigorous definition is needed. How, then, should we define “socio-cultural factors” in the context of the TSC? Furthermore, is the word “factor” really acceptable, since the term already seems to presuppose that one element is influencing another? Perhaps the term “socio-cultural phenomenon” is preferable. (Zach Brown, Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
• Can there be delegation authority to tools, or other material objects? Imagine a community which takes all of its scientific knowledge from a giant manuscript. Is the community delegating authority to the long-dead writers of this manuscript, or are they delegating to the book itself? When scientists use an instrument in an experiment, who are they delegating authority to? Standard research practice says that when using an instrument in an experiment, the scientist should cite the manufacturers of the instrument in their research paper. Does this indicate that authority is being delegated to the manufacturers rather than the tool itself? If authority can be delegated to a material object, does this mean that the object is the bearer of a mosaic? (Nick Overgaard, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• The Contextual Appraisal Theorem defines “historical context” as “scientific historical context” (i.e, the set of accepted theories and employed methods held at time t). When discussing the influence of socio-cultural factors on the mosaic, however, we shift to a conception of “historical context” which includes non-scientific socio-cultural phenomenon. Should the idea of “historical context” be consistent through the TSC, and if so, how should we define it? Will this alter the Contextual Appraisal Theorem? (Stephen Watt, 2016)
• Can a method become employed by being the deductive consequence of an already accepted methodology? How would this affect the Methodology Can Shape Methods theorem, which states that methodology can only affect the employment of methods which are implementations of some more abstract requirement? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
• Is there any connection between accepted methodology and theory pursuit? For example, string theory is not given much funding in comparison to other pursed theories; this is likely because string theory, which cannot be falsified, goes against the falsificationist methodology widely accepted in the physics community. (Jennifer Whyte, Jacob MacKinnon, Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)

Copied from Scientific Mosaic Page

• What is the status of “problems” or “questions” in the mosaic? Are they separate ontological entities, or can they be formulated as theories? (Nick Overgaard & Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• What is the status of “models” in the mosaic? Can they be reduced to theories and/or methods? A solution to this question has yet to be proposed.
• What is the status of technological knowledge in the mosaic? Can a proposition that deals with technological knowledge (e.g. “X is a useful bridge building technology”) be accepted, or merely used? (Sean Cohmer, 2015). A solution has yet to be proposed.
• How do disciplinary boundaries exist in the mosaic?
• What is the relationship between individuals and mosaics? Can an individual ever be considered the bearer of a mosaic? (Kevin Zheng, 2016) If so, then we are presented with two possibilities: either the definition of “community” is reformulated to allow for a community to be comprised of only one person, or the definition of “mosaic” should be changed to include the possibility that an individual can bear a mosaic. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
• In order to become a contender for acceptance, a theory must meet the requirements of the demarcation criteria outlined by the employed method of the time. Can employed methods shape theory construction? In addition, it seems as though other elements of the mosaic play a part in shaping theory construction. For example, the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics could not have been built without prior acceptance of the formalism of Hilbert Spaces in mathematics. In what way does our mosaic impose constraints on theory construction? (Jennifer Whyte, 2016)