Mechanism of Mosaic Split

{{Topic |Question=What happens to a mosaic when two or more similar theories are considered equally acceptable by a scientific community? Under what conditions does a mosaic split occur? What happens to a mosaic when it is transformed into two or more mosaics? |Topic Type=Descriptive |Description=There have been many cases in the history of science when one community divided into two or more communities. These distinct communities would then have their own distinct theories and methods. For example, consider the case outlined by Barseghyan] of the two scientific mosaics that existed among the communities of French and English physicists in the early part of the 18th century, wherein the former accepted the Cartesian physics and the latter accepted Newtonian physics.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 203] We can see by various indicatorspp. 113-120 that the dispute between these two communities was not a simple matter of scientific disagreement within a community such as we might observe in the contemporary dispute between various interpretations of quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen Interpretation is generally regarded as the accepted view 1 but a number of other alternatives are advocated by various individuals within the field. As Barseghyan2 notes on page 202 it this is a perfectly acceptable situation so long as the individuals acknowledge that the accepted theory is that the Copenhagen Interpretation is accepted as the best description of its object. A contender theory might be said to be pursued but this is perfectly consistent with our present understanding of scientific change.

What makes the situation in the case of the 18th century French and English mosaics distinct is that the communities accepted the Cartesian and Newtonian physics as the best description of the physical reality. In this case we justified as regarded these as distinct epistemic communities which each bears its own mosaic. Understanding the mechanism by which this sort of situation occurs is among the goals of a general descriptive theory of scientific change. |Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan, |Formulated Year=2015 |Prehistory=Traditionally the topic of why communities of scientists accept different theories has been an enigma for historians and philosophers of science, although the problem has been known about for some time. In the Categories for example, Aristotle grappled with the question of false belief and how false beliefs came to be acquired, and the significance of the question for science and epistemology.3pp. 289-290 While it is true that we are no longer so interested in the question of false beliefs but are instead interested in the question of divergent beliefs the central question of how different beliefs arise in epistemic communities remains the same.

Pre-Kuhnian philosophers' typical response to divergent community beliefs has largely depended on their views of scientific change more generally. An example of this is the work of Karl Popper. Popper regarded scientific change as being a process of conjectures and refutations, "of boldly proposing theories; of trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful".4p. 68 Thus, Popper's approach suggested that any difference in the beliefs of certain communities could be chalked up to differences either in available knowledge (whether a conjecture had been refuted) or a difference in experimental methods (whether the same criteria were being applied in refutations). The difference between philosophers of science in this period more generally was their views on how science changes; this in turn coloured what factors (or mistakes) present in difference communities were relevant to divergent scientific beliefs. This form of thinking with regards to differences of thought on scientific theories - if not the exact formulation it takes - was generally held by "positivists" or "logical empiricists" and accepted until the historical turn in the 1960s.5p. 4

It was with the emergence of Thomas Kuhn's Structures of Scientific Revolutions in the 1960s that the consensus about divergent beliefs was challenged.6 Kuhn's "revolutionary" approach to scientific change radically diverged from his predecessors. On this view science has periods of normal science wherein the prevailing dogmas and core theories (the paradigm) are unquestioned and science proceeds as a process of puzzle solving; this is followed by a crisis in which mounting anomalies cause scientists to question the theoretical foundations of the paradigm.7 Crises may have no impact on normal science or they may result in a revolution, what Kuhn calls "the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the ensuing battle over its acceptance".7p. 84 The present question of how divergent beliefs arise within communities fits nicely into this framework - a unified community starts by doing normal science, anomalies emerge within the paradigm, and a revolution occurs which splits the community. Subsequent work by philosophers in the field of scientific change would be coloured by the same kind of analysis of the historical record that shaped Kuhn's view of the subject, including the work done by Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, and Larry Laudan.5p. 5

One other approach to divergent community beliefs that deserves mention is the approach taken by the social sciences, namely the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) advanced principally by David Bloor.8 SSK regards scientific activity to be indistinct from other kinds of human social activity and as such and area that falls under the purview of the social sciences.9 As such, any divergence in community beliefs is the result of and explainable by sociological factors that contribute to belief formation. |History=This question was proposed by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015 with the publishing of the Laws of Scientific Change.2 }}