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| − | '''The second law of scientific change''', also known as '''the law of theory acceptance''' states that in order to become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] into the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]], a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time.
| + | #REDIRECT [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)]] |
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| − | == Prehistory ==
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| − | <div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed">
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| − | In his 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]], [[Thomas Kuhn]] supposed that theories, methods, and values formed integrated units which he called paradigms. Kuhn's holism lead him to view scientific change as a kind of gestalt shift, seemingly involving a non-rational leap of faith. Critics charged him with attributing scientific change to "mob psychology". Later, he suggested that scientists are guided by epistemic values in making such choices. He supposed these values were fixed through history [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977)]].
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| − | Past philosophers of science have generally failed to provide a definitive answer concerning the existence of a mechanism that governs transitions from one accepted theory to the next. In regard to theory acceptance, they have often failed to clearly distinguish between "[[Method|method]]" and "[[Methodology|methodology]]"[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 52-61]].
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| − | Both [[Rudolph Carnap]] and [[Karl Popper]] realized the beginnings of a distinction between method and methodology by recognizing that it is the implicit method of a scientific community that is employed in theory assessment instead of its explicit prescriptions. [[Larry Laudan]] also tacitly acknowledged the distinction within his reticulated model by showing that the accepted rules of scientific practice (methodology) were at odds with the actual scientific practice of the time (method)[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]]. However, he then goes on to explicitly criticize a similar distinction accepted by Lakatos and Worrall.
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| − | There has also been a fierce debate among philosophers of science over the status of novel predictions. While, Popper, [[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]] and Musgrave argued for a special status of novel predictions, Hempel, Carnap, and Laudan maintained that, as far as criteria for theory goes, there is no substantial difference between the value of novel predictions and post factual explanations of known facts. Nonetheless, some philosophers have used the lack of novel predictions in past historical episodes as a way to argue against the idea that theories are always accepted when they meet the criteria of the employed method. However this argument is unsound because it assumes that the hypothetico-deductive method was employed in every historical case.
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| − | </div>
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| − | == History ==
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| − | In 2013, Barseghyan initially proposed the second law to explain how [[Theory|theories]] are accepted into a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]. It states that a theory becomes accepted only when it satisfies the [[Method|method]] employed at the time by the [[Scientific Community|scientific community]] in question.
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| − | == Current View ==
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| − | Currently, ''the second law'' retains its initial formulation:[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.129]]
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| − | [[File: The_Second_Law.png |center|321px]]
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| − | Thus, the task of a new theory is to meet the implicit expectations of the community. When the implicit expectations are met, that theory becomes accepted.
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| − | |description=The second law explained by Hakob Barseghyan
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| − | Since it follows from the definition of "[[Method Employment|employed method]]" (a set of implicit rules actually employed in theory assessment), the second law is currently viewed as an analytic proposition. Thus, a theory may violate the [[Methodology|methodology]] to which a [[Scientific Community|scientific community]] explicitly subscribes, but not the actually employed method - a fact true by definition.
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| − | == Open Questions ==
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| − | * Is the second law really a tautology, or does it have some empirical content after all? The Lysenko affair is a prominent example that puts the analyticity of the second law into doubt. Two ways of addressing this issue have so far been proposed, neither of which has been conclusively decided upon:
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| − | # Lysenkoism is accepted into the mosaic, the 2nd law is violated, and as a result must be considered a synthetic proposition.
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| − | # Lysenkoism is in fact accepted into a second mosaic, without violation of the 2nd law, and thus the 2nd law remains an analytic proposition.
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| − | * Is it possible for a community to say that they do not accept a theory, but in reality they do? Are there any historical examples of a case like this?
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| − | * If a theory is accepted in violation of the Second Law, should we ignore this in our historical analysis, or should the TSC attempt to explain these instances?
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| − | * Can we apply the “accepted/used/pursued” distinction to methods?
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| − | == Related Articles ==
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| − | [[Scientific Mosaic]]
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| − | [[Theory]]
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| − | [[Theory Acceptance]]
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| − | [[Method]]
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