Difference between revisions of "The Second Law"
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== Prehistory == | == Prehistory == | ||
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| − | + | Past philosophers of science failed to provide a definitive answer concerning the existence of a mechanism that governs transitions from one accepted theory to the next. In regard to theory acceptance, past philosophers of science have often conflated the terms ‘method’ and ‘methodology.’ | |
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| + | Both Rudolph Carnap and Karl Popper realized the beginnings of a distinction between method and methodology by recognizing that it is the implicit method of a scientific community that is employed in theory assessment instead of its explicit prescriptions. Larry Laudan also acknowledged the distinction within his reticulated model by showing that the accepted rules of scientific practice (methodology) were at odds with the actual scientific practice of the time (method). | ||
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| + | There has also been a fierce debate amongst philosophers of science over the status of novel predictions. While, Popper, Lakatos and Musgrave argued for a special status of novel predictions, Hempel, Carnap and Laudan maintained that, as far as criteria for theory goes, there is no substantial difference between the value of novel predictions and post factual explanations of known facts. Nonetheless, some philosophers have used the lack of novel predictions in past historical episodes as a way to argue against the idea that theories are always accepted when they meet the criteria of the employed method. However this argument is unsound because it assumes that the hypthetico-deductive method was employed in every historical case. | ||
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Revision as of 01:52, 20 March 2016
The second law of scientific change, also known as the law of theory acceptance states that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a theory is assessed by the method actually employed at the time.
Prehistory
Past philosophers of science failed to provide a definitive answer concerning the existence of a mechanism that governs transitions from one accepted theory to the next. In regard to theory acceptance, past philosophers of science have often conflated the terms ‘method’ and ‘methodology.’
Both Rudolph Carnap and Karl Popper realized the beginnings of a distinction between method and methodology by recognizing that it is the implicit method of a scientific community that is employed in theory assessment instead of its explicit prescriptions. Larry Laudan also acknowledged the distinction within his reticulated model by showing that the accepted rules of scientific practice (methodology) were at odds with the actual scientific practice of the time (method).
There has also been a fierce debate amongst philosophers of science over the status of novel predictions. While, Popper, Lakatos and Musgrave argued for a special status of novel predictions, Hempel, Carnap and Laudan maintained that, as far as criteria for theory goes, there is no substantial difference between the value of novel predictions and post factual explanations of known facts. Nonetheless, some philosophers have used the lack of novel predictions in past historical episodes as a way to argue against the idea that theories are always accepted when they meet the criteria of the employed method. However this argument is unsound because it assumes that the hypthetico-deductive method was employed in every historical case.
History
Current View
Open Questions
• Question 1
• Question 2
