Difference between revisions of "The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)"
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| − | These criteria are employed [[method|methods]], and therefore can change over time according to [[The Third Law|the law of method employment]]. They dictate the standard that other theories and methods must meet so as to remain compatible with each other. The compatibility criterion of the contemporary scientific mosaic is believed to be along the lines of a non-explosive paraconsistent logic [[CiteRef::Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2013)]]. This logic allows known contradictions, like the contradiction between signal locality in special relativity and signal non-locality in quantum mechanics to coexist without implying triviality. The compatibility criterion can be understood as a consequence of fallibilism about science. Even a community's best theories are merely truth-like, not strictly true. Our current compatibility criteria appears to be formulated as such. It is very likely that our current compatibility criteria has not always been the one employed. Discovery of the kind of compatibility criteria contained in the current and historical mosaics is an important empirical task for observational scientonomy. | + | These criteria are employed [[method|methods]], and therefore can change over time according to [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the law of method employment]]. They dictate the standard that other theories and methods must meet so as to remain compatible with each other. The compatibility criterion of the contemporary scientific mosaic is believed to be along the lines of a non-explosive paraconsistent logic [[CiteRef::Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2013)]]. This logic allows known contradictions, like the contradiction between signal locality in special relativity and signal non-locality in quantum mechanics to coexist without implying triviality. The compatibility criterion can be understood as a consequence of fallibilism about science. Even a community's best theories are merely truth-like, not strictly true. Our current compatibility criteria appears to be formulated as such. It is very likely that our current compatibility criteria has not always been the one employed. Discovery of the kind of compatibility criteria contained in the current and historical mosaics is an important empirical task for observational scientonomy. |
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | |Resource=Barseghyan (2015) | ||
|Prehistory=The idea that our beliefs should not contradict each other is one of the oldest in philosophy. It can be traced, at least, to the time of Aristotle (384-322 BCE)[[CiteRef::Carnielli and Marcos (2001)]]. In classical logic, it derives from the principle of explosion, which states that a contradiction entails every other sentence. Any system of beliefs that contains a contradiction, since it compels belief in anything and everything, is therefore known as a trivialism. This deceptively simple premise is implicit in most philosophies of science, and in philosophy overall. For this reason it is rarely stated outright within a philosophical or scientific framework. However, the use of contradictions to reject particular theories is important in frameworks as diverse as Isaac Newton’s Four Rules of Scientific Reasoning (non-contradiction is the fourth)[[CiteRef::Newton (1689)]], [[CiteRef::Smith (2007)]] and [[Karl Popper]]’s 'Logic of Scientific Discovery'[[CiteRef::Popper (2005)]]. | |Prehistory=The idea that our beliefs should not contradict each other is one of the oldest in philosophy. It can be traced, at least, to the time of Aristotle (384-322 BCE)[[CiteRef::Carnielli and Marcos (2001)]]. In classical logic, it derives from the principle of explosion, which states that a contradiction entails every other sentence. Any system of beliefs that contains a contradiction, since it compels belief in anything and everything, is therefore known as a trivialism. This deceptively simple premise is implicit in most philosophies of science, and in philosophy overall. For this reason it is rarely stated outright within a philosophical or scientific framework. However, the use of contradictions to reject particular theories is important in frameworks as diverse as Isaac Newton’s Four Rules of Scientific Reasoning (non-contradiction is the fourth)[[CiteRef::Newton (1689)]], [[CiteRef::Smith (2007)]] and [[Karl Popper]]’s 'Logic of Scientific Discovery'[[CiteRef::Popper (2005)]]. | ||
Revision as of 03:05, 5 September 2016
References
- a b c d e f g h i j Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- ^ Carnielli, Walter and Marcos, Joano. (2001) Ex Contradictione Non Sequitur Quodlibet. Bulletin of Advanced Reasoning and Knowledge 1, 89-109.
- ^ Newton, Isaac. (1687) Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy). Pepys, London.
- ^ Smith, George. (2009) Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathmatica. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/newton-principia/.
- ^ Popper, Karl. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.
- ^ Harder, Rory. (2013) Scientific Mosaics and the Law of Consistency. Unpublished manuscript.
- ^ Fine, Aurthur. (2013) The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument in Quantum Theory. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/qt-epr/.
- a b Einstein, Albert; Podolsky, Boris and Rosen, Nathan. (1935) Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete? Physical Review 47, 777-780.
- ^ Priest, Graham; Tanaka, Koji and Weber, Zachary. (2015) Paraconsistent Logic. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/logic-paraconsistent/.
- ^ Bueno et al (1998)
- ^ Meheus (2003)
- ^ Meheus(2003)
- ^ Smith(1988)
- ^ Smith (1988)
