Applicability of Scientonomy to Theories as Models
Is the theory of scientific change applicable to theories construed as sets of models, or in ways that reject their purely formal characterization?
The theory of scientific change currently defines theories as sets of descriptive or normative propositions. This definition is most closely aligned with the syntactical view of theories promulgated by logical empiricists early in the twentieth century.1 Two other competing views of the nature of scientific theories have since been proposed. The semantic view of theories holds that they should be seen as sets of models, as models were defined by Alfred Tarski. The pragmatic view rejects a purely formal characterization of theories and holds them to include sentences, models, problems, examples, skills, practices, analogies, and metaphors, some of which necessarily resist formalization.12 Is the theory of scientific change compatible with these more recent and broader views of theories?
In modern times philosophers have held varied views about how best to express the structure and content of scientific theories and about whether or not they are wholly reducible to sets of propositions.1 For a more complete discussion, see Theory.
|Community||Accepted From||Acceptance Indicators||Still Accepted||Accepted Until||Rejection Indicators|
|Scientonomy||10 March 2017||It was acknowledged as an open question by the Scientonomy Seminar 2017.||Yes|
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This question is a subquestion of Applicability of the Laws of Scientific Change.
This topic is also related to the following topic(s):
- Winther, Rasmus. (2016) The Structure of Scientific Theories. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/structure-scientific-theories/.
- Mormann, Thomas. (2008) Idealization in Cassirer's Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2), 151-181.