Mirkin, Maxim. (2018) The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic. Scientonomy 2, 39-53. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/29645.
|Title||The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic|
|Resource Type||journal article|
In this paper, I argue that there is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly accept theories, technological communities merely use them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal sciences, and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic.
Here are all the theories formulated in Mirkin (2018):
|Explicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)||Definition||Propositional knowledge that has been openly formulated by the agent.||2018|
|Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)||Definition||Not explicit.||2018|
|Explicable-Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)||Definition||Propositional knowledge that hasn’t been openly formulated by the agent.||2018|
|Inexplicable (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)||Definition||Non-propositional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that cannot, even in principle, be formulated as a set of propositions.||2018|
|Explicit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Mirkin-2018)||Descriptive||Explicit is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of explicit.||2018|
|Implicit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Mirkin-2018)||Descriptive||Implicit is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of implicit.||2018|
|Technological Knowledge as Part of Mosaic (Mirkin-2018)||Descriptive||Propositional technological knowledge can be accepted and be part of a mosaic.||2018|
Here are all the modifications suggested in Mirkin (2018):
- Sciento-2018-0011: Accept the three-fold distinction between explicit, explicable-implicit, and inexplicable. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Hakob Barseghyan and Maxim Mirkin on 28 December 2018.1 The modification was accepted on 1 September 2019. The consensus on this modification emerged primarily off-line. It was agreed that "the modification should be accepted".c1 It was also agreed "that the three-fold distinction is to be accepted as it introduces a distinction between explicable-implicit and inexplicable and thus contributes to the clarity of discussions concerning implicit and explicit."c2
- Sciento-2018-0012: Accept that propositional technological knowledge – i.e. technological questions, theories, and methods – can be part of a mosaic. The modification was suggested to Scientonomy community by Maxim Mirkin on 28 December 2018.1 The modification was accepted on 11 February 2020. After a series of mostly off-line discussions, it has been agreed that the modification is to be accepted. It was agreed that "Mirkin's discussion of potential counterarguments [are] convincing".c1 The consensus is that "Mirkin presents arguments that technological knowledge, like scientific knowledge, can be accepted and not just used, and argues that there are no good prior reasons to suppose that technological knowledge would not be explicable using established scientonomic laws or patterns of change".c2 There seem to be "no prima facie reasons why changes in technological knowledge should not obey the same patterns of scientific change",c3 especially given that fact that "there is considerable overlap between science and technology, as when an instrument is used to acquire scientific data, and the trustworthiness of this data must be assessed".c4
- Mirkin, Maxim. (2018) The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic. Scientonomy 2, 39-53. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/29645.