Possibility: The Argument from Social Construction

The Argument from Social Construction is one of the primary particularist arguments against the possible existence of a general theory of scientific change. There are three forms of the Argument from Social Construction, all of which share the central concept that science is a product of social interactions and only possible in a specific type of environment. Such an interpretation of science holds that, since science is a social construct, then a general theory of scientific change cannot exist.

Pre-History

The notion that a general theory of scientific change can exist challenges the particularist approach to the history of science. Proponents of this approach included philosophers such as Shapin1 and Kuhn2, who would hold that, since each social interaction that qualifies as science is unique, and that the changes between such interactions would also be specific to the circumstances that brought them about, there could be no general theory of scientific change. Related to this concept is the division between the nomothetic sciences which, are concerned with discovering universal laws, and the idiographic sciences, which are concerned with describing features particular to a given individual phenomenon.3 It was not until a diagnosis by Hacking4 that the the multi-headed nature of the social constructivist argument, and the problems it raised for the possibility of crafting a general theory of scientific change were clarified.

History

The Argument from Social Construction and its more specific formulations were first proposed in the initial version of the TSC as follows:

Contingency Thesis

The contingency thesis states that a scientific mosaic’s form, being a social construct, is not strictly deterministic. Rather, it proposes that there are a number of different mosaics that could have been produced in its stead.

Nominalist Thesis

The nominalist thesis holds an instrumentalist view of science. It is instrumentalist, because it views all the propositions within a scientific mosaic to not be reflective of the inner structure of the world.5 Furthermore, the theories of science cannot reflect how the world truly is, according to the nominalist stance, since the world-as-it-is lacks any inherent structure at all.

Reducibility Thesis

The reducibility thesis can be broken down into three separate claims, all of which hold that the a general theory of scientific change must necessarily be a set of axioms and theorems that would describe, and thus be reducible to, an underlying set of social interactions.

Ontological (Metaphysical) Reducibility Thesis

The ontological reducibility thesis holds that higher levels of organization do not necessitate the introduction of new conceptual entities outside of what its lower levels are comprised of. With regards to the TSC, this thesis states that the subject matter of a general theory of scientific change is ontologically reducible to social constructs.5

Epistemic (Theoretical) Reducibility Thesis

The epistemic reducibility thesis presupposes the ontological reducibility thesis to be true, while making the further claim that the laws of any TSC would be necessarily reducible to more fundamental sociological laws.

Methodological (Pragmatic) Reducibility Thesis

The methodological reducibility thesis can be broken down into weak and strong formulations. The weak version claims that the process of scientific change can be fruitfully investigated at the level of social interactions. The strong version of the thesis claims that the process of scientific change can only be fruitfully investigated at the level of social interactions, interests, conflicts etc. Both versions prioritize sociologically-based examinations of scientific change, with the strong thesis making the bolder claim that there are no alternative ways to fruitfully approach the subject.

Current View

Currently, the aforementioned social constructivist arguments can be confronted with the following solutions:

Against the Contingency Thesis

The contingency thesis does not hinder the possibility of a general theory of scientific change, as it has never proven robust enough to fully preclude the possibility of a general theory. Strictly deterministic growth is not a necessary condition for a general theory of scientific change to be possible.

Against the Nominalist Thesis

The nominalist thesis does not pose a threat to the existence of a general theory of scientific change, because its instrumentalist critique could be levelled against any other well-established science. While the nominalist thesis cannot be disproven, history has shown that it is also not fatal to the formulation of general theories about the world.

Against the Reducibility Thesis

Solutions to each specified formulation of the Reducibility Thesis are as follows:

Against the Ontological Reducibility Thesis

Nearly all other well-established sciences are characterized by their ability to make generalizations about phenomena that can be reduced to a lower level of composition. This thesis is no more threatening to the creation of a general theory of scientific change that it is to any other science.

Against the Epistemic Reducibility Thesis

There are two major points against the epistemic reducibility thesis. First, there is the lack of a clear meaning behind “reduction” here at the theoretical level. Second, even if the epistemic reduction proposed by this thesis were possible, it would still have to furthermore prevent a proposed TSC from occurring.5 Lack of support for this thesis prevents it from barring the TSC from being possible.

Against the Methodological Reducibility Thesis

Since the weak version of the methodological reducibility thesis only condones investigating scientific change at the sociological level without invalidating other approaches, it can safely be ignored.

When confronted with the strong version of the methodological reducibility thesis, it can be seen that, acceptance of it would invalidate the methodological premise of other well-established sciences since they typically are fruitfully studied at levels of organization other than those directly below it. Due to the fact that these sciences progress unhindered, it is safe to say that a general theory of scientific change would not, in principle, be faced with such an obstacle.

Open Questions

• Are the laws of scientific change reducible to some sociological or psychological laws?

No solutions have been proposed at this point.

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• Possibility: Argument from the Changeability of Scientific Method
• Argument from Nothing Permanent
• Argument from Bad Track Record