Supertypes of Compatibility

What are the supertypes of compatibility?

In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Patrick Fraser and Ameer Sarwar in 2018. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community. The following supertype of Compatibility is currently accepted in Scientonomy:

• Epistemic Stance

Scientonomic History

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this question (it includes all the instances when the question was accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by a community):

Community	Accepted From	Acceptance Indicators	Still Accepted	Accepted Until	Rejection Indicators
Scientonomy	28 December 2018	Supertypes of Compatibility became accepted by virtue of the acceptance of Compatibility. The question became accepted with the publication of the paper by Fraser & Sarwar.	Yes

All Theories

The following answers have been added to this encyclopedia:

Theory	Formulation	Formulated In
Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)	Compatibility is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of compatibility.	2018

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Accepted Theories

The following theories have been accepted as answers to this question:

Community	Theory	Accepted From	Accepted Until
Scientonomy	Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)	1 October 2021

Suggested Modifications

According to our records, there have been no suggested modifications on this topic.

Current View

In Scientonomy, the following supertype of Compatibility is currently accepted:

• Epistemic Stance

Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) states: "Compatibility is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of compatibility."

According to Fraser and Sarwar, "compatibility is a distinct epistemic stance that agents can take towards elements".1p.70 They show this by arguing that it is possible to take the stance of compatibility towards a pair of elements without taking any of the other stances towards these elements. Thus, compatibility is distinct from acceptance, since two elements need not be in the same mosaic, or even accepted by any agent to be considered, in principle, compatible. For example, an epistemic agent may consider Ptolemaic astrology compatible with Aristotelian natural philosophy without accepting either Ptolemaic astrology or Aristotelian natural philosophy. Compatibility is also different from use, since a pair of theories can be considered compatible regardless of whether any of them is considered useful. For instance, one can consider quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology compatible, while finding only the former useful. Finally, compatibility is also distinct from pursuit, since an agent can consider a pair of theories compatible with or without pursuing either. An agent, for instance, may find two alternative quantum theories pursuitworthy while clearly realizing that the two are incompatible.