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|Brief=a Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist; he is widely considered the most important philosopher to write in the English language.|Summary=Hume’s contributions to our understanding of the processes of scientific knowledge change and the nature of scientific change knowledge come from his two major philosophical works: including ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' (1738) and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'' (1748). He is most noted for his skeptical views on a variety of topics including human identity, the powers of human reason, metaphysics, human identity, and the existence of God.[[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] He is perhaps best known, first, for rejecting Aristotle’s epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief and replacing it with his own distinction between matters of fact (which depend on the way the world is) and relations of ideas (that are discoverable by thought, such as mathematical truths). This new distinction is known as Hume's Fork. Secondly, he is known for questioning the justifiability of whether knowledge derived from inductive reasoningcan be justified. The problem he posed is known today as Hume's Problem of Induction. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] Thirdly, Hume questioned whether theological knowledge is possible,and played a substantial role in its removal from the scientific mosaic of the modern world. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] The impact of these skeptical fallibilist arguments is still felt to this day.|Historical Context=David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1711. His family had a modest estate and was socially connected, but not wealthy.[[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] They recognized that Hume was precocious, and sent him to Edinburgh University two years early (at the age of 10 or 11) with his older brother (who was 12). He studied Latin and Greek, read widely in history, literature, and ancient and modern philosophy, as well as some mathematics and natural philosophy. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Harris (2015)|p. 35-65]] Both at home and at the university, Hume was raised in the stern '''Calvinist faith''', with prayers and sermons as prominent features of his home and university life. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] Following the completion of his studies, Hume rejected his family's plan that he become a lawyer, and instead determined to become a scholar and philosopher, engaging in three years of intensive personal study.

Although little is known Following the completion of his activities during studies, Hume rejected his schooling and afterwards, family's plan that he would have spent the fourth year of the curriculum at Edinburgh studying natural philosophybecome a lawyer, and would have been exposed instead determined to experimental natural philosophybecome a scholar and philosopher, including engaging in three years of intensive personal study. Living in the aftermath of the theories acceptance of [[Isaac Newton]] 's(1643-1727). [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]] Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica'' (''Mathematical Principles revolutionary theories of Natural Philosophy'motion and gravitation, eighteenth century thinkers proclaimed the ') in which he put forth his '''laws Age of motion''Enlightenment', '''law of universal gravitation''', and his inductive '''experimental expected philosophy''' more than thirty years earlier in 1687. [[CiteRef:: Westfall (1999which then included what we would call the natural and social sciences)]][[CiteRef::Janiak (2016)]] By about 1700 Newton's theory had become accepted in Britainto dramatically improve human life. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan Bristow (20152017)|p. 210]] Like Hume, like many of his times, Hume revered Newton, calling him "the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of the species". [[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]] The works of other experimental philosophers were also available to the young Hume. The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume is known to have contributed, contained an extensive collection of the works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), as well as the works of [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and [[John Locke]]'s (1632-1704) ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding''. This work, published in 1689, more than twenty years before Hume was born, propounded Locke's '''empiricist''' view of human knowledge. The library included some controversial works, such as those of the '''materialist''' Thomas Hobbs (1588-1679). [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Boyle, Newton, and Locke were all associated with the '''Royal Society of London''', which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's birth, and sought to promote the experimental method and the new natural philosophy. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]][[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]

By Little is known of Hume's timeactivities during his schooling and afterwards. According to the curriculum then in place at Edinburgh, he would have spent his fourth year studying natural philosophy, and would have been exposed to experimental natural philosophy, including Newton's theories. [[AristotleCiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]]More than thirty years earlier, in 1687, Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica''s (384 BC-322 BC''Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy'') teleological account of causation had been rejected in favor which he put forth his '''laws of the motion'''corpuscular mechanistic, ''' view law of causation espoused by Descartes, Lockeuniversal gravitation''', and the Royal Society. In this view, derived from ancient atomism, material bodies are made of invisibly small particles, called corpuscleshis inductive '''experimental philosophy'''. The only form of causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of bodies or their constituent corpuscles [[CiteRef::DePierris Westfall (20061999)]] Natural philosophers continued to accept Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and belief. Scientific knowledge was taken to be knowledge of causes and consisted of '''demonstration'''; proving the necessary connection between cause and effect. Locke supported this view of knowledge and made the popular notion of a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the associated notion of a metaphysically necessary connection between cause and effect central to his system. He nonetheless viewed demonstrative knowledge as seldom attainable because of the unobservability of corpuscles [[CiteRef::DePierris Janiak (20062016)]]By about 1700 these theories had become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] in Britain. [[CiteRef::Kochiras Barseghyan (20142015)|p. 210]] Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and Locke's empiricism The works of other experimental philosophers were also available to constitute a unified system, there was a distinct tension between themthe young Hume. The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume recognized. Newton had been unable is known to explain his gravitational force in terms of a corpuscular mechanism. He saw his inductive method as have contributed, contained an alternative to the demands extensive collection of a corpuscularism that stood in the way works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), the acceptance works of a mathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. Hume's Newton inspired skepticism of speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to reject corpuscularism[[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and his enthusiastic championing of Newton[[John Locke]]'s inductive method led him to challenge Locke(1632-1704) ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding's concept of causation, and Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge and opinion. Hume translated this latter distinction into a distinction between relations of ideasThis work, which are discoverable by thought (for examplepublished in 1689, mathematical truths)more than twenty years before Hume was born, and matters of fact, which depend on how the world actually is. This distinction became known as propounded Locke's ''Hume's Forkempiricist'''view of human knowledge. Rejecting necessary causation[[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Boyle, his careful analysis of Newton, and Locke were all associated with the 's inductive method led him to identify ''Royal Society of London''', which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's Problem of Induction'''birth, questioning our ability and sought to rationally justify knowledge of causation obtained by inductionpromote the experimental method and the new natural philosophy. [[CiteRef::Hume Uzgalis (19752016)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Rogers (20161982)]]

By the Hume's time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of religious belief. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Aristotle]]'s (2016384 BC-322 BC)]] The term teleological account of causation had been rejected in favour of the '''atheismcorpuscular mechanistic''' was coined by Sir John Cheke almost two hundred years earlier in 1540view of causation. Derived from ancient atomism, to refer to a lack it held that material bodies are made of belief in divine providenceinvisibly small particles, called corpuscles. The term assumed its modern meaning only form of disbelief in the existence causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth centurybodies or their constituent corpuscles. [[CiteRef:: Hyman DePierris (20072006)]] Although Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, it was nonetheless a challenge Natural philosophers continued to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This methodology stressed the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of reliance on divine revelation and the text of the Bible. Descartes instead stressed the human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. Descartes' rationalist argument for Godaccept Aristotle's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of distinction between scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circularand belief. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It Scientific knowledge was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both taken to be knowledge of which stressed experience causes and observation as sources consisted of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire. It eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Though they held non-standard beliefs, both Newton and Locke were devoutly religious. Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they rejected traditional rationalist proofs of God's existence and instead espoused the ''demonstrations'design argument''', supposing that the experimental method could demonstrate that ; proving the universe was an artifact crafted by a cosmic Designer. Hume's ''Dialogues on Natural Theology'' (1779) was a response to such hopes, necessary connection between cause and was to raise devastating objections to themeffect. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in supported this view of knowledge and made the mid-eighteenth century, with popular notion of a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]|Major Contributions=Hume's main philosophical contributions were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise associated notion of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 a metaphysically necessary connection between cause and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. It was not a success in effect central to his own timesystem. Hume wrote He nonetheless recognized that the work fell "deadborn from the press", [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 4]] and he lamented that "I demonstrative knowledge was carry'd away by the Heat seldom attainable because of Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately So vast an Undertaking, plan’d before I was one and twenty, & compos’d before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times”. [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 25]] It is however, today regarded as a major and important work. Hume recast the material into two later publications, ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, ''concerning the Principles unobservability of Morals'' published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume had ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his deathcorpuscles. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown DePierris (20162006)]][[CiteRef:: Norton Kochiras (20092014)]]

=== Hume Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and moral philosophy ===The basic goal of the first three of these works is indicated by the subtitle of the Locke''Treatise''; "an attempt s empiricism to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] An admirer of the Newtonian experimental philosophyconstitute a unified system, Hume sought to extend it from natural philosophy into what there was then called '''moral philosophy'''a distinct tension between them, which he defines as the "science of human nature". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] Moral philosophy included topics that a modern scientist might classify as psychology or cognitive science. To Hume, an understanding of the workings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|precognized. 34]] Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, he maintains, had cured themselves been unable to explain his gravitational force in terms of their "passion for hypotheses and systems"a corpuscular mechanism. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] Hume sought He saw his inductive method as an alternative to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full demands of speculative metaphysical theories and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He is noted as a skeptic because of his rejection of speculative metaphysical beliefs, and because he argues corpuscularism that we cannot rationally justify many stood in the way of our beliefs. But he also observes that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs, and it is these faculties the acceptance of which he wishes to give a positive descriptive accountmathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] Hume sought 's Newton inspired skepticism of speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to found an empirical science of the mindreject corpuscularism, based on experience and observation. He noted that the application his enthusiastic championing of the experimental Newton's inductive method led him to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophychallenge Locke's concept of causation, because it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, with premeditation". Instead, knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation of human life...by menand Aristotle's behaviour taxonomy of knowledge and opinion in company, in affairs, favour of a new epistemic taxonomy and in pleasures"new concept of causation. [[CiteRef::Brio Hume (20091975)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, conducted in the laboratory, would not make its appearance until the late 19th century. [[CiteRef::Leary Morris and Brown (19792016)]]

Hume uses By the term time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'perceptions' to designate mental content at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of any sortreligious belief. He supposes there are [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The term '''atheism''' was coined by Sir John Cheke (1514-1557) almost two sorts hundred years earlier in 1540, to refer to a lack of perceptions, impressions and ideasbelief in divine providence. Impressions include feelings we get from our senses, such as The term assumed its modern meaning of a red tomato currently disbelief in front the existence of meGod, as well divine non-existence emerged as desires, emotions, passions, and sentiments, such as my current hunger for a disquieting possibility in the tomatoseventeenth century. Hume distinguishes impressions [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]] In early modern Christian Europe, theological knowledge was deemed to derive from ideas by their degree of vivacity or forcetwo sources. Thus'''Natural religion''' attempted to demonstrate God's existence and nature through reason, I have an impression of the tomato that is currently presentlogic, and an idea observation of a tomato I ate last yearthe natural world. Hume supposes our ideas are copies of our impressions. Noting that there is a regular order to our thoughts, he asserts '''Revealed religion''' was based on the premise that the mind has text of the power to associate ideas. Hume posits three associative principles; resemblance (as when one recognizes that currently before me resembles the one in my garden), contiguity in time and place, Bible was divinely inspired and causation (as when one recognizes cause and effect). Hume believes that by thus anatomizing human nature, its laws a source of operation can be discoveredreliable theological knowledge. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] It was Hume's careful analysis of the mind that led to insights relevant to scientific methodology.

=== Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, but it was also a challenge to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), which stressed the limitations of human reason, and the need to rely on Biblical revelation. Descartes instead claimed a human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. However, his rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire, and eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Both Newton and Locke were nevertheless devoutly religious, though they held non-standard beliefs. Newton authored an entire volume on Biblical prophesies. [[CiteRef::Mandelbrote (2004)]] Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they supported a form of natural religion that sought to use the experimental method to demonstrate that the universe exhibited the order and purposefulness of a designed artifact crafted by an all-powerful Intelligence. Hume doubted both revealed religion and Scientific Methodology ===natural religion as sources of knowledge, and published strong arguments against both. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]|Major Contributions==== The Problem Hume was one of Induction ====Aristotle drew a categorical distinction between number of eighteenth century British philosophers whose work was inspired primarily by Newton's physical theories and experimental philosophy. Hume and Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746) believed that the mind's operations could be studied by broadly Newtonian observational methods, and in both cases this led them to forms of local skepticism. Joseph Priestly (1733-1804) and David Hartley (1705-1757) applied Newtonianism to both the operations of the mind and to its substance, becoming materialists. George Turnbull (1698-1748) and his pupil Thomas Reid(1710-1796) sought to ground Newtonian empiricism in a common-sense understanding of the world, thus avoiding Hume's skepticism. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Hume's main philosophical contributions to matters relevant to scientific knowledgechange were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' or published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. Since it sold poorly, Hume recast the material into two later publications, ''scientiaEnquiries concerning Human Understanding'' , published in 1748, and ''concerning the Principles of Morals'belief'published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume had '', or Dialogs concerning Natural Religion''opinio'published posthumously in 1779, three years after his death. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)]] Here we first consider Hume's views on the mind, which are critical to understanding his views regarding scientific methodology and change. We then consider three issues of central importance to [[Scientific Change|scientific change]], types of knowledge was a , the status of inductive knowledge , and the status of causestheological knowledge within the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]. Scientific explanation consisted  === Hume and The Science of Human Nature ===The basic goal of the first three of Hume's major works is indicated by the subtitle of the ''demonstrationTreatise''; "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] Hume sought to extend Newton's experimental philosophy from natural philosophy into what was then called '''moral philosophy''', in which a necessary connection between a cause he defined as the "science of human nature". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] The field of moral philosophy was much broader then than today, and included topics that we might classify as psychology or cognitive science, as well as epistemology. To Hume, an understanding of the workings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and its effect Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] His work in this area was proven using intuitively obvious premises independently thus critical to his ideas regarding scientific methodology and scientific change. Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, Hume maintained, had cured themselves of experiencetheir "passion for hypotheses and systems". Descartes [[CiteRef:: Morris and other corpuscularists retained this demonstrative ideal Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] He sought to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full of scientific explanationspeculative metaphysical hypotheses and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] Descartes supposed that He proposed an empiricist alternative to ''a mechanical cause is intrinsically priori'' metaphysics based on pure reason and necessarily related the speculative belief systems to its effectwhich it led. A demonstrative science was thus possible[[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] As a naturalist, because Hume rejected any appeal to the general principles supernatural in explanations of physical human nature could . For such beliefs, and because he argued that we cannot justify many of our beliefs, he is noted as a skeptic. But Hume himself rejected skepticism. While skepticism can't be deduced defeated by reason, he observed that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs (such as the belief that there is a world external to my mind of which my senses provide knowledge). He wrote that "it is fortunate that Nature eventually breaks the force of all skeptical arguments, keeping them from mathematical principles concerning having much influence on our understanding". [[CiteRef::Hume (2017)]] It was these faculties of which he sought to give a positive descriptive account. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]][[CiteRef::Wright (2012)]] Hume sought to found an empirical science of the shapemind, sizebased on experience and observation. He noted that the application of the experimental method to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophy, positionbecause it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, motionwith premeditation" on such matters. Instead, and causal interaction among the ultimate corpuscular particles knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation of matterhuman life.. Newton.by men's inductive methodbehaviour in company, in which general principles are derived inductively from observation affairs, and experimentin pleasures". [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, was with controlled experiments in the laboratory, would not compatible withmake its appearance until the late 19th century. [[CiteRef::Leary (1979)]]

The problem Hume took Newton’s opposition to demonstrative science much further, questioning the idea of a necessary mechanical connection between cause and effect. "Let an object be presented to a man of induction stems from ever so strong natural reason and abilities;" he wrote, "if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the reasoning behind causal inferencemost accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. This is a Adam [the Biblical first man], though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very important problem Hume brings up because first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the methodology fluidity and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the time called for axiomatic schemeslight and warmth of fire, that it would consume him. These schemes were based largely on causal inferences. As suchNo object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes, which produced it, Hume’s Problem of Induction threatened science at or the time as effects, which will arise from it proved causal inferences were irrational; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact." [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)|p. 109-110]] The connection between a cause and its effect was learned by observation and experience, and could not be shown by demonstrative argument.[[CiteRef:: Bell (2009)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]]

Given Having rejected demonstrative knowledge for the previous natural world, Hume recast Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and opinion as a distinction between '''relations of ideas ''' and '''matters of fact'''. [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 108-113]] Relations of ideas are ''a priori'' truths that are discoverable independent of experience, and can be shown with certainty by demonstration or intuition. Because they must be true in any world, they cannot provide any new information about our own world. Relations of ideas are confined to the connection within causal inference should fall under one formal sciences of mathematics, geometry, and logic. Examples of those categoriessuch statements include 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees', '1 + 1 = 2', or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. With this Relations of ideas can not be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in mindtheir very definition. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 108-113]] Matters of fact, by contrast, are ''a posteriori'' statements based on knowledge obtained from the world through observation or experience. Examples of such statements include 'the sky is blue', Hume found or 'water is odourless'. Note that causal inference cannot be the contrary of a relation matter of fact is not something impossible. The claim that ‘the sun will not rise tomorrow’ is just as intelligible as, and no more contradictory than the claim that ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’. The two claims are only distinguishable by observation and experience. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 11]] Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds and so must cannot be established by demonstration. They can never be a matter known with certainty. Hume’s new categories of knowledge made it clear that natural philosophy, since it relied on knowledge of matters of fact, could never aspire to the kind of certainty that Aristotle supposed for scientific knowledge, and should be content with the modest sort of knowledge available through Newton’s inductive method. [[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]]

The reason he came to this conclusion was that each cause is independent ==== Hume’s problem of induction ====While championing Newton’s inductive method, Hume also exposed its effect. The two are limitations by showing that conclusions drawn by inductive reasoning could not associated with each otherbe rationally justified. For example, never having seen an anti-bioticAs discussed above, Hume argued that knowledge of cause and without being told of its effects, would a person be able to establish its effect through sole means comes only from the constant conjunction of reasoning and senses? Quite simply, no. Without particular phenomena in experience, a person would have no understanding to what which allows the purpose use of the medicine is, or that it is medicine at allinduction to draw conclusions about cause and effect. And herein, Hume concludes, since ''a priori'' reasoning cannot be the source of connection between causes [[CiteRef::Morris and effects, the inference must be a matter of fact.Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume De Pierris (19752006)]]Hume envisions such an inductive argument as follows:

Describing causal inferences as a matter of fact provides leeway to use experience to determine the effects of a cause. Using the example from before, if 1) "I have found that same person had tried anti-biotics in the past and had such an object has always been cured, they begin to infer the reason for their getting better was the anti-bioticattended with such an effect. Grasping this chain of events Hume attempts to formulate that person’s argument for their inference and states it as such:.."

# In the past x has resulted 2) "I foresee, that other objects, which are in y.# Thereforeappearance, similar, in the future x will result in ybe attended with similar effects." [[CiteRef:: Hume (1975) |p.114]]

Here however, Hume notices a gap in logic. How does (1) infer (2)? Hume sees that demonstrative reasoning cannot fill this gap, because a complete contrast where x does not result in y implies no contradiction within the inference. Herein, it seems Newton supposed that there is an underlying assumption within the first premise: the future will be like the past. This assumption is more commonly known as the uniformity principle. Using use of such an assumption would fill the logical gap within the current argument, however before it can be used, it must inductive arguments could be established that the principle is either intuitive or demonstrable. Nonetheless, the only way to formulate justified by an argument for the principle is appeal to rely on the principle itselfuniformity of nature.[[CiteRef::Hume De Pierris (19752006)]] With Hume however, found a fundamental problem in rationally justifying inductive arguments. Consider the following argument, which might seem to justify our reliance on the uniformity principle the full argument would follow like thisinduction:

# 1) In the past, the future has been like the past.# Therefore, the future will be like the past.

Within this argument, the premise assumes the conclusion and, as such, the argument is circular. In this sense2) Therefore, the first example shows an irrational train of thought. It seems then, that Hume established there is no way that reason could future will be like the connection between cause and effectpast. Thus, Hume sought another connection between cause and effect. He eventually recognized this connection to be custom or habit. This is more commonly known today as induction. As a person experiences something repeatedly, they grow to expect it to happen again. However, despite being an adequate connection, this solution forces the abandonment of reason within causal inference. [[CiteRef:: DePierris (2006)]] As previously mentioned, such a conclusion yields grave consequences for science of the time, which was heavily dependent on causal inferences.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]

=== But this argument itself relies on induction; the very mode of argument it seeks to justify. As Hume's Fork ===In Hume’s entrance put it: "According to my account, all arguments about existence are based on the debate relation of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean distinction between scientific cause and effect; our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and belief into his own termsin drawing conclusions from experience we assume that the future will be like the past. These are:* Relations of ideasSo if we try to prove this assumption by probable arguments, i. * Matters of facte. Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain through either demonstration or purely through intuition. They are ''arguments regarding existence, we shall obviously be going in a priori''circle, taking for granted the very point that is in question." [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. 16]] He concluded that they "the conclusions we draw from experience are discoverable independent of experience. This categorization does not necessitate ideas to carry information dependent based on reasoning or on the world and thus ideas falling into this category are independent any process of any existing thingunderstanding". [[CiteRef:: Hume (2008) |p. They are universal constants 15]] But induction is necessary for the conclusions that we draw, not only in that they hold true Newtonian science, but also in all worldsour daily lives, which would not be possible without it. It should be notedHume concludes that we are compelled to use induction by a powerful natural instinct, relations or more specifically his principles of ideas cannot provide any new information about the worldassociation. These types "All these operations" he wrote, "are species of propositions are simply a means used natural instincts, which no reasoning… is able either to help understand more complex ideasproduce or prevent". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| p. They can be thought 46-47]] Humans must, Hume concludes, rely on "the ordinary wisdom of as symbols nature", which insures that we form beliefs "by some instinct or a series mechanical tendency", rather than trusting "the fallacious deductions of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex ideaour reason". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975) |p. Common examples usually include geometry or math as formal sciences fall within 55]] In keeping with this categorization. Examples naturalistic conclusion, Hume devotes an entire section of such statements include the 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees' or Enquiry'1 + 1 = 2'to an argument that non-human animals also learn by induction. AlternativelyHe writes that "it seems evident that animals, a worded proposition may look something like 'when you runmen, you move your bodylearn many things from experience,' or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'and infer that the same outcomes will always follow the same causes". [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. Relations 53]] Hume’s conclusion was a radical challenge to the central role assigned by rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz to reason in the production of ideas can never be denied our knowledge, and is seen today as their denial would imply a contradiction step towards modern ideas in the very definition of the terms within the propositioncognitive science and neuroscience.[[CiteRef::Hume Biro (19752009)]]

Matters of fact are ==== Hume's skepticism about theological knowledge ====In the complete opposite of relations of ideas. Matters of fact are ''a posteriori'' statements early modern Christian Europe, theology and thus based on experience. Unlike relations of ideasnatural philosophy were not deemed foreign to one another, matters but rather seen as compatible parts of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds. The contrary an integrated [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of matters of fact imply no contradiction and such statements cannot be established by demonstrationknowledge. Matters of fact can show new information about the world but rely on the experience of the world[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. Examples 65]] Theological knowledge derived from observations of such statements include 'the sky is blue', or 'water is odourless', or 'all guitars have 6 frets.' It should be noted that false statementsnature and its supposed design, such as the last example, can still be matters of fact. The level supposed divine revelation of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this senseBible, contrasting statements are, too, matters of factsand supposed miraculous events where God had intervened directly in human affairs.[[CiteRef::Hume Fieser (19752016)]]As a thoroughgoing empiricist, Hume questioned all these sources of knowledge, and rejected theological knowledge as impossible.

The reason behind this distinction was simple; it was In a letter to provide criteria by which Henry Home (1696-1782) published in 1737, Hume confessed that he intended to organize scientific statementsinclude a skeptical discussion of miracles in his ''Treatise'' but left it out for fear of offending readers. Through this distinctionCritics of religion in eighteenth century Europe faced the risk of fine, imprisonment, all statements were categorized into either matters of fact or relations of ideasworse. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Hume did later publish his critique in the ''Enquiry'' in 1748. This also ultimately meant He wrote that there was no type of idea which was certain and provided information about "A wise man...proportions his belief to the worldevidence" [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. In 56]] and drew the case conclusion that "A miracle is a violation of matters the laws of factnature; and because firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, propositions are reliant on senses and due the case against a miracle is- just because it is a miracle- as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined to be....No testimony is sufficient to the fallibility establish a miracle unless it is of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the sensesfact it tries to establish...When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, have no certaintyI immediately ask myself whether it is more probable that this person either deceives or has been deceived or that what he reports really has happened... In If the case falsehood of relations of ideas, propositions can his testimony would be proven with absolute certainty through more miraculous than the use of other relations of ideas. Unfortunatelyevent he relates, howeverthen he can claim to command my belief or opinion, these statements cannot give any new information about the world. This distinction was often taken by the scientific community as a strike at Newton’s theory of motionbut not otherwise". [[CiteRef::Kant Hume (20072008)| p. 58-59]] Such The claim that a distinction has large consequences in the fields dead man was restored to life is, of sciencecourse, religioncentral to Christian theology. Hume's arguments have gained a relevance beyond theological knowledge, and even philosophy due to its prevention have been espoused as a [[methodology]] for evaluating other sorts of extraordinary or surprising claims, such as claims of paranormal occurrences or of certain real world statementsextraterrestrial intelligence. They are succinctly summarized by the maxim, popularized by the twentieth century astronomer Carl Sagan (1934-1996), that "extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence". [[CiteRef::Sagan (1979)| p. As 62]][[CiteRef:: Deming (2016)]] In 1757, Hume published an example this distinction would make useless essay entitled ''The Natural History of Religion'' which was the first systematic attempt to try to prove non physical entities as matters explain religious belief solely in terms of factwhat we would call psychological and sociological factors. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]]

# α Having called revealed religion into question by doubting miraculous events, Hume turned his attention to natural theology in his ''Dialogues concerning Natural Religion'', which he arranged to have published posthumously because of its inflammatory nature. In it, Hume raised devastating objections to the claim that the universe showed evidence of purposeful design by an Intelligent Creator. This claim was then widely popular among natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] The ''Dialogues'' is written as a conversation between three characters; ''Cleanthes'', a proponent of the design argument, ''Demea'', a mystic, and ''Philo'', a religious skeptic generally supposed to be Hume's spokesperson. Philo argues that the analogy between the universe and a designed artifact is weak. For example, we experience only one universe and have nothing to compare it to. We recognize human artifacts by contrast with non-physical entityartifacts such as rocks.# It has He also notes that we have no observable effect on experience of the origin of the universe, and that causal inference requires a basis in experienced constant conjunction between two things. For the origin of the universe we have nothing of the sort. ''Demea'' deems ''Cleanthes'' concept of God as cosmic designer to be anthropomorphic and limiting. By the end, Hume's characters' arguments lead the reader to the conclude, with ''Philo'', that God's nature seems inconceivable, incomprehensible, and indefinable and therefore the world question of God's existence is rendered meaningless. [[CiteRef::Hume (2007)]][[CiteRef::Oppy (1996)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]]|Criticism=Hume's skeptical arguments were troubling to many, and received a good deal of criticism. He was criticized, notably, by a fellow Scottish philosopher of his times; Thomas Reid. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Reid rejected Hume's theories of perception and its causation because of their skeptical consequences. Hume supposed that our perceptual experience was of impressions in our minds. He also maintained that causal relations do not exist in the world, but are rather posited in our minds when two events are constantly conjoined in experience. Such views, taken together, made up it impossible to claim that our perceptual impressions are caused by objects in an external world. This would require that external objects themselves, and our impressions of a physical thingthem be conjoined in our experience, which is obviously impossible.# α is Hume accepted that his belief in an external world was merely a relation matter of ideashabit, custom, or instinct, and could not be justified.# Relations Reid found this unacceptable, and supposed that our perceptual experience was directly of ideas are objects in the world, just assigned symbols helping to explain as everyday common sense tells us. He noted that such direct experience was no more complex symbolsmysterious than Hume's supposition that we directly experienced impressions in our mind. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]][[CiteRef::Reid (2007)|pp.# The statement ‘α exists’ proven 1-10]] Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume's supposition that the direct objects of perception were mental entities such as ideas, impressions, sensations, or otherwise doesn’t say anything about sense data remained widely popular into the twentieth century, [[CiteRef::Hatfield (2004)]] but had been strongly challenged by the beginning of the twenty first century [[CiteRef::Warren (2005)]][[CiteRef::Thompson (2007)]]. By that time though, the relationship between this problem and that of external world; it is just a play on wordsskepticism had been substantially reconfigured.[[CiteRef::Clark (2017)]]

Much akin to Reid likewise rejected Hume's view of causality. He noted that a view of causality based on constant conjunctions in our experience could not give a causal account of unique events. Suppose, he posited, that an earthquake struck Mexico City for the reasoning first time in its history, resulting in the analytic/synthetic distinction uses, it is impossible, according to destruction of the city. Under Hume's definition, for a proposition we could not to fall within claim that the distinction. In Hume’s eyesearthquake caused the destruction of the city, since the two events, being unique, such a proposition would be completely meaningless are not constantly conjoined in experience. He further noted that it would simply night following day and day following night are constantly conjoined experiences, but we generally do not be claim that day causes night and night causes day, but rather that both are caused by Earth's rotation. Reid proposes instead that two events have a causal relationship whenever they are conjoined by a rational law of nature, whether or reasonable endeavournot they are constantly conjoined in experience. It is in this binary categorizationUnlike Hume, Reid maintains that causes necessitate their effects even though he concedes that this distinction necessitation is historically importantnot evident through perception alone. Philosophers at the time were [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] James Beattie (1735-1803) drew heavily reliant on innate meaningful Reid's ideas (synthetic ''in a priori'' statements), but Hume’s distinction book critical of the types of proposition did not allow for such ideas. Hume believed 's philosophy that innate ideas cannot be meaningful in that they never contain real world statements. This meant most axiomatic schemes were immediately broken down with Hume’s skepticism. became a smash bestseller [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::DePierris McDermid (20062017)]]

==== Skepticism about theological knowledge ====|Criticism=Historically, due The German philosopher Immanuel Kant(1724-1824) sought to respond to the threatening nature of Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas Hume's skeptical challenge regarding cause and matters of facteffect, particularly to Newtonian physics, as well as in his problem ''Critique of induction there have been many critics of Hume. One of the Pure Reason'' (1781) and most prominent critics explicitly in his ''Prolegomena to criticize Hume on the account of his distinction between the types of propositions was [[Immanuel Kant]]Any Future Metaphysics'' (1783). Kant criticized sought to synthesize early modern rationalism with empiricism, and thereby avert Hume's skepticism. He did this by supposing that the world as we can experience it, seeking to validate Newton’s propositions about the sensible world which could never be meaningful under Hume’s distinction. Kant theorized that , is structured by the world was interpreted through sensory and intellect and thus there must exist some sort of ''a priori'' synthetic propositionforms of our cognitive faculties.4 The existence of such understanding is thus a proposition would of course result in a proposition that fit both categories prerequisite for experience. Possible human experience thus conforms to certain necessary laws, which we can know through our reason, independently of Hume’s distinctionexperience. Unfortunately, Kant’s For Kant this ''a priori'' synthetic proposition was debunked with structuring framework included Euclidean space and time, and cause and effect. Kant argued that by such means, the arrival idea of probabilistic determinismnecessary causal laws that human reason could know was restored. [[CiteRef::Rohlf (2016)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris and Friedman (2013)]]

As for criticisms on In the twentieth century, Karl Popper (1902-1994) challenged Hume's Problem of Induction, there are skepticism on quite a few casesdifferent grounds. One of the more notable cases was the critique [[Karl Popper]] had towards rejected Hume, stating 's Newtonian inductivism. Popper argued that induction is a mythnever actually used in science, since all observation is selective and theory-laden.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]]Popper argued advocated a '''hypothetico-deductive method''' for science, arguing that science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than by reference to the past, and that the main purpose of observations wasn’t to make inferences about the future but to refute present existing theories. Popper was committed to the idea believed that Hume had incorrectly orientated himself towards was mistaken in seeking a means of justifying to justify knowledge. Popper, instead, preferred to look for sought a process by which to reveal and correct errorsscientific error.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]]

[[Wesley Salmon]] responded The strongest criticisms directed against Hume were based on his skepticism about theological knowledge. Due to his religious views, he was never able to obtain an academic faculty appointment. His critics called him "The Great Infidel". Hume's arguments in the ''Dialogs'' did not put a stop to this criticism the claim that natural philosophy could find evidence of intelligent design in Hume’s placenature, stating theories still need predictions in part because Hume failed to be testedsupply an adequate alternative explanation for apparently purposeful complexity. When Popperians have multiple theoriesIn 1802, each sharing twenty three years after the same quantity publication of empirical contentHume's ''Dialogues'', William Paley (1743-1805), Popperians would choose an English clergyman, expounded the theories which were better corroborated but lack any justification design argument in this decisionhis ''Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity''. The Popperians either make Paley argued that the purposeful sophistication of biological "contrivances", such as the eye, were clear evidence of design by an inductive claimIntelligent Being. [[CiteRef::Ayala (2003)]][[CiteRef:: # A theory was reliable in Paley (1809)]] Among those who read and appreciated Paley's arguments were the naturalist Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In his ''Origin of Species'' (1859) Darwin argued that biological species were not separately created and are instead physically descended from pre-existing species, with all living things ultimately descended from a common ancestor. He explained Paley's contrivances by positing the pastprocess of natural selection, which he justified with extensive studies of animal breeding.# It will be reliable By explaining the appearance of design in living systems, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection dealt a severe blow to the future having survived falsificationdesign argument among natural scientists.Or they admit corroboration is not an indication Scientists [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] methodological naturalism, and theological propositions were no longer considered part of predictive powerthe [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]].[[CiteRef::Salmon Ruse (1999)]][[CiteRef::Ruse (19672003)]]|Page Status=Needs EditingEditor Approved