Open main menu

Changes

no edit summary
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn argues that Science cannot be investigated with an objective outlook, for the formulation of “objective” conclusions of science are products of the activity of subjective scientists and researchers in the first place. His idea was that science undergoes ‘paradigm shifts’ rather than progressing in a linear and continuous way [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 75]].
In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), Imre Lakatos claims that the scientific methodology constitutes research programmes that dictate, which theories are accepted over time[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 187]]. This implies that the method of theory acceptance is a subjective one.In The Social Construction of What (1999), Ian Hacking posits that the idea that Science is a social construct can be argued through the Contingency thesis and the Nominalist thesis[[CiteRef::Hacking (1999)|p. 89]].
The Contingency thesis argues that Science cannot be said to be deterministic as the evolution of scientific mosaic is not contingent. This claim implies that the scientific mosaic could develop in ways that we cannot predict (as any change to the mosaic if fundamentally not inevitable). As such, no general laws or theories of scientific change can be devised through inspection of the evolution of Science.