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In terms of criticisms for the problem of induction, most philosophers seem to criticize Hume on this account. One of the more notable cases is the critique [[Karl Popper]] has towards Hume, stating that induction is a myth.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] Popper argued science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than reference to the past, and that the main purpose of observations wasn’t to make inferences about the future but to refute present existing theories. Popper was committed to the idea that Hume was asking the wrong question ‘how can theories that cannot be justified by induction, otherwise be justified?’ Popper, instead, preferred to look for a process by which to correct errors.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]]
[[Wesley Salmon ]] responded to this criticism in Hume’s place, stating theories still need predictions to be tested. When Popperians have multiple theories, each sharing the same quantity of empirical content, Popperians would choose the theories which were better corroborated but lack any justification in this decision. The Popperians either make an inductive claim:
# A theory was reliable in the past.
# It will be reliable in the future having survived falsification.
Or they admit corroboration is not an indication of predictive power.[[CiteRef::Salmon (1967)]]
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