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In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist scientific methodology, but a relatively similar set of possible stances towards theories. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]]
[[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (19621962a)|pp. 10-13]]
In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances that epistemic agents might take toward research programs. They could be deemed either ''progressive'' or ''degenerating''. A research program was progressive if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts. It was degenerating if it failed to make successful bold predictions, and if its theories were intentionally fashioned so as to accommodate already known facts. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978)]]