Difference between revisions of "Epistemic Stances"
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|Description=[[Epistemic Agents|Epistemic agents]] (e.g. individual scientists, [[Epistemic Community|scientific communities]]) can take different epistemic stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') towards different [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] (e.g. ''theories'', ''methods''). In principle, the types of stances that can be taken towards a [[Theory|theory]] may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards [[Method|methods]] of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]]. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type. | |Description=[[Epistemic Agents|Epistemic agents]] (e.g. individual scientists, [[Epistemic Community|scientific communities]]) can take different epistemic stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') towards different [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] (e.g. ''theories'', ''methods''). In principle, the types of stances that can be taken towards a [[Theory|theory]] may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards [[Method|methods]] of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]]. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type. | ||
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|Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change | |Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change | ||
| − | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan | + | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan |
|Formulated Year=2015 | |Formulated Year=2015 | ||
| − | |Prehistory=In the early twentieth century, many [[Rudolf Carnap|logical positivists]] supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, [[Carl Hempel]], a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that, on such grounds, an agent might take one of three stances towards a theory, ''accepting'' it, ''rejecting'' it, or ''withholding judgment''. [[CiteRef::Losee (2001)|p. 167-168]][[CiteRef::Hempel (1945)]] | + | |Prehistory=In the early twentieth century, many [[Rudolf Carnap|logical positivists]] supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, [[Carl Hempel]], a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that, on such grounds, an agent might take one of three stances towards a theory, ''accepting'' it, ''rejecting'' it, or ''withholding judgment''.[[CiteRef::Losee (2001)|p. 167-168]][[CiteRef::Hempel (1945)]] |
| − | In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist scientific methodology, but a relatively similar set of possible stances towards theories. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]] | + | In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist scientific methodology, but a relatively similar set of possible stances towards theories. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests.[[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]] |
| − | [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 10-13]] | + | [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 10-13]] |
| − | In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances that epistemic agents might take toward research programs. They could be deemed either ''progressive'' or ''degenerating''. A research program was progressive if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts. It was degenerating if it failed to make successful bold predictions, and if its theories were intentionally fashioned so as to accommodate already known facts. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]] | + | In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances that epistemic agents might take toward research programs. They could be deemed either ''progressive'' or ''degenerating''. A research program was progressive if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts. It was degenerating if it failed to make successful bold predictions, and if its theories were intentionally fashioned so as to accommodate already known facts.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]] |
| − | [[Larry Laudan]]'s reticulated model of scientific change involved scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. Methods could change along with theories, and thus epistemic agents could take stances with respect to them both. For Laudan, a theory would be regarded as ''accepted'' by an agent if that agent accepted its truth, or ''rejected'' if deemed by the agent to be false. He also proposed a new stance, that of ''pursuit''. To pursue a theory is to work with it or explore it without committing to a belief that it is true. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)|pp. 108-114]] | + | [[Larry Laudan]]'s reticulated model of scientific change involved scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. Methods could change along with theories, and thus epistemic agents could take stances with respect to them both. For Laudan, a theory would be regarded as ''accepted'' by an agent if that agent accepted its truth, or ''rejected'' if deemed by the agent to be false. He also proposed a new stance, that of ''pursuit''. To pursue a theory is to work with it or explore it without committing to a belief that it is true.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)|pp. 108-114]] |
| − | |Related Topics=Epistemic Agents, Epistemic Elements | + | |History= |
| + | |Current View= | ||
| + | |Related Topics=Epistemic Agents, Epistemic Elements | ||
|Page Status=Editor Approved | |Page Status=Editor Approved | ||
| + | |Editor Notes= | ||
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{{Acceptance Record | {{Acceptance Record | ||
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|Acceptance Indicators=While, in this general form, the question wasn't clearly stated in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], it was implicit in a more specific question of [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories]]. | |Acceptance Indicators=While, in this general form, the question wasn't clearly stated in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], it was implicit in a more specific question of [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories]]. | ||
|Still Accepted=Yes | |Still Accepted=Yes | ||
| + | |Accepted Until Era= | ||
| + | |Accepted Until Year= | ||
| + | |Accepted Until Month= | ||
| + | |Accepted Until Day= | ||
|Accepted Until Approximate=No | |Accepted Until Approximate=No | ||
| + | |Rejection Indicators= | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 02:30, 10 June 2020
What are the epistemic stances that can be taken by epistemic agents towards different epistemic elements?
Epistemic agents (e.g. individual scientists, scientific communities) can take different epistemic stances (e.g. acceptance, use, pursuit, employment) towards different epistemic elements (e.g. theories, methods). In principle, the types of stances that can be taken towards a theory may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards methods of theory assessment. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type.
In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community.
In Scientonomy, the accepted answer to the question is:
- The stance of compatibility can be taken towards an epistemic element.
Contents
Broader History
In the early twentieth century, many logical positivists supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, Carl Hempel, a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that, on such grounds, an agent might take one of three stances towards a theory, accepting it, rejecting it, or withholding judgment.1p. 167-1682
In his Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), 3 Karl Popper argued for a falsificationist scientific methodology, but a relatively similar set of possible stances towards theories. Scientific ideas gained acceptance when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where rejected when they failed to survive such tests.45p. 57-74
Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including universally received, embraced, acknowledged, and committed to.6pp. 10-13
In Imre Lakatos's theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances that epistemic agents might take toward research programs. They could be deemed either progressive or degenerating. A research program was progressive if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts. It was degenerating if it failed to make successful bold predictions, and if its theories were intentionally fashioned so as to accommodate already known facts.7
Larry Laudan's reticulated model of scientific change involved scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. Methods could change along with theories, and thus epistemic agents could take stances with respect to them both. For Laudan, a theory would be regarded as accepted by an agent if that agent accepted its truth, or rejected if deemed by the agent to be false. He also proposed a new stance, that of pursuit. To pursue a theory is to work with it or explore it without committing to a belief that it is true.58pp. 108-114
Scientonomic History
Acceptance Record
| Community | Accepted From | Acceptance Indicators | Still Accepted | Accepted Until | Rejection Indicators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scientonomy | 1 January 2016 | While, in this general form, the question wasn't clearly stated in The Laws of Scientific Change, it was implicit in a more specific question of Epistemic Stances Towards Theories. | Yes |
All Theories
| Theory | Formulation | Formulated In |
|---|---|---|
| Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) | The stance of compatibility can be taken towards an epistemic element. | 2018 |
If an answer to this question is missing, please click here to add it.
Accepted Theories
| Community | Theory | Accepted From | Accepted Until |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scientonomy | Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) | 1 October 2021 |
Suggested Modifications
| Modification | Community | Date Suggested | Summary | Verdict | Verdict Rationale | Date Assessed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sciento-2018-0016 | Scientonomy | 28 December 2018 | Accept compatibility as a distinct epistemic stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. Also accept that compatibility is binary, reflexive, and symmetric. Transitivity of compatibility holds only within mosaics, not in general. | Accepted | The community agreed that the compatibility is "a distinct epistemic stance, separable, in principle, from that of theory acceptance",c1 as it is "a stance that may be taken in addition to/combination with other stances".c2 The reviewers agreed that "Fraser and Sarwar argue convincingly that elements outside the mosaic can be assessed for compatibility with other elements inside or outside the mosaic",c3 since it "can be used to compare elements that are all part of a mosaic, all not part of a mosaic, or some combination of the two".c4 It was also argued that "since we accept the existence of compatibility criteria... we should also accept that there is such a stance as compatibility".c5 Finally, it was also suggested that the idea of compatibility as a binary relation is to be further explored.c6 | 1 October 2021 |
Current View
In Scientonomy, the accepted answer to the question is Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018).
Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) states: "The stance of compatibility can be taken towards an epistemic element."
Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.9p. 70
Related Topics
This question is a subquestion of Ontology of Scientific Change.
It has the following sub-topic(s):
References
- ^ Losee, John. (2001) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
- ^ Hempel, Carl. (1945) Studies in the Logic of Confirmation. Mind 54 (213), 1-26.
- ^ Popper, Karl. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson & Co.
- ^ Thornton, Stephen. (2016) Karl Popper. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/popper/.
- a b Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2003) Theory and Reality. University of Chicago Press.
- ^ Kuhn, Thomas. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press.
- ^ Lakatos, Imre. (1978) Philosophical Papers: Volume 1. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Laudan, Larry. (1977) Progress and Its Problems. University of California Press.
- ^ Fraser, Patrick and Sarwar, Ameer. (2018) A Compatibility Law and the Classification of Theory Change. Scientonomy 2, 67-82. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31278.
