'''{{Author|First Name=Imre |Last Name=Lakatos''' (1922–1974) was |DOB Era=CE|DOB Year=1922|DOB Month=November|DOB Day=9|DOB Approximate=No|DOD Era=CE|DOD Year=1974|DOD Month=February|DOD Day=2|DOD Approximate=No|Brief=a Hungarian-born philosopher of science who studied greatly contributed to the problem of demarcation criteria and theory choice in science.[[CiteRef::Musgrave & Pigden (2016)]][[CiteRef::Chalmers (2013)]] |Summary=A protege of [[Karl Popper]], Lakatos attempted to respond to problems posed by the work of Popper and [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]]. [[CiteRef::Musgrave and Pigden (2016)]][[CiteRef::Chalmers (2013)]] His [[Lakatos (1970)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes'' ]] (MSRP) offers a holistic approach to theory choice which extends beyond Popper's falsificationism, and instead . It assesses a particular research program as progressive or degenerative, depending on its overall record of predictive and explanatory successes and failures. Lakatos later entered into a correspondence with [[Paul Feyerabend]], with the goal of addressing Feyerabend’s objections to the MSRP. He met an untimely death due to a heart attack at the age of 51. Some of Feyerabend’s objections remain open challenging to this day.|Historical Context=Much of Lakatos's work was a response to the problems of [[Karl Popper]]’s '''falsificationism''', and was expressed in a series of publications between 1935 and the early 1970's. Lakatos rejected the idea that a false prediction was alone grounds for rejecting a theory. Most theories, he pointed out, are born in an “ocean of anomalies” and are therefore falsified from the moment of their inception. For example, Copernican heliocentric astronomy predicts that the stars should change in apparent position as the Earth revolves around the sun, but for three centuries after Copernicus proposed his theory, all attempts to detect this stellar parallax failed. Astronomers nevertheless accepted the theory on other grounds. The failure of Newtonian mechanics to account for the motions of the planet Mercury was known for many decades, during which the theory also wasn't rejected.[[CiteRef::Musgrave and Pigden (2016)]] A well known criticism of falsificationism, the [[Pierre Duhem|Duhem]]-Quine thesis,[[CiteRef::Stanford (2016)]][[CiteRef::Duhem (1962)]][[CiteRef::Quine (1951)]] which Lakatos championed, was that the failure of a prediction could be due to a problem anywhere in the network of theories and auxiliary assumptions responsible for that prediction. Lakatos thus argued that Popper's theory was overly restrictive and inconsistent with much of scientific practice. In scientific practice, Lakatos observed that if a theory is the best available of its kind, it is typically allowed to undergo modifications to account for all data and not rejected.
== Historical Context ==Much Lakatos also responded to Thomas Kuhn’s ''Structure of Lakatos’ work Scientific Revolutions'', published in 1962.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]] He was a response to troubled by Kuhn's '''incommensurability thesis''', which asserts that theories with different taxonomies cannot be rationally compared. Lakatos accused Kuhn of depicting the problems process of Popper’s falsificationism, which was expressed in scientific change as completely irrational. If there truly existed a series problem of works published incommensurability in science, then there would be no method to demarcate between 1935 science and pseudoscience, and no way of measuring scientific progress.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]] At the early '70same time, Lakatos and Kuhn'sviews of science have important points in common. Lakatos Both rejected the idea that a false prediction was alone grounds for rejecting a theory. Most theoriespositivist, he pointed outinductivist accounts of science popular in the early twentieth century, are born in an “ocean of anomalies” and are therefore falsified from both emphasized the moment importance of their inceptiontheory over observation. For example, Copernican heliocentric astronomy predicts Both agreed that any theory of how science works must make sense of the stars should change in apparent position as actual history of science.[[CiteRef::Chalmers (2013)|pp. 103-114]]|Major Contributions==== Lakatos on Theory Choice ===Following the Earth revolves around the sunDuhem-Quine thesis, but for three centuries after Copernicus proposed his theoryLakatos recognized that scientific theories could not be appraised individually. Rather, all attempts to detect this stellar parallax failed. Astronomers nevertheless accepted of the theory theoretical assumptions bearing on other grounds. The failure of Newtonian mechanics an experimental finding had to account for the motions be assessed holistically, as parts of the planet Mercury was known for many decades, during which the theory also wasnwhat he called a '''research program'''t rejected.[[CiteRef::Musgrave & Pigden Lakatos (20161970)|pp. 31-55]] A well known criticism of falsificationism While Kuhn supposed that, which Lakatos championedin a mature scientific discipline, was that the failure of only one paradigm generally existed at a prediction could be due to a problem anywhere in the network of theories and auxiliary assumptions responsible for that prediction. time, Lakatos thus argued that Popper's theory it was overly restrictive generally the case that more than one research program existed in a field at any given time, and inconsistent with much that large-scale processes of scientific practicechange should be understood as competition between research programs.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. In scientific practice102-121]] Within a research program, Lakatos observed that if not all theoretical assumptions are treated equally. The indispensable central theoretical assumptions of a theory is research program are its '''hard core'''. Any modification of the hard core constitutes the best available abandonment of its kind, it is typically allowed to undergo modifications to account for all data the research program and not rejectedthe creation of a new one. [[CiteRef::Chalmers (2013)|pp. 103-114]][[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp.31-55]]
Lakatos also responded Auxiliary propositions that are relevant to Thomas Kuhn’s the hard core, but are not part of it form a '''protective belt'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'', published . Adherents of a research program attempt to explain an increasingly wide range of relevant natural phenomena in 1962terms of the core. He was troubled by Kuhn's incommensurability thesisIn so doing, which asserts that theories with different taxonomies cannot be rationally comparedthey add to the protective belt of auxiliary propositions. Lakatos accused Kuhn This expansion of depicting the process range of applicability of scientific the program constitutes its '''positive heuristic'''. Scientists committed to a research program defend the hard core against change by using their ingenuity as completely irrational. If there truly existed a problem needed to make alterations to the protective belt of incommensurability in science, then there would be no method auxiliary propositions to demarcate between science explain phenomena and pseudoscience, and no way avoid falsification of the core. This protection of measuring scientific progressthe hard core is a research program's '''negative heuristic'''.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a1970)|pp. 47-51]] However, like Kuhn, Lakatos believed that any theory of science must make sense of the history of science.
For example, the hard core of the Newtonian physics research program would consist of Newton's three laws of motion and Law of Universal Gravitation. The protective belt would include propositions such as "the Earth is an oblate spheroid" or "Neptune is 17 times more massive than Earth". In the nineteenth century, astronomers could not explain the movements of the planet Uranus using Newton's theory and known gravitational influences. Rather than modifying the theory itself, which would have obviated the Newtonian research program, they modified the protective belt by positing the existence of a new planet, whose Newtonian gravitational influence was affecting Uranus. The prediction was a stunning success, as the new planet, to be named Neptune, was discovered in 1846.[[CiteRef::Chalmers (2013)|pp. 103-114]][[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-48]]
CANT CORROBORATE THIS PART, OXYGEN IS NOT COMBUSTIBLE Lakatos held that theories employing different taxonomies could be compared provided they were rationally reconstructed in If any evidence is found against a common, modern language. For exampletheory, and if the phlogiston theory held that all combustible substances contained a hypothetical substance otherwise possesses both greater heuristic and explanatory powers than known as “phlogiston”. Todayalternatives, chemists might identify combustible elements as hydrogen or oxygen. The example of phlogiston and/or hydrogen/oxygen serves to illustrate Lakatos supposed that a rejected theory in falsification should be averted by modifying the history of science research program's protective belt. There thus can be expressed in modern terms despite employing no 'crucial experiments'; a different taxonomy. Lakatos accused Kuhn of depicting the process of scientific change as completely irrational. If there truly existed research program cannot be instantly overthrown by a problem of incommensurability single experimental finding taken in science, then there would be no method to demarcate between science and pseudoscience, and no way of measuring scientific progressisolation.
== Main Contributions Lakatos held that a research program should be evaluated in terms of both its explanatory power; its ability to explain known phenomena, and its heuristic power; its ability to successfully explain newly discovered phenomena or to the Philosophy of Scientific Change ==predict their existence.
=== Lakatos on Theory Choice ===Following the Quine-Duhem thesis, Lakatos recognized stipulated that scientific theories could not be appraised individually. Rather, a modification is '''progressive''' if ''all '' of the theoretical assumptions bearing on an experimental finding had to be assessed holistically, in terms of what following conditions are met:[[CiteRef::Lakatos called a "research program"(1970)|pp. Within a research program31-34]] # the modification has some excess empirical content, not all theoretical assumptions are treated equallyi. It contains a "hard core" of theoretical assumptions, which are its indispensable constituentse. Any modification of it increases the "hard core" results in the creation overall empirical content of a new research program. Adherents of a research program attempt to explain an increasingly wide range of relevant natural phenomena in terms of the core. In so doing, they create a "protective belt" of auxiliary propositions. This expansion of the range of applicability of the program constitutes its "positive heuristic". Scientists committed to a research program defend the "hard core" against change programme (by using making novel predictions or increasing their ingenuity as needed to make alterations to the "protective belt" of auxiliary propositions to explain phenomena precision and avoid falsification accuracy);# some of the core. This protection of the hard core is a research program's "negative heuristic". For example, the "hard core" of the Newtonian physics research program would consist of Newton's three laws of motion this excess empirical content has been corroborated in experiments and Law of Universal Gravitation. The protective belt would include propositions such as "observations;# the Earth modification is an oblate spheroid" or "Neptune is 17 times more massive than Earth". In the nineteenth century, astronomers could not explain the movements of the planet Uranus using Newton's theory and known gravitational influences. Rather than modifying the theory itself, which would have obviated in organic unity with the Newtonian research program, they modified the protective belt by positing the existence rest of a new planet, whose Newtonian gravitational influence was affecting Uranus. The prediction was a stunning success, as the new planet, to be named Neptune, was discovered in 1846programme.[[CiteRef::Chalmers (2013)]][[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]
Thus, according to Lakatos held that a research programme should be chosen for both its “explanatory power” and its “heuristic power”. That is to say that a theory is accepted for its ability to both explain past and present phenomena, as well as its ability to be applied to and posit the existence there are three types of future phenomena and anomaliesregressive (''ad hoc'') modifications. Given any evidence against a theory, A modification is '''regressive''' if at least one of the theory possesses both greater heuristic and explanatory powers than its counterpartsfollowing obtains:[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1971a)|pp. 112, its protective belt should be allowed to undergo modifications and avoid falsificationn. These modifications should be “progressive” and intended to save 2]]# it does not increase the empirical content of the research programme from degenerating, i. This, for Lakatos, represents the difference between falsification and rejectione.A research programme is considered “progressive” if it can doesn't make novel predictions later confirmed by experimentor increase their precision/accuracy (''ad hoc<sub>1</sub>'');# it introduces excess empirical content, much but fails to corroborate any of this excess content empirically (''ad hoc<sub>2</sub>'');# it is not in line organic unity with the Popperian notion rest of “novel predictions”. On the other hand, if a theory fails to offer such predictions and merely attempts to “save” itself from a disproving instance, it is considered “degenerative”programme (''ad hoc<sub>3</sub>''). Lakatos established the following criteria for appraising modifications:
{| class="wikitable" style="width: 85%; margin: auto; text-align:center;"|-! style="background-color: #ccffcc;"|Progressive Modifications! style="background-color: #ffcccc;"|Degenerative Modifications|-| Increase the empirical content of a research programme by making predictions and increasing its precision | Do not increase the empirical content, make predictions or increase the precision of a programme (The term ''ad hoc<sub>1</sub>'')|-| Add excess empirical content which has been corroborated though experiments and observation | Introduce excess content, but fail to corroborate the excess content (''ad hoc<sub>2</sub>'')|-| Are in organic unity with the rest of the programme | Are not in organic unity with the rest of the programme (''ad hoc<sub>3</sub>'')|}
The term organic unity is intended to mean that modifications should be contiguous with the rest of the programmeprogram. If For instance, if the research programme program is “natural selection”Darwin's theory of natural selection, a modification which adds the proposition “extra"extra-terrestrial beings intervened with human evolution” evolution" would not be contiguous – not in organic unity – with the rest of the research programme program, and is therefore ad hoc<sub>3</sub>regressive.
Given any modification to a research programme’s protective belt, any research programme P1 would subsequently become P2. In this way we can track changes to research programme P from P1 to Pn and retrospectively ascertain if the modifications made have been progressive or degenerative. However, the degeneration of a research program doesn't necessitate its dismissal. Rather, given research programmes A and B, where programme A has been degenerating and programme B has been progressing, Lakatos suggests that the scientific community should invest most of its resources into A. The community should not invest all resources into A because there have been instances where a degenerative programme has become progressive, such as heliocentrism and atomism. According to Lakatos, working on a degenerative programme is not prohibited, but it is irrational given that it has ceased to bear fruit.
=== Lakatos on Demarcation Criteria ===
The demarcation between “progressive” "progressive" and “degenerative” "degenerative" research programmes also serves to demarcate between science and pseudoscience. A scientific theory should not only explain past and present phenomena; it should also have the ability to be applied to and posit the existence of future phenomena. For example, proving that an object falls in an experiment does not make the Newtonian research programme scientific. However, the Newtonian research programme predicted that comets move in either hyperbolas, parabolas or ellipses (contrary to the contemporary theory that they move in straights lines). Using this hypothesis, Edmond Halley successfully predicted the return of Halley’s comet to the minute. Such predictions affirm that the Newtonian research programme was progressive and, therefore, scientific. On the other hand, a research programme such as astrology, which merely provides ''post hoc '' explanations and is subject to ''ad hoc '' modifications, is considered pseudoscientific.|Criticism=Paul Feyerabend pointed out that there exists a serious problem in how one can justify working on a degenerating programme. Lakatos’ response to Feyerabend's criticism was ambiguous. While it is irrational to work on a degenerating programme, Lakatos held that it was not prohibited. Just because a research programme is degenerating does not mean that it should be rejected. Feyerabend's objection, however, remains open because Lakatos failed to provide anything more than stipulation.
== Criticisms & New Directions ==
Paul Feyerabend pointed out that there exists a serious problem in how one can justify working on a degenerating programme. Lakatos’ response to Feyerabend's criticism was ambiguous. While it is irrational to work on a degenerating programme, Lakatos held that it was not prohibited. Just because a research programme is degenerating does not mean that it should be rejected. Feyerabend's objection, however, remains open because Lakatos failed to provide anything more than stipulation.
Feyerabend also argued that a problem exists with the notion of a time limit. If a research programme has been degenerating for some time, how do we know when to abandon it? Heliocentrism and atomism had degenerated for well over a millennium before being reinvigorated and subsequently accepted. On the other hand, fields such as homeopathy or psychoanalysis, which are nascent in comparison to the aforementioned theories, are easily ascribed the title of pseudoscience. Lakatos’ response was that there is no discernable time limit; but once again, he failed to address the actual problem.
== |Related Articles Topics==[[Karl Popper]] [[Thomas Kuhn]] [[Paul Feyerabend]] [[Larry Laudan]] {{#referencelist:}} == Authors ==[mailto:jacob.mackinnon@mail.utoronto.ca Jacob MacKinnon], 2016 [mailto:paul.patton@mail.utoronto.ca Paul Patton], 2016 {{#scite:Musgrave & Pigden (2016) |type=collection |author=Musgrave, Alan & Pigden, Charles |title=Imre Lakatos |year=2016 |collectioneditor=Zalta |collectionyear=2016 |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/lakatos/}}{{#scite:Chalmers (2013) |type=book |author=Chalmers, Alan |title=What is This Thing Called Science? |year=2013 |publisher=University Mechanism of Queensland Press |isbn=978-0702250873}}{{#scite:Lakatos (1978a) |type=book |author=LakatosScientific Change, Imre |title=Philosophical Papers: Volume 1. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes |year=1978 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbnPage Status=978-0521280310Editor Approved
}}