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In the first book of his ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding'' Locke begins by arguing that there are no principles or ideas that are innate in human beings. In seventeenth century England, such principles were widely held to exist and to be necessary to the stability of religion and morality. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] "Nothing is more commonly taken for granted" he wrote, "than that certain principles both speculative and practical are accepted by all mankind. Some people have argued that because these principles are (they think) universally accepted, they must have been stamped into the souls of men from the outset." [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|p. 3]] He denies that we hold speculative innate principles, including innate ideas of God, identity, or impossibility. This criticism was aimed widely, but was directed, in part, at Cartesians, who held, among other things, that we have an innate idea of substance. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Locke maintained that if there were such innate principles, they would be known to everyone, even "children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people", which was clearly not the case. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|p. 8]] Mathematical truths likewise cannot be innate, as these must be discovered by reason and are learned from others by most people. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]]
In the second book, Locke begins his positive account of how people acquire knowledge. "Let us suppose", he writes, "the mind to have no ideas in it, to be like ''white paper'' with nothing written on it. How then does it come to be written on?...To this I answer, in one word, from ''experience''". Locke's belief that all knowledge comes from sense experience is '''empiricism'''.[[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 18]] Unlike Descartes, Locke does not seriously entertain the possibility that his senses are fundamentally unreliable. He writes that, "We certainly find that pleasure or pain follows upon the application to us of certain objects whose existence we perceive (or dream we perceive!) through our senses; and this certainly is as great as we need for practical purposes, which are the only purposes we ought to have". [[CiteRef::Locke (2015d)|p. 202]] When our senses are applied to particular perceptible objects, they convey into the mind perceptions of those things. This '''sensation''' is the source of most of our ideas. We can also perceive the workings of our own mind within us, which gives us ideas of the mind's own operations such as "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different things our minds do", a process which Locke calls '''reflection'''. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 18]] Simple ideas produced by these processes can be grouped into complex ideas, such as those of substances and modes. '''Substances''' are independently existing things like God, angels, humans, animals, plants, and constructed things. '''Modes''' are dependently existing things like mathematical and moral ideas, which form the content of religion, politics, and culture. Note that while Locke does not believe that we are born with ideas, he believes we are born with faculties to receive and manipulate them. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Locke rejected Descartes contention that thinking was an inherent property of the mind. He wrote that "To ask, at what time a Man has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body; which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a man's ideas, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of his soul". [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]
As a corpuscularist, Locke took all observable bodies to be composed of invisibly small material particles called corpuscles. Such particles interacted primarily by direct physical contact, which could convey motion. Locke however, did accept Issac Newton's concept of gravitation, believing it this attraction at a distance to be a special property added to matter by God. [[CiteRef:: Kochiras (2014)]] Material bodies had certain '''primary qualities''' including size, shape, texture, and motion, which were impossible to separate from them. They also had '''secondary qualities''', which were the object's abilities to produce sensations of color, sound, taste, and smell in human beings when they interact with bodies or particles with the appropriate primary qualities. [[CiteRef::Kochiras (2014)]] Unlike Descartes, Locke accepted the possibility that the soul might be material. In book IV of his Essay, he wrote that "anyone who will allow himself to think freely...will hardly find reason directing him firmly for or against the soul's materiality". He argued that the materiality of the soul was consistent with "the great ends of religion and morality", since God might effect the material resurrection of the dead on judgment day. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 205]]
=== Locke on Scientific Methodology ===
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