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|Summary=Karl Popper’s epistemological theories on the logic of scientific discovery were his proposal for what constituted a good scientific method. Popper’s early work centered on three objectives: (1) # solving Hume’s problem concerning inductive reasoning; (2) # to objectively evaluate theories, separately from direct testing (due to criticism based on the Duhem-Quine thesis); and (3), # to formulate a critical method for scientific change, consisting of a cycle of conjectures, refutations, and corrections for falsified theories. Popper’s work directly opposed the positivist principle that inductive logic adequately separates empirical sciences from metaphysical and non-scientific knowledge. His critical rationalism stands as a unique variation from a lineage of competing interpretations of the mind’s limitations when attempting to prove the truth of general empirical claims, such as scientific theories. Popper’s approach focused on ascertaining criteria for a demarcation between science and non-science, and on debunking the opinion that science establishes truth beyond doubt. He defined a value for scientific progress beyond both the optimism of describing essences and realities hidden behind appearances, and the pessimism that relegates scientific discovery to instrumental, or heuristic utility.