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Popper’s work directly opposed the positivist principle that inductive logic adequately separates empirical sciences from metaphysical and non-scientific knowledge. His critical rationalism stands as a unique variation from a lineage of competing interpretations of the mind’s limitations when attempting to prove the truth of general empirical claims, such as scientific theories. Popper’s approach focused on ascertaining criteria for a demarcation between science and non-science, and on debunking the opinion that science establishes truth beyond doubt. He defined a value for scientific progress beyond both the optimism of describing essences and realities hidden behind appearances, and the pessimism that relegates scientific discovery to instrumental, or heuristic utility.

|Historical Context=Pyrrho’s skepticism is commonly associated with philosophical thought on the nature of things in themselves as necessarily separated from our experience of them. This problem of sensations leads to accepting a limitation to empirical knowledge. Such limits influenced the classical philosophy of the Enlightenment as well as contemporary philosophy of science, including Popper’s critical rationalism.