Changes

Larry Laudan is an American philosopher who contributed to the study of philosophy of science in the 1970s and 80s. He wrote many works notably, including ''Progress and its Problems'' (1977), ''Science and Hypothesis'' (1981) and ''Science and Values'' (1984). Larry Laudan’s most notable contribution to the study of scientific change is the idea that scientific methods change, representing a departure from the tradition of [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhnian]] “paradigms.” Laudan presents presented his reticulated model as an explanation for how methods can change and he defended this view from the criticisms made by notable prominent colleagues like [[John Worrall]].

Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part to of the changing nature of science.

Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. In He first subscribes to this view in his 1984 work Science and Values , wherein he describes his reticulated model, which serves as a demonstration of his belief . He believed that scientific methods change. He believed this because he viewed an individual scientist’s goals as being a major contributing force to the formulation of scientific methods. This view was against the beliefs commonly held belief in the community among philosophers of science that methods of science do not change. By 1988, his beliefs on method change became slightly less clear. In Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (1988), it appears as though he is defending a static methodview of methods. Laudan was a co-author of authored a series of papers which stated belef in this described a static method, however, the view of unchanging methods is nonetheless present in this work. As such, one can draw two conclusions: either, he changed his view on dynamic methods , or he merely did not object to the static method being assumed in the work. Judging by how closely his 1988 work is dated to Science and Values, it is in all likelihood the latter option.

The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states the assumption that it, “[…] assumes that the “the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”
The Covariance Fallacy comes in two forms. Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists scientific beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, if two scientists disagree in the Kuhnian tradition, where each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are in the scientists belong to different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe.Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given set of scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.

This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a given scientific phenomena phenomenon to what constitutes evidence of for a theory. An example of a disagreement of at the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, in where with Newton believed believing in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also different levels of resolution: Methodological for Factual, Axiological for Methodological and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve the disputes a dispute, the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can work in the higher levelbe resolved there. Laudan posits suggests that this is the structure for model according to which it is understood how scientists resolve disputes prior to positing his reticulated methodmodel.

Laudan’s first distinct reason for refuting a goal is that the goal is seen as being utopian and unrealizable. He gives three types of utopianism: demonstrable utopianism, semantic utopianism, and epistemic utopianism. * Demonstrable: The Demonstrable utopianism amounts to when the cognitive goals are not possible to achieve due to possibly achievable because of the laws of nature or our understanding of logic. * Semantic: Semantic Utopianism is exemplified when scientists state goals that cannot be characterized in a “succinct and cogent way”; that is to say , the goals they state can be imprecise and ambiguous. * Epistemic: Epistemic Utopianism is adhered to when those who are seeking the a goal can give a clear definition of their clearly define that goal , but they cannot show it is not utopian. Laudan’s second reason for refuting a goal is when it is not congruent with its implicit and explicit components. This Such a discontinuity can result occur when a person creating a theory fails to recognize certain consequences of the theory. As such, what is assumed to be his goal is actually an unrecognized consequence. Laudan elaborates, “Since virtually any action has indefinitely many consequences…[t]here is always some doubt about which, if any, of these consequences were the one the agent intended to bring about and which were in effect, just incidental or inadvertent side effects of his actions.” The fact that an agent can be unaware of unseen goals is further compounded by the fact that in some cases the agent is simply unaware of what their goals are, or they may seek to hide their goals from the community.

The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where the theories, methods, theories and aims of science are all changeable. One aspect of having changeable; theories, methods and aims is that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for why someone would want to engage engaging in scientific inquiry and because of this . Accordingly, there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of having multiple goals is that the goals which meet the requirements of the model may be mutually incompatible.

To demonstrate the incompatibility that between two goals can have let, consider two scientists possessing different goals, the following example of Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Now Though Goal 2 is obviously rather extreme but Goal 2 suggests , it makes the claim that nature is not real, where . Goal 1 , on the other hand, implicitly assumes natures nature's existence. These The two views goals are incompatible as they both strive to prove opposite claims. One : one cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is assumed nature does exist.

The reticulated model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore , the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Progress beingHere, progress means “a certain sequence of theories [that] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal states.” As long as progress, relative scientists are moving closer to their goals, occurs then it science can be said to be progressing. However, science does not have to require progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing that compels us to make our judgements of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are various. Implications An implication that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science are is that the apparent progressiveness of science is dependent depends on the value metric of the given scientific community in question.

In 1988, [[John Worrall]] responded to Laudan’s ''Science and Values'' in a paper titled "The Value of Fixed Methodology" (1988.) Worrall seeks , attempting to demonstrate how the reticulated model is was incorrect by stating . In the paper, Worrall argued that when Laudan claims, methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change is real. Implicit methodology to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary.

In 1989 Laudan replies replied to Worrall’s criticism in "If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it" (1989). There, Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.

In turn, Worrall replies replied to Laudan in his "Fix it and be Damned" (1989). Worrall claims claimed that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science.

The idea that methods of science change but do so in a rational fashion is one of Laudan's lasting contributionsto the philosophy of science.