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{{Bibliographic Record
|Title=Cognitive and Non-cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy
|Resource Type=collection article
|Author=Helen Longino
|Year=1996
|Cover Image=
|Abstract=Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical
data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches
those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in
agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed
to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge.
I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria
drawn from a pool of cognitive or theoretical values, such as simplicity or generality,
to bolster judgements about the worth of models, theories, and hypotheses.
What is the status of such criteria? Larry Laudan, in Science and Values, argued
that cognitive values could not be treated as self-validating, beyond justification,
but are embedded in a three-way reticulational system containing theories,
methods, and aims or values, which are involved in mutually supportive relationships
(Laudan, 1984). My interest in this paper is not the purportedly selfvalidating
nature of cognitive values, but their cognitive nature. Although Laudan
rejects the idea that what he calls cognitive values are exempt from rational criticism
and disagreement, he does seem to think that the reticulational system he
identifies is independent of non-cognitive considerations. It is this cognitive/
non-cognitive distinction that I wish to query in this paper. Let me begin by summarizing
those of my own views about inquiry in which this worry about the
distinction arises.
|Historical Context=
|Synopsis=
|Criticism=
|URL=
|DOI=
|Page Status=Stub
|Publisher=
|ISBN=
|Collection=Nelson and Nelson 1996
|Journal=
|Volume=
|Number=
|Pages=39-58
}}
|Title=Cognitive and Non-cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy
|Resource Type=collection article
|Author=Helen Longino
|Year=1996
|Cover Image=
|Abstract=Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empirical
data can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreaches
those elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or in
agreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developed
to minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge.
I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteria
drawn from a pool of cognitive or theoretical values, such as simplicity or generality,
to bolster judgements about the worth of models, theories, and hypotheses.
What is the status of such criteria? Larry Laudan, in Science and Values, argued
that cognitive values could not be treated as self-validating, beyond justification,
but are embedded in a three-way reticulational system containing theories,
methods, and aims or values, which are involved in mutually supportive relationships
(Laudan, 1984). My interest in this paper is not the purportedly selfvalidating
nature of cognitive values, but their cognitive nature. Although Laudan
rejects the idea that what he calls cognitive values are exempt from rational criticism
and disagreement, he does seem to think that the reticulational system he
identifies is independent of non-cognitive considerations. It is this cognitive/
non-cognitive distinction that I wish to query in this paper. Let me begin by summarizing
those of my own views about inquiry in which this worry about the
distinction arises.
|Historical Context=
|Synopsis=
|Criticism=
|URL=
|DOI=
|Page Status=Stub
|Publisher=
|ISBN=
|Collection=Nelson and Nelson 1996
|Journal=
|Volume=
|Number=
|Pages=39-58
}}