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|SummaryBrief='''Ludwik Fleck''' (1896–1961) was a Polish-Jewish microbiologist, whose writings made an important early contribution to the historical philosophy and sociology of science. |Summary=He was a pioneer in the social epistemology of science,[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] and is seen as a significant influence on Thomas Kuhn’s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''.[[CiteRef::Babich (2003)]] Fleck developed a descriptive system of scientific communities, called ''thought-collectives'' (''Denkkollektiv'') with incommensurable ''thought-styles'' (''Denkstil''), and focused on the historical development and fallibility of “facts” as a result of faulty social constructions.
Fleck wrote the primary elements of his concept of thought-collectives and thought-styles in German before the Second World War in Lwów, Poland (now Lviv, Ukraine), notably in the 1935 book ''Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact'', and his 1936 paper ''The Problem of Epistemology''. The invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany and Fleck’s capture in 1941 prevented further development of Fleck’s philosophy until after the war.
Fleck purports that a proto-idea lies at the basis of any thought-style, and provides persistent influence on the style and its facts over time. Fleck cites that modern atomic theory was developed step-by-step from Democritus’ atomist doctrine.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] Proto-ideas are initially generated (in the language of Fleck) as a spontaneous transposition of experience, in the form of analogies of a philosophical and spiritual nature.[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]][[CiteRef::Fleck (1936)]] A proto-idea, says Fleck, becomes a subconscious guiding principle. Even if facts disintegrate the primitive assumptions of the proto-idea, it still conditions the pursuit of particular questions for the thought-collective.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1936)]]
Before a thought-style exists to explain a kind of phenomena, or before an individual is inducted into the appropriate thought-collective to understand the phenomena, said "inexperienced person, [...] cannot 'see' — he 'looks'. He perceives at first only a 'chaos'."[[Cognition CiteRef::Cohen and fact: materials on Ludwik FleckSchnelle (Eds.) (1986)]] This chaos can be transposed into the foundation of a thought-style, to be elaborated on. For instance, Fleck cites that modern atomic theory was developed step-by-step from Democritus’ atomist doctrine.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] From the proto-idea of the atomists, modern atomic theory is fixed in position to ask about the combination and separation of atoms, their motions, and effects — and little else. This is strictly because that these presumptions lie in the basis of the thought-style, presumptions including the idea that inseparable particles exist, and hold in perfect mathematical relations to each other, and account for all matter. These presumptions and inherent guiding principles and relations are, according to Fleck, inherited from the pre-Socratic thought-style.
Fleck notes that contemporary members of a thought-collective will marvel at this “wisdom” and presume that their predecessors had a particularly strong sense of intuition. Fleck asserts that the reality is that these vague proto-ideas still hold a grip on the present-day community and shape the permitted pursuit of ideas, and the observational connections made (rather, the knowledge available to be discovered), such that it naturally seems obvious to have arrived at these observations.[[CiteRef::Fleck (1979)]] Modern atomic theorists arrived at the idea of indivisible, indestructible, fundamental and universal particles, just as the early Atomists did, not because of clever intuition but because that these presumptions were pre-set.
|Criticism=Fleck’s primary philosophical work was laid out in the mid-1930s, and while the reception of his papers was on the whole positive,[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] the Second World War, and the invasion of Lwów in 1941 and Fleck’s capture by the Germans generally stunted the spread of his work — an English translation would not be available until 1979 with ''Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact''.
Fleck on the whole is frequently scene seen as a standout, peculiarly-informed precursor to future theories of the sociology of science — including features of incommensurability and historical a priori forms. Thomas Kuhn spoke positively of Fleck, considering him a predecessor and early adopter of many ideas that were present in the ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. Only in Kuhn’s preface to ''Structure'' is Fleck’s work mentioned however, as “an essay that anticipated many of [Kuhn’s] own ideas.”[[CiteRef::Kuhn (19621962a)]] Babette E. Babich suggests that Kuhn did not neglect, but rather intentionally avoided referencing Fleck in ''Structure'' proper in light of the Cold War political circumstances surrounding Structure’s publication.[[CiteRef::Babich (2003)]]
Fleck is most appreciated in circles of German philosophers and historians of science, also being seen as an early adopter of historical reconstruction, ala Kuhn, in the epistemology of science. As well, in France, Bruno Latour considers Fleck the founder of the sociology of science.[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]]
|Related Topics=Scientific Change, Scientific Community, Static vs. Dynamic Methods, Role of Sociocultural Factors in Scientific Change, Role of Sociocultural Factors in Theory Acceptance, Sociocultural Factors,
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