Difference between revisions of "Method"

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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
 
|Formulated Year=2015
 
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Prehistory here- currently in progress
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|Prehistory=In classical philosophy of science, although theories and methods are closely bound up with one another, theories change but the scientific method does not. According to [[Paul Hoyningen-Huene|Hoyningen-Huene]],[[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2008)]][[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2013)]] from the time of the Ancients until the second half of the 20th century science just was characterized by its method. [[Aristotle]] and his medieval successors identified science with absolute certainty guaranteed by axiomatic proof. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics as well as the Organon, Aristotle identified three determinants of scientific method: the aims of discovery/ordering/display of facts gained through passive observation, the nature of the knowledge pursued as well as the explanatory causes of that kind of knowledge, and a logical system to aid the proper arrangement of and inferences from observation.[[CiteRef::Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]] In the West, these ideas were perpetuated and refined by medieval thinkers like [[Albertus Magnus]], [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[Robert Grosseteste]], [[Roger Bacon]], [[William of Ockham]], [[Andreas Vesalius]], and [[Giacomo Zabarella]]. They developed accounts of the acquisition of knowledge through observation and induction and rules for the justification and application of induction. Scholars from the East such as [[Al-Kindi]], [[Alhazen]], and [[Averroes]] were more critical of the Ancients.  
|History=The original definition of the term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
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|Current View=Three different types of criteria have been identified so far: criteria of demarcation, criteria of acceptance, and criteria of compatibility. Methods should not be confused with openly professed [[Methodology|methodologies]], which prescribe how science ''ought'' to be done. Methods should also be differentiated from research techniques, which are used in theory construction and data gathering.
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The Scientific Revolution of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries involved serious reflection on the legitimacy of the methods that facilitated the rapid advancements in scientific knowledge at the time. Thinkers like [[Galileo Galilei]] and [[Francis Bacon]] emphasized mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important constituents of a disinterested method. [[Isaac Newton]]’s Opticks (1704)[[CiteRef::Newton (1704)]] and Principia Mathematica (1726)[[CiteRef::Newton (1999)]] also excluded non-epistemic values and subjectivity from scientific practice through his implicit method of experiments and reasoning and his explicit methodological rules. Subsequent thinkers clarified and reinforced Newton’s approach, including [[Colin Maclaurin]], [[Denis Diderot]], and [[Francesco Algarotti]]. However, some criticized the self-effacement of the scientist and inductivism. These thinkers include the likes of [[George Berkeley]] (1734),[[CiteRef::Berkeley (1992)]] who challenged the Newtonian image of science, and [[David Hume]]’s attack on induction (1739).[[CiteRef::Hume (2000)]]
== Open questions ==
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•How do technological research tools relate to employed methods? Currently, according to the TSC, knowledge concerning technical tools takes the forms of accepted beliefs, for example: “telescopes are useful tools for examining distant celestial bodies”. This in turn leads to the employment of telescopes as a method for examining celestial bodies. However, are there technological tools that are used independently of any method? Consider the telescope before is was known to be useful to astronomy(Paul Patton, 2016) One possibility might be the technique of brainstorming: we commonly use it as a research technique, but don’t seem to formulate it as a method. (Hakob Barseghyan, 2016)
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A search for new foundations to undergird the empirical method ensued in response to these critics. The most notable example is [[Immanuel Kant]]’s (1781) reply to Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason.[[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Kant’s contributions generated additional debates on science and methods. In centre stage during the 19th century was [[John S. Mill]]’s inductivism versus [[William Whewell]]’s hypothetico-deductivism. For both thinkers, theory acceptance and method employment remained closely bound up.
  
• Can we apply the "accepted/used/pursued" distinction to methods? If so, this might help us in our analysis of how normative propositions (especially ethical propositions) affect method employment. For example, a method deemed unethical may not be used, but still accepted as being effective for theory assessment.
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But the quantum revolution of the 20th century soon uprooted the security of commonsense intuitions, coaxing a renewed empiricism. From this emerged a methodological distinction by [[Hans Reichenbach]] (1938) between the contexts of discovery and justification.[[CiteRef::Reichenbach (1938)]] The literature focused on the latter, especially through such works as [[Rudolf Carnap]]’s logical positivism which attempted to axiomatize scientific theories.
  
• The TSC currently states that the employment of a new concrete method cannot lead to the rejection of another employed method. However, it seems conceivable that method X might cease to be employed when a new method is employed which is thought to be more effective than X. Are there any examples of this happening in the history of science? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
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Nevertheless, the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification was challenged by the theory-ladenness of observation. Emphasis on the sociological, institutional, material, and political variables within science grew, thanks to the work of pioneers like [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Dudley Shapere]], [[Larry Laudan]], and [[Ernan McMullin]]. They replaced the positivists’ rational image of science with historicism. Some sociologists went further, claiming that it was not methods but social ideologies or individual interactions/circumstances that primarily determined the beliefs that obtained to scientific knowledge (e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1979)]] (1986),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1986)]] Shapin and Schaffer (1985)[[CiteRef::Shapin and Schaffer (1985)]]). In addition, philosophers of science increasingly specialized on specific fields within science.[[CiteRef::Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]] Combined, these changes culminated in the abandonment of a grand unifying scientific methodology. Furthermore, by the 1980s philosophers of science concluded that theories and methods change and, moreover, theories shape methods.
  
• Scientists often seem to rely on practical propositions when conduction research— e.g “when conducting an experiment, chose the cheapest technique capable of producing acceptable results”. What is the status of practical propositions like these in the mosaic? Are they normative theories, or a separate entity? How are they accepted into the mosaic, and how do they change through time? How do they affect other elements of the mosaic? Do they affect method employment? (Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, 2016)
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But philosophers like Larry Laudan rejected the notion that change in science occurs all at once. Instead, he proposed that theories and methodologies can change at different times. Contemporary studies attempt to reconcile sociological and rationalist accounts of scientific knowledge and method to understand how methods change, especially in relation to theory acceptance.
 
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|History=The original definition of the term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
• Can a method become employed by being the deductive consequence of an already accepted methodology? How would this affect the Methodology Can Shape Methods theorem, which states that methodology can only affect the employment of methods which are implementations of some more abstract requirement? (Mirka Loiselle, 2016)
 
 
|Related Topics=Theory, Scientific Mosaic
 
|Related Topics=Theory, Scientific Mosaic
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|Page Status=Needs Editing
 
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|Acceptance Indicators=That's when the first scientonomic definition of the term, [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)]], became accepted, which is a indication that the topic itself is considered legitimate.
 
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Revision as of 00:40, 18 March 2018

What is method? How should it be defined?

One of the tasks of scientonomy is to explain how methods change through time. Thus, a proper definition of method is in order.

In the scientonomic context, this term was first used by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The term is currently accepted by Scientonomy community.

In Scientonomy, the accepted definition of the term is:

  • A set of criteria for theory evaluation.

Broader History

In classical philosophy of science, although theories and methods are closely bound up with one another, theories change but the scientific method does not. According to Hoyningen-Huene,12 from the time of the Ancients until the second half of the 20th century science just was characterized by its method. Aristotle and his medieval successors identified science with absolute certainty guaranteed by axiomatic proof. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics as well as the Organon, Aristotle identified three determinants of scientific method: the aims of discovery/ordering/display of facts gained through passive observation, the nature of the knowledge pursued as well as the explanatory causes of that kind of knowledge, and a logical system to aid the proper arrangement of and inferences from observation.3 In the West, these ideas were perpetuated and refined by medieval thinkers like Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, William of Ockham, Andreas Vesalius, and Giacomo Zabarella. They developed accounts of the acquisition of knowledge through observation and induction and rules for the justification and application of induction. Scholars from the East such as Al-Kindi, Alhazen, and Averroes were more critical of the Ancients.

The Scientific Revolution of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries involved serious reflection on the legitimacy of the methods that facilitated the rapid advancements in scientific knowledge at the time. Thinkers like Galileo Galilei and Francis Bacon emphasized mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important constituents of a disinterested method. Isaac Newton’s Opticks (1704)4 and Principia Mathematica (1726)5 also excluded non-epistemic values and subjectivity from scientific practice through his implicit method of experiments and reasoning and his explicit methodological rules. Subsequent thinkers clarified and reinforced Newton’s approach, including Colin Maclaurin, Denis Diderot, and Francesco Algarotti. However, some criticized the self-effacement of the scientist and inductivism. These thinkers include the likes of George Berkeley (1734),6 who challenged the Newtonian image of science, and David Hume’s attack on induction (1739).7

A search for new foundations to undergird the empirical method ensued in response to these critics. The most notable example is Immanuel Kant’s (1781) reply to Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason.8 Kant’s contributions generated additional debates on science and methods. In centre stage during the 19th century was John S. Mill’s inductivism versus William Whewell’s hypothetico-deductivism. For both thinkers, theory acceptance and method employment remained closely bound up.

But the quantum revolution of the 20th century soon uprooted the security of commonsense intuitions, coaxing a renewed empiricism. From this emerged a methodological distinction by Hans Reichenbach (1938) between the contexts of discovery and justification.9 The literature focused on the latter, especially through such works as Rudolf Carnap’s logical positivism which attempted to axiomatize scientific theories.

Nevertheless, the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification was challenged by the theory-ladenness of observation. Emphasis on the sociological, institutional, material, and political variables within science grew, thanks to the work of pioneers like Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Imre Lakatos, Dudley Shapere, Larry Laudan, and Ernan McMullin. They replaced the positivists’ rational image of science with historicism. Some sociologists went further, claiming that it was not methods but social ideologies or individual interactions/circumstances that primarily determined the beliefs that obtained to scientific knowledge (e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979),10 (1986),11 Shapin and Schaffer (1985)12). In addition, philosophers of science increasingly specialized on specific fields within science.3 Combined, these changes culminated in the abandonment of a grand unifying scientific methodology. Furthermore, by the 1980s philosophers of science concluded that theories and methods change and, moreover, theories shape methods.

But philosophers like Larry Laudan rejected the notion that change in science occurs all at once. Instead, he proposed that theories and methodologies can change at different times. Contemporary studies attempt to reconcile sociological and rationalist accounts of scientific knowledge and method to understand how methods change, especially in relation to theory acceptance.

Scientonomic History

The original definition of the term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015.13

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this question (it includes all the instances when the question was accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by a community):
CommunityAccepted FromAcceptance IndicatorsStill AcceptedAccepted UntilRejection Indicators
Scientonomy1 January 2016That's when the first scientonomic definition of the term, Method (Barseghyan-2015), became accepted, which is a indication that the topic itself is considered legitimate.Yes

All Theories

The following theories have attempted to answer this question:
TheoryFormulationFormulated In
Method (Barseghyan-2015)A set of requirements for employment in theory assessment.2015
Method (Barseghyan-2018)A set of criteria for theory evaluation.2018

If an answer to this question is missing, please click here to add it.

Accepted Theories

The following theories have been accepted as answers to this question:
CommunityTheoryAccepted FromAccepted Until
ScientonomyMethod (Barseghyan-2015)1 January 20161 September 2019
ScientonomyMethod (Barseghyan-2018)1 September 2019

Suggested Modifications

Here is a list of modifications concerning this topic:
Modification Community Date Suggested Summary Verdict Verdict Rationale Date Assessed
Sciento-2018-0005 Scientonomy 8 October 2018 Accept the new definitions of method as a set of criteria for theory evaluation and methodology as a normative discipline that formulates the rules which ought to be employed in theory assessment. Accepted The consensus concerning this modification emerged primarily off-line, following a series of discussions. It was noted that the new definition "does clarify the scientific understanding of methods as normative theories that can be both accepted and employed".c1 It was also highlighted that the consensus on this modification "has been manifested on several occasions, including the first scientonomy conference in May 2019 in Toronto, where several of the speakers treated the suggested definition of method as accepted".c2 Importantly, it was also agreed that the acceptance of "this definition will require a whole series of changes to other theories already accepted by the scientonomic community to accord with the new definitions, for example, the Methodology can shape Method theorem."c3 This raises an important workflow-related question: does this mean that the encyclopedia editors have the right to make the respective changes?c4 1 September 2019

Current View

In Scientonomy, the accepted definition of the term is Method (Barseghyan-2018).

Method (Barseghyan-2018) states: "A set of criteria for theory evaluation."

Method (Barseghyan-2018).png

This definition of method is meant to encompass the criteria of evaluation of all types, regardless of their being explicit or implicit, and thus merge what was previously separated into two classes of elements - methods and methodologies.

Related Topics

This topic is also related to the following topic(s):

References

  1. ^  Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. (2008) Systematicity: The Nature of Science. Philosophia 36 (2), 167-180.
  2. ^  Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. (2013) Systematicity: The Nature of Science. Oxford University Press.
  3. a b  Andersen, Hanne and Hepburn, Brian. (2015) Scientific Method. In Zalta (Ed.) (2016). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-method/.
  4. ^  Newton, Isaac. (1704) Opticks: or, A Treatise of the Reflexions, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours of Light. Prince's Arms in St. Paul's Churchyard. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/opticksortreatis00newt.
  5. ^  Newton, Isaac. (1999) The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. University of California Press.
  6. ^  Berkeley, George. (1992) De Motu and The Analyst: A Modern Edition with Introductions and Commentary. Springer.
  7. ^  Hume, David. (2000) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
  8. ^  Kant, Immanuel. (1781) Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press.
  9. ^  Reichenbach, Hans. (1938) Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. Literary Licensing.
  10. ^  Latour, Bruno and Woolgar, Steve. (1979) Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press.
  11. ^  Latour, Bruno and Woolgar, Steve. (1986) Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press.
  12. ^  Shapin, Steven and Schaffer, Simon. (1985) Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Princeton University Press.
  13. ^  Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.