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|Prehistory=The social constructivists do not use a particular line of reasoning to argue for their case. Over the years, various approaches have been taken to show that science is not independent of external sociocultural factors.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), Thomas Kuhn argues that Science cannot be investigated with an objective outlook, for the formulation of “objective” conclusions of science are products of the activity of subjective scientists and researchers in the first place. His idea was that science undergoes ‘paradigm shifts’ rather than progressing in a linear and continuous way[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 75]].
In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (1970), Imre Lakatos claims that the scientific methodology constitutes research programmes that dictate, which theories are accepted over time[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 187]]. This implies that the method of theory acceptance is a subjective one.In The Social Construction of What (1999), Ian Hacking posits that the idea that Science is a social construct can be argued through the Contingency thesis and the Nominalist thesis[[CiteRef::Hacking (1999)|p. 89]].
The Contingency thesis argues that Science cannot be said to be deterministic as the evolution of scientific mosaic is not contingent. This claim implies that the scientific mosaic could develop in ways that we cannot predict (as any change to the mosaic if fundamentally not inevitable). As such, no general laws or theories of scientific change can be devised through inspection of the evolution of Science[[CiteRef::Hacking (1999)|pp. 78-80]].
The Nominalist Thesis posits that the scientific mosaic is not reflective of the inner structure of the world. This means that our scientific theories can describe our experiences and can serve as important instruments, but they do not ultimately reveal to us any truth about the external world. This is because the external world does not have any inherent structure, or at least as far as we know. Hence, one cannot predict the evolution of Science in the future or devise any such laws to describe them[[CiteRef::Hacking (1999)|p. 84]].
Another Social Constructivist thesis that undermines the possibility of scientific change is the Reducibility thesis. In The Laws of Scientific (2015), Barsegyhan discusses that the Reducibility thesis can be construed in three distinct forms[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.93]]:
Ontological Reducibility Thesis: “The scientific mosaic and scientific change cannot exist independently of the underlying social interactions.”