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{{Definitional Topic

|Topic Type=Definitional|Description=It is currently accepted in scientonomy Sarwar and Fraser [[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] argue that an epistemic agent can take three distinct stances towards a theory: acceptance, use, unique and pursuit.While these three stances are essential for understanding the process of scientific change, the current framework fails to capture an important independent epistemic stance that can be taken by epistemic agents take agenst towards theories, ''scientificity''. It is a historical fact The history of science shows that that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and others some as unscientific. For example, ; general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community ,[[CiteRef::Hartle (Hartle, 20052006), ]] while the theory of phlogiston theory is considered unscientific .[[CiteRef::Wisniak (Wisniak, 20052004). One suggested subspecies of unscientific theories ]] It is generally understood that is often considered in the literature is there exist pseudoscientific theories (Hanson, 2017). Furthermore, it is also possible for an agent not to have any definitive stance concerning the scientificity of which are a theory. In such cases, we can say that the scientificity subclass of that theory is undefined for that agentunscientific theories. Consider the current status of marketing. There is clearly no consensus in the scientific community about the scientific status of marketing. Some view it as an amalgamation of theories from other scientific disciplines [[CiteRef::Hansson (which they claim render it scientific2017)]] It is important, while others contend that it does not therefore, to have a scientific identity and it merely applies other theories (Brown, 1996; Anderson, 1983)definition of scientificity.|Parent Topic=It is argued in (|Authors List=Ameer Sarwar & , Patrick Fraser, |Formulated Year=2018) that |Prehistory=|History=|Current View=If scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, it must have a definition, but it is unclear how it should be definedwhat a precise definition would entail. Consider the following definition (suggested to us by Paul Patton in a private correspondence)hypothetical formulation: “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. At first, this definition seems This may appear to be a an intuitively plausible starting point. After all, questions have been recently accepted into the scientonomic ontology of epistemic elements, and it strikes one as intuitive that because any scientific theory that claims to be scientific must, at the very least, try attempt to answer a question that is itself considered also scientific. However, this definition won’t do as it has at least four drawbacks. To begin with, it uses the concept of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is circularly dependent on the concept of scientificity. In order to understand what makes an inquiry scientifically legitimate, one must understand what scientificity is, and in order to understand what scientificity is, one must know what scientifically legitimate inquiry is. Clearly, this definition does little to clarify the notion of scientificityfails for several reasons.

SecondFirst, it defers the phrase “legitimate topic content of scientific inquiry” is itself undefined in scientificity's definition to the scientonomic context. The only time something similar to this phrase occurs in scientonomic literature is in Rawleigh’s definition of question acceptance: “a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry” (Rawleigh, 2018, p. 10). However, Rawleigh which itself is cautious enough not to include “scientific” in his definition. Consequently, although we do have an accepted definition dependent on the concept of question acceptance, we currently lack any notion of question scientificity. Thus, if we were This circularity does little to define the notion of theory scientificity by means of question scientificity. Furthermore, we would be relying on a yet undefined concept according to Sarwar and would be pushing the task further back, without introducing much clarity to the definiendum. FurthermoreFraser, "dealing with a “legitimate "legitimate topic of scientific inquiry” inquiry" may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific". Take, for example, the question “what determines the variation in human temperament?” which is currently considered scientific in mainstream personality psychology. Naturally, the very fact [[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] Sarwar and Fraser go further and claim that a certain theory attempts to answer this question is not sufficient to render theory scientific. After all, one could give astrological or phrenological explanations for the differences in human temperaments. This would be a case of a theory providing unscientific answers to a scientific question. Thus, attempting to answer a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry is not sufficient for a theory to be considered scientific. Finally, "it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic for the same reasons listed above... It is always possible to construct ''ad hoc'', non-scientific theories that answer a given [scientific] question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific". Therefore, the [[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] The content of questions cannot determine scientific theories from unscientific theories. Although this was only a single attempt appears to formulate be a definition of fruitless avenue for defining scientificity, it . This highlights many of the complexities complexity that arise arises when one tackles this problem. It is therefore an important, though complex open question as attempts to how one might properly formulate the notion of concretely define scientificityare made.|Authors List=Ameer SarwarConsequently, Patrick Frasera definition is needed,|Formulated Year=2018but it is not provided.