Difference between revisions of "Scientificity"

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|Question=What is '''scientificity'''? How should it be ''defined''?
 
|Question=What is '''scientificity'''? How should it be ''defined''?
 
|Topic Type=Definitional
 
|Topic Type=Definitional
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|Description=It is currently accepted in scientonomy that an epistemic agent can take three distinct stances towards a theory: acceptance, use, and pursuit.
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|Description=Scientonomy currently accepts three distinct stances which an epistemic agent may take towards a theory: acceptance, use, and pursuit.
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While these three stances are essential for understanding the process of scientific change, the current framework fails to capture an important epistemic stance that epistemic agents take towards theories, scientificity. It is a historical fact that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and others as unscientific. For example, general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community (Hartle, 2005), while phlogiston theory is considered unscientific (Wisniak, 2005). One suggested subspecies of unscientific theories that is often considered in the literature is pseudoscientific theories (Hanson, 2017). Furthermore, it is also possible for an agent not to have any definitive stance concerning the scientificity of a theory. In such cases, we can say that the scientificity of that theory is undefined for that agent. Consider the current status of marketing. There is clearly no consensus in the scientific community about the scientific status of marketing. Some view it as an amalgamation of theories from other scientific disciplines (which they claim render it scientific), while others contend that it does not have a scientific identity and it merely applies other theories (Brown, 1996; Anderson, 1983).
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Sarwar and Fraser [[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] argue that there is another important epistemic stance which may be taken towards theories which the current framework precludes: scientificity. We see from the history of science that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and some as unscientific; general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community [[CiteRef::Hartle (2006)]], while the theory of phlogiston is considered unscientific [[CiteRef::Wisniak (2005)]]. It is generally understood that there exist pseudoscientific theories, which are a subclass of unscientific theories [[CiteRef::Hanson (2017)]]. Furthermore, an agent may not take a definitive stance regarding the scientificity of a theory. Consider the academic discipline of marketing, for instance; there is no consensus about the scientific status of marketing, and there are arguments for and against the claim that marketing is a scientific discipline [[CiteRef::Brown (1996)]][[CiteRef::Anderson (1983)]].
  
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It is argued in (Sarwar & Fraser, 2018) that scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, but it is unclear how it should be defined. Consider the following definition (suggested to us by Paul Patton in a private correspondence): “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. At first, this definition seems to be a plausible starting point. After all, questions have been recently accepted into the scientonomic ontology of epistemic elements, and it strikes one as intuitive that any theory that claims to be scientific must, at the very least, try to answer a question that is itself considered scientific. However, this definition won’t do as it has at least four drawbacks.
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If scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, it must have a definition, but it is unclear how it should be precisely defined. Consider the following hypothetical formulation: “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. This may appear to be a plausible starting point, now that questions have been accepted into the scientonomic ontology of epistemic elements, and it might strike one as intuitive that any scientific theory must attempt to answer a scientific question. However, this definition fails for several reasons.
  
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To begin with, it uses the concept of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is circularly dependent on the concept of scientificity. In order to understand what makes an inquiry scientifically legitimate, one must understand what scientificity is, and in order to understand what scientificity is, one must know what scientifically legitimate inquiry is. Clearly, this definition does little to clarify the notion of scientificity.
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First, it defers the content of the definition to the definition of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is dependent on the concept of scientificity. This is circular, and so this definition does little to clarify the notion of scientificity. Furthermore, according to Sarwar and Fraser, "dealing with a `legitimate topic of scientific inquiry' may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific" [[CiteRef:Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]]. Thus, resorting to the question/answer part of the scientonomic framework in this way is not sufficient for a theory to be considered scientific. Sarwar and Fraser go further and claim that "it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic for the same reasons listed above. It is always possible to construct ad hoc, non-scientific theories that answer a given question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific" [[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]]. The content of questions appears to be a fruitless avenue for defining scientificity. This highlights the complexity that arise when one attempts to define scientificity concretely. As such, a definition is required.
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Second, the phrase “legitimate topic of scientific inquiry” is itself undefined in the scientonomic context. The only time something similar to this phrase occurs in scientonomic literature is in Rawleigh’s definition of question acceptance: “a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry” (Rawleigh, 2018, p. 10). However, Rawleigh is cautious enough not to include “scientific” in his definition. Consequently, although we do have an accepted definition of question acceptance, we currently lack any notion of question scientificity. Thus, if we were to define the notion of theory scientificity by means of question scientificity, we would be relying on a yet undefined concept and would be pushing the task further back, without introducing much clarity to the definiendum.
 
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Furthermore, dealing with a “legitimate topic of scientific inquiry” may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific. Take, for example, the question “what determines the variation in human temperament?” which is currently considered scientific in mainstream personality psychology. Naturally, the very fact that a certain theory attempts to answer this question is not sufficient to render theory scientific. After all, one could give astrological or phrenological explanations for the differences in human temperaments. This would be a case of a theory providing unscientific answers to a scientific question. Thus, attempting to answer a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry is not sufficient for a theory to be considered scientific.
 
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Finally, it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic for the same reasons listed above. It is always possible to construct ad hoc, non-scientific theories that answer a given question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific. Therefore, the content of questions cannot determine scientific theories from unscientific theories.
 
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Although this was only a single attempt to formulate a definition of scientificity, it highlights many of the complexities that arise when one tackles this problem. It is therefore an important, though complex open question as to how one might properly formulate the notion of scientificity.
 
 
|Authors List=Ameer Sarwar, Patrick Fraser,
 
|Authors List=Ameer Sarwar, Patrick Fraser,
 
|Formulated Year=2018
 
|Formulated Year=2018
 
|Page Status=Stub
 
|Page Status=Stub
 
}}
 
}}

Revision as of 19:05, 25 February 2019

What is scientificity? How should it be defined?

Scientonomy currently accepts three distinct stances which an epistemic agent may take towards a theory: acceptance, use, and pursuit.

Sarwar and Fraser 1 argue that there is another important epistemic stance which may be taken towards theories which the current framework precludes: scientificity. We see from the history of science that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and some as unscientific; general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community 2, while the theory of phlogiston is considered unscientific 3. It is generally understood that there exist pseudoscientific theories, which are a subclass of unscientific theories 4. Furthermore, an agent may not take a definitive stance regarding the scientificity of a theory. Consider the academic discipline of marketing, for instance; there is no consensus about the scientific status of marketing, and there are arguments for and against the claim that marketing is a scientific discipline 56.

If scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, it must have a definition, but it is unclear how it should be precisely defined. Consider the following hypothetical formulation: “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. This may appear to be a plausible starting point, now that questions have been accepted into the scientonomic ontology of epistemic elements, and it might strike one as intuitive that any scientific theory must attempt to answer a scientific question. However, this definition fails for several reasons.

First, it defers the content of the definition to the definition of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is dependent on the concept of scientificity. This is circular, and so this definition does little to clarify the notion of scientificity. Furthermore, according to Sarwar and Fraser, "dealing with a `legitimate topic of scientific inquiry' may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific" CiteRef:Sarwar and Fraser (2018). Thus, resorting to the question/answer part of the scientonomic framework in this way is not sufficient for a theory to be considered scientific. Sarwar and Fraser go further and claim that "it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic for the same reasons listed above. It is always possible to construct ad hoc, non-scientific theories that answer a given question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific" 1. The content of questions appears to be a fruitless avenue for defining scientificity. This highlights the complexity that arise when one attempts to define scientificity concretely. As such, a definition is required.

In the scientonomic context, this term was first used by Patrick Fraser and Ameer Sarwar in 2018.

Scientonomic History

Acceptance Record

Our records state that this question has never been accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by any community.

All Theories

According to our records, no theory has attempted to answer this question.

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Accepted Theories

According to our records, no theory on this topic has ever been accepted.

Suggested Modifications

According to our records, there have been no suggested modifications on this topic.

Current View

There is currently no accepted answer to this question.


Related Topics

References

  1. a b  Sarwar, Ameer and Fraser, Patrick. (2018) Scientificity and The Law of Theory Demarcation. Scientonomy 2, 55-66. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31275.
  2. ^  Hartle, James. (2006) General Relativity in the Undergraduate Physics Curriculum. American Journal of Physics 74 (1), 14-21..
  3. ^ Wisniak (2005) 
  4. ^ Hanson (2017) 
  5. ^  Brown, Stephen. (1996) Art or Science? Fifty Years of Marketing Debate. Journal of Marketing Management 12 (4), 243-267.
  6. ^  Anderson, Paul. (1983) Marketing, Scientific Progress, and Scientific Method. Journal of Marketing 47 (4), 18-31.

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