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Scope of Scientonomy - Time Fields and Scale (view source)
Revision as of 19:36, 30 November 2018
, 19:36, 30 November 2018no edit summary
{{Topic
|Question=For changes in the mosaic of what ''time period '' ''ought '' a scientonomic theory account? For changes in which ''fields of inquiry '' ought it to account? Ought it explain deal only in grand changes, or should it account for minor changes as well?
|Topic Type=Normative
|Description=A scientonomic theory could account for all changes that the mosaic has undergone since antiquity, or only those undergone since the scientific revolution, or over some other historically limited period. It could deal only with certain scientific fields, like physics, or biology, or with all of them. It could deal only with grand changes, like the scientific revolution, or with the kind of small changes that are constantly going on in science.
|Parent Topic=Scope of Scientonomy
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Philosophers of science often held that theories of scientific change only apply to more contemporary science, while others did not restrict their time frames. Certain philosophers have restricted their scope to more mature or hard sciences, while others have remained non-committal or unrestricted. Many scientific methodologies also distinguished between smaller and larger scale scientific changes.
Lakatos's methodology which heavily involved the notion of confirmed novel predictions in theory acceptance is hardly applicable to pre-16th century science such as Aristotelian-Medieval science where novel predictions played little to no role.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)|p. 195]] Lakatos also divides the sciences through his own demarcation between 'mature sciences' and 'immature sciences' where his research programmes are only present in the more mature sciences.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)|p. 87]] Lakatos divides the scale of scientific change into the large changes experienced by the hard core and the smaller shifts of the protective belt or auxiliary hypotheses.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)|p. 33]]
The VPI project which compared many theories of science against historical episodes restricted itself to post-16th century science.[[CiteRef::Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|p. 149]] However, it ostensibly applied to all fields of inquiry.[[CiteRef::Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|pp. 159-160]] The VPI project also distinguished between major and minor changes in science.[[CiteRef::Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|p. xii]]
Kuhn’s theory was intended to apply to ancient and medieval science as well as post-16th century science.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1996)|pp. 2-3]] Kuhn restricted himself to to mature physical sciences, despite his theory being applicable to more fields.[[CiteRef::Nickles (1986)|p. 254]] Kuhn draws the line between transitions occurring in normal science and revolutionary transitions between paradigms.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1996)|pp. 66-76]]
Both Laudan's early (1977) and late (1984) theories could apply to virtually all historical episodes. Laudan's early theory focused on science's problem-solving capability which is relevant to effectively all periods of science.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)|pp. 11-12]] Laudan's later reticulated model which included a piecemeal approach to changing scientific theory, methodology and axiology is applicable to all historical periods.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1984a)|pp. 62-66]] Laudan's theories were also applicable to most scientific domains and his reticulated model in particular could distinguish between changes in methods or aims and changes in theories.
Although some exclude political or cultural studies from the realms of scientific inquiry, Bunge notes that although political or cultural studies may seem primitive in relation to harder sciences, they do still provide scientific generalizations.[[CiteRef::Bunge (1999)|pp. 157, 220-221]] Bunge delineated between changes in specific theories and generic theories (or frameworks).[[CiteRef::Bunge (1999)|p. 99]]
Sarton explained how the history of science cannot be looked at from a fixed modern perspective.[[CiteRef::Sarton (1924)|pp. 27-34]] The evolution of scientific knowledge must be appreciated and the modern views must be understood to only stand exalted in virtue of their historical predecessors. Thus, Sarton concludes that to do history of science one must not focus exclusively modern science, but the process that lead us to where we are today.
Wilson and Ashplant also warn of restricting the fields of inquiry in the history or philosophy of science to only those fields which meet the present day's scientific demarcation criteria rather than the demarcation criteria of the past.[[CiteRef::Wilson and Ashplant (1988)|pp. 264-265]] They called this doing 'tunnel history'.
|Related Topics=Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance Use and Pursuit, Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal, Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive and Normative, Scope of Scientonomy - Explicit and Implicit, Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social,
|Page Status=Needs Editing
}}
{{Acceptance Record
|Accepted From Day=1
|Accepted From Approximate=No
|Acceptance Indicators=That is when the community accepted its first answer to this question, the Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015), which indicates that the question is itself considered legitimate. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 61-72]]
|Still Accepted=Yes
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
}}