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{{Bibliographic Record
|Title=The dynamics of group cognition
|Resource Type=journal article
|Author=Spyridon Orestis Palermos,
|Year=2016
|Abstract=The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible,
distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature)
is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science and
sociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon of
distributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examined
from the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for this
novel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitive
scientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can deliver
two distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactions
between group members necessitates the postulation of the corresponding
group entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the way
group entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcome
is a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributed
cognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, while
being well in line with materialism
|DOI=DOI 10.1007/s11023-016-9402-5
|Page Status=Stub
|Journal=Minds and Machines
|Volume=26
|Number=4
|Pages=409-440
}}
|Title=The dynamics of group cognition
|Resource Type=journal article
|Author=Spyridon Orestis Palermos,
|Year=2016
|Abstract=The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible,
distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature)
is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science and
sociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon of
distributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examined
from the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for this
novel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitive
scientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can deliver
two distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactions
between group members necessitates the postulation of the corresponding
group entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the way
group entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcome
is a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributed
cognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, while
being well in line with materialism
|DOI=DOI 10.1007/s11023-016-9402-5
|Page Status=Stub
|Journal=Minds and Machines
|Volume=26
|Number=4
|Pages=409-440
}}