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{{Bibliographic Record
|Title=Group-sized distributed cognitive systems
|Resource Type=collection article
|Author=Georg Theiner
|Year=2015
|Cover Image=
|Abstract=Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discussions
of the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive labor
in groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there are
diff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what
“ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitive
systems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debate
is taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been developed,
since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and David
Kirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up the
DC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather,
it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognition
can be analyzed as distributed.
|Historical Context=
|Synopsis=
|Criticism=
|URL=
|DOI=
|Page Status=Stub
|Publisher=
|ISBN=
|Collection=
|Journal=
|Volume=
|Number=
|Pages=
}}
|Title=Group-sized distributed cognitive systems
|Resource Type=collection article
|Author=Georg Theiner
|Year=2015
|Cover Image=
|Abstract=Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discussions
of the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive labor
in groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there are
diff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what
“ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitive
systems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debate
is taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been developed,
since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and David
Kirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up the
DC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather,
it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognition
can be analyzed as distributed.
|Historical Context=
|Synopsis=
|Criticism=
|URL=
|DOI=
|Page Status=Stub
|Publisher=
|ISBN=
|Collection=
|Journal=
|Volume=
|Number=
|Pages=
}}