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Although little is known Following the completion of his activities during studies, Hume rejected his schooling and afterwards, family's plan that he would have spent the fourth year of the curriculum at Edinburgh studying natural philosophybecome a lawyer, and would have been exposed instead determined to experimental natural philosophybecome a scholar and philosopher, including engaging in three years of intensive personal study. Living in the aftermath of the theories acceptance of [[Isaac Newton]] 's(1643-1727). [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]] Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica'' (''Mathematical Principles revolutionary theories of Natural Philosophy'motion and gravitation, eighteenth century thinkers proclaimed the ') in which he put forth his '''laws Age of motion''Enlightenment', '''law of universal gravitation''', and his inductive '''experimental expected philosophy''' more than thirty years earlier in 1687. [[CiteRef:: Westfall (1999which then included what we would call the natural and social sciences)]][[CiteRef::Janiak (2016)]] By about 1700 Newton's theory had become accepted in Britainto dramatically improve human life. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan Bristow (20152017)|p. 210]] Like Hume, like many of his times, Hume revered Newton, calling him "the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of the species". [[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]] The works of other experimental philosophers were also available to the young Hume. The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume is known to have contributed, contained an extensive collection of the works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), as well as the works of [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and [[John Locke]]'s (1632-1704) ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding''. This work, published in 1689, more than twenty years before Hume was born, propounded Locke's '''empiricist''' view of human knowledge. The library included some controversial works, such as those of the '''materialist''' Thomas Hobbs (1588-1679). [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Boyle, Newton, and Locke were all associated with the '''Royal Society of London''', which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's birth, and sought to promote the experimental method and the new natural philosophy. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]][[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]
By Little is known of Hume's timeactivities during his schooling and afterwards. According to the curriculum then in place at Edinburgh, he would have spent his fourth year studying natural philosophy, and would have been exposed to experimental natural philosophy, including Newton's theories. [[AristotleCiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]]More than thirty years earlier, in 1687, Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica''s (384 BC-322 BC''Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy'') teleological account of causation had been rejected in favor which he put forth his '''laws of the motion'''corpuscular mechanistic, ''' view law of causation espoused by Descartes, Lockeuniversal gravitation''', and the Royal Society. In this view, derived from ancient atomism, material bodies are made of invisibly small particles, called corpuscleshis inductive '''experimental philosophy'''. The only form of causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of bodies or their constituent corpuscles [[CiteRef::DePierris Westfall (20061999)]] Natural philosophers continued to accept Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and belief. Scientific knowledge was taken to be knowledge of causes and consisted of '''demonstration'''; proving the necessary connection between cause and effect. Locke supported this view of knowledge and made the popular notion of a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the associated notion of a metaphysically necessary connection between cause and effect central to his system. He nonetheless viewed demonstrative knowledge as seldom attainable because of the unobservability of corpuscles [[CiteRef::DePierris Janiak (20062016)]]By about 1700 these theories had become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] in Britain. [[CiteRef::Kochiras Barseghyan (20142015)|p. 210]] Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and Locke's empiricism The works of other experimental philosophers were also available to constitute a unified system, there was a distinct tension between themthe young Hume. The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume recognized. Newton had been unable is known to explain his gravitational force in terms of a corpuscular mechanism. He saw his inductive method as have contributed, contained an alternative to the demands extensive collection of a corpuscularism that stood in the way works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), the acceptance works of a mathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. Hume's Newton inspired skepticism of speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to reject corpuscularism[[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and his enthusiastic championing of Newton[[John Locke]]'s inductive method led him to challenge Locke(1632-1704) ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding's concept of causation, and Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge and opinion. Hume translated this latter distinction into a distinction between relations of ideasThis work, which are discoverable by thought (for examplepublished in 1689, mathematical truths)more than twenty years before Hume was born, and matters of fact, which depend on how the world actually is. This distinction became known as propounded Locke's ''Hume's Forkempiricist'''view of human knowledge. Rejecting necessary causation[[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Boyle, his careful analysis of Newton, and Locke were all associated with the 's inductive method led him to identify ''Royal Society of London''', which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's Problem of Induction'''birth, questioning our ability and sought to rationally justify knowledge of causation obtained by inductionpromote the experimental method and the new natural philosophy. [[CiteRef::Hume Uzgalis (19752016)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Rogers (20161982)]]
=== Hume Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and moral philosophy ===The basic goal of the first three of these works is indicated by the subtitle of the Locke''Treatise''; "an attempt s empiricism to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] An admirer of the Newtonian experimental philosophyconstitute a unified system, Hume sought to extend it from natural philosophy into what there was then called '''moral philosophy'''a distinct tension between them, which he defines as the "science of human nature". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] To Hume, an understanding of the workings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion"recognized. [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, he maintains, had cured themselves been unable to explain his gravitational force in terms of their "passion for hypotheses and systems"a corpuscular mechanism. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] Hume sought He saw his inductive method as an alternative to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full demands of speculative metaphysical theories and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He is noted as a skeptic because of his rejection of speculative metaphysical beliefs, and because he argues corpuscularism that we cannot rationally justify many stood in the way of our beliefs. But he also observes that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts the acceptance of beliefs, and it is these faculties of which he wishes to give a positive descriptive accountmathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] Hume sought 's Newton inspired skepticism of speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to found an empirical science of the mindreject corpuscularism, based on experience and observation. He noted that the application his enthusiastic championing of the experimental Newton's inductive method led him to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophychallenge Locke's concept of causation, because it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, with premeditation". Instead, knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation of human life...by menand Aristotle's behaviour taxonomy of knowledge and opinion in company, in affairs, favour of a new epistemic taxonomy and in pleasures"new concept of causation. [[CiteRef::Brio Hume (20091975)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, conducted in the laboratory, would not make its appearance until the late 19th century. [[CiteRef::Leary Morris and Brown (19792016)]]
In Hume’s entrance to the debate of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean Aristotle drew a categorical distinction between '''scientific knowledge ''' or ''scientia'' and '''belief into his own terms''', or ''opinio''. These are:* Relations Scientific knowledge was knowledge of ideas. * Matters of fact. Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain causes and proceeded through either '''demonstration or purely through intuition. They are ''a priori'', in which a necessary connection between a cause and its effect was proven using premises that they are discoverable independent were intuitively obvious independently of experience. This categorization does not necessitate ideas Corpuscularists retained this demonstrative ideal of scientific explanation. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] Descartes supposed that a mechanical cause is necessarily related to carry information dependent on its effect. A demonstrative science was thus possible, at least in principle, because the general principles of physical nature could be deduced from mathematical principles concerning the world shape, size, position, motion, and causal interaction among the ultimate corpuscular particles of matter. The Aristotelian categories of knowledge were thus ideas falling into still accepted by Hume’s contemporaries. However, Newton's method, in which general principles are derived inductively from observation and experiment, did not mesh well with this category are independent demonstrative view of any existing thingscience. They are universal constants in that Newton came to oppose the purely hypothetical explanations of the mechanical philosophy, because they hold true stood in all worldsthe way of his inductive arguments for universal gravitation. It should be noted[[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]] Hume took Newton’s opposition to demonstrative science much further, relations of ideas cannot provide any new information about questioning the world. These types idea of propositions are simply a means used to help understand more complex ideasnecessary mechanical connection between cause and effect. They can "Let an object be thought of as symbols or presented to a series man of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex idea. Common examples usually include geometry or math as formal sciences fall within this categorization. Examples ever so strong natural reason and abilities;" he wrote, "if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up its sensible qualities, to 360 degrees' discover any of its causes or '1 + 1 = 2'effects. AlternativelyAdam [the Biblical first man], a worded proposition may look something like 'when you runthough his rational faculties be supposed, you move your bodyat the very first,' orentirely perfect, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of ideas can never be denied as their denial water, that it would imply a contradiction in suffocate him, or from the very definition light and warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the terms within qualities which appear to the propositionsenses, either the causes, which produced it, or the effects, which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact." [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)|p. 109-110]] The connection between a cause and its effect was learned by observation and experience, and could not be shown by demonstrative argument. [[CiteRef:: Bell (2009)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]]
Matters of fact are Having rejected demonstrative knowledge for the complete opposite of natural world, Hume recast Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and opinion as a distinction between '''relations of ideas''' and '''matters of fact'''. Matters [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 108-113]] Relations of fact ideas are ''a posterioripriori'' statements truths that are discoverable independent of experience, and thus based on experiencecan be shown with certainty by demonstration or intuition. Because they must be true in any world, they cannot provide any new information about our own world. Unlike relations Relations of ideasare confined to the formal sciences of mathematics, geometry, matters and logic. Examples of fact do not hold true in such statements include 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees', '1 + 1 = 2', or, 'all possible worldsbachelors are unmarried'. The contrary Relations of matters of fact ideas can not be denied as their denial would imply no a contradiction in their very definition. [[CiteRef:: Morris and such statements cannot be established by demonstrationBrown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 108-113]] Matters of fact can show new information about , by contrast, are ''a posteriori'' statements based on knowledge obtained from the world but rely on the through observation or experience of the world. Examples of such statements include 'the sky is blue', or 'water is odourless', or 'all guitars have 6 frets.' It should be noted Note that the contrary of a matter of fact is not something impossible. The claim that false statements‘the sun will not rise tomorrow’ is just as intelligible as, such as and no more contradictory than the last exampleclaim that ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’. The two claims are only distinguishable by observation and experience. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 11]] Unlike relations of ideas, can still be matters of factdo not hold true in all possible worlds and cannot be established by demonstration. The level They can never be known with certainty. Hume’s new categories of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this senseknowledge made it clear that natural philosophy, contrasting statements aresince it relied on knowledge of matters of fact, toocould never aspire to the kind of certainty that Aristotle supposed for scientific knowledge, matters and should be content with the modest sort of factsknowledge available through Newton’s inductive method.[[CiteRef::Hume De Pierris (19752006)]]
The reason behind this distinction was simple; it was to provide criteria ==== Hume’s problem of induction ====While championing Newton’s inductive method, Hume also exposed its limitations by showing that conclusions drawn by which to organize scientific statementsinductive reasoning could not be rationally justified. Through this distinctionAs discussed above, all statements were categorized into either matters of fact or relations of ideas. This also ultimately meant Hume argued that there was no type of idea which was certain and provided information about the world. In the case of matters knowledge of fact, propositions are reliant on senses cause and due to effect comes only from the fallibility constant conjunction of the sensesparticular phenomena in experience, have no certainty. In the case of relations of ideas, propositions can be proven with absolute certainty through which allows the use of other relations of ideas. Unfortunately, however, these statements cannot give any new information induction to draw conclusions about the world. This distinction was often taken by the scientific community as a strike at Newton’s theory of motioncause and effect. [[CiteRef::Kant Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris (20072006)]] Such a distinction has large consequences in the fields of science, religion, and even philosophy due to its prevention of certain real world statements. As Hume envisions such an example this distinction would make useless the attempt to try to prove non physical entities inductive argument as matters of fact. follows:
# α is a non-physical entity.# It 1) "I have found that such an object has no observable always been attended with such an effect on the world and its not made up of a physical thing.# α is a relation of ideas.# Relations of ideas are just assigned symbols helping to explain more complex symbols.# The statement ‘α exists’ proven or otherwise doesn’t say anything about the world; it is just a play on words."
Much akin to the reasoning the analytic/synthetic distinction uses2) "I foresee, it is impossible, according to Hume, for a proposition not to fall within the distinction. In Hume’s eyesthat other objects, such a proposition would be completely meaningless in that it would simply not be a rational or reasonable endeavour. It is which are in this binary categorizationappearance, that this distinction is historically important. Philosophers at the time were heavily reliant on innate meaningful ideas (synthetic ''a priori'' statements)similar, but Hume’s distinction of the types of proposition did not allow for such ideas. Hume believed that innate ideas cannot will be meaningful in that they never contain real world statements. This meant most axiomatic schemes were immediately broken down attended with Hume’s skepticismsimilar effects. " [[CiteRef::DePierris Hume (20061975)|p. 114]]
==== Problem Newton supposed that the use of Induction ====The problem such inductive arguments could be justified by an appeal to the uniformity of induction stems from the reasoning behind causal inferencenature. This is [[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]] Hume however, found a very important fundamental problem Hume brings up because in rationally justifying inductive arguments. Consider the methodology of the time called for axiomatic schemes. These schemes were based largely following argument, which might seem to justify our reliance on causal inferences. As such, Hume’s Problem of Induction threatened science at the time as it proved causal inferences were irrational.induction:
Given 1) In the previous distinction between relations of ideas and matters of factpast, the connection within causal inference should fall under one of those categories. With this in mind, Hume found that causal inference cannot be a relation of ideas, and so must be a matter of factfuture has been like the past.
The reason he came to this conclusion was that each cause is independent of its effect. The two are not associated with each other. For example, never having seen an anti-biotic, and without being told of its effects, would a person be able to establish its effect through sole means of reasoning and senses? Quite simply, no. Without experience2) Therefore, a person would have no understanding to what the purpose of the medicine is, or that it is medicine at all. And herein, Hume concludes, since ''a priori'' reasoning cannot future will be like the source of connection between causes and effects, the inference must be a matter of factpast.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
Describing causal inferences as a matter But this argument itself relies on induction; the very mode of fact provides leeway argument it seeks to use experience justify. As Hume put it: "According to determine my account, all arguments about existence are based on the effects relation of cause and effect; our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and in drawing conclusions from experience we assume that the future will be like the past. So if we try to prove this assumption by probable arguments, i.e. arguments regarding existence, we shall obviously be going in a causecircle, taking for granted the very point that is in question." [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. Using 16]] He concluded that "the example conclusions we draw from beforeexperience are not based on reasoning or on any process of understanding". [[CiteRef:: Hume (2008) |p. 15]] But induction is necessary for the conclusions that we draw, if not only in Newtonian science, but also in our daily lives, which would not be possible without it. Hume concludes that same person had tried antiwe are compelled to use induction by a powerful natural instinct, or more specifically his principles of association. "All these operations" he wrote, "are species of natural instincts, which no reasoning… is able either to produce or prevent". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| p. 46-biotics in 47]] Humans must, Hume concludes, rely on "the ordinary wisdom of nature", which insures that we form beliefs "by some instinct or mechanical tendency", rather than trusting "the past and had been curedfallacious deductions of our reason". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975) |p. 55]] In keeping with this naturalistic conclusion, they begin Hume devotes an entire section of the ''Enquiry'' to an argument that non-human animals also learn by induction. He writes that "it seems evident that animals, like men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the reason for their getting better was same outcomes will always follow the anti-bioticsame causes". Grasping this chain of events [[CiteRef::Hume attempts (2008)| p. 53]] Hume’s conclusion was a radical challenge to formulate that person’s argument for their inference the central role assigned by rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz to reason in the production of our knowledge, and states it is seen today as sucha step towards modern ideas in cognitive science and neuroscience. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]]
# ==== Hume's skepticism about theological knowledge ====In the past x has resulted in yearly modern Christian Europe, theology and natural philosophy were not deemed foreign to one another, but rather seen as compatible parts of an integrated [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of knowledge. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.# Therefore65]] Theological knowledge derived from observations of nature and its supposed design, in the future x will result supposed divine revelation of the Bible, and supposed miraculous events where God had intervened directly in yhuman affairs. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] As a thoroughgoing empiricist, Hume questioned all these sources of knowledge, and rejected theological knowledge as impossible.
Here howeverIn a letter to Henry Home (1696-1782) published in 1737, Hume notices confessed that he intended to include a gap skeptical discussion of miracles in his ''Treatise'' but left it out for fear of offending readers. Critics of religion in logiceighteenth century Europe faced the risk of fine, imprisonment, or worse. How does [[CiteRef::Fieser (12016) infer ]] Hume did later publish his critique in the ''Enquiry'' in 1748. He wrote that "A wise man...proportions his belief to the evidence" [[CiteRef::Hume (22008)? Hume sees | p. 56]] and drew the conclusion that demonstrative reasoning cannot fill this gap"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and because firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the case against a miracle is- just because it is a miracle- as complete contrast where x does not result in y implies no contradiction within the inferenceas any argument from experience can possibly be imagined to be.... Herein, No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless it seems is of such a kind that there is an underlying assumption within the first premise: the future will its falsehood would be like more miraculous than the pastfact it tries to establish... This assumption When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately ask myself whether it is more commonly known as probable that this person either deceives or has been deceived or that what he reports really has happened...If the uniformity principle. Using such an assumption falsehood of his testimony would fill the logical gap within be more miraculous than the current argumentevent he relates, however before it then he can be usedclaim to command my belief or opinion, it must be established but not otherwise". [[CiteRef:: Hume (2008)| p. 58-59]] The claim that the principle a dead man was restored to life is either intuitive or demonstrable, of course, central to Christian theology. NonethelessHume's arguments have gained a relevance beyond theological knowledge, the only way to formulate an argument and have been espoused as a [[methodology]] for evaluating other sorts of extraordinary or surprising claims, such as claims of paranormal occurrences or of extraterrestrial intelligence. They are succinctly summarized by the principle is to rely on maxim, popularized by the principle itselftwentieth century astronomer Carl Sagan (1934-1996), that "extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence".[[CiteRef::Hume Sagan (1979)| p. 62]][[CiteRef:: Deming (19752016)]] With reliance on In 1757, Hume published an essay entitled ''The Natural History of Religion'' which was the uniformity principle the full argument first systematic attempt to explain religious belief solely in terms of what we would follow like thiscall psychological and sociological factors. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]]
# Having called revealed religion into question by doubting miraculous events, Hume turned his attention to natural theology in his ''Dialogues concerning Natural Religion'', which he arranged to have published posthumously because of its inflammatory nature. In it, Hume raised devastating objections to the claim that the universe showed evidence of purposeful design by an Intelligent Creator. This claim was then widely popular among natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] The ''Dialogues'' is written as a conversation between three characters; ''Cleanthes'', a proponent of the design argument, ''Demea'', a mystic, and ''Philo'', a religious skeptic generally supposed to be Hume's spokesperson. Philo argues that the pastanalogy between the universe and a designed artifact is weak. For example, we experience only one universe and have nothing to compare it to. We recognize human artifacts by contrast with non-artifacts such as rocks. He also notes that we have no experience of the future has been like origin of the universe, and that causal inference requires a basis in experienced constant conjunction between two things. For the origin of the universe we have nothing of the sort. ''Demea'' deems ''Cleanthes'' concept of God as cosmic designer to be anthropomorphic and limiting. By the end, Hume's characters' arguments lead the reader to the conclude, with ''Philo'', that God's nature seems inconceivable, incomprehensible, and indefinable and therefore the pastquestion of God's existence is rendered meaningless.[[CiteRef::Hume (2007)]][[CiteRef::Oppy (1996)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]]# Therefore|Criticism=Hume's skeptical arguments were troubling to many, and received a good deal of criticism. He was criticized, notably, by a fellow Scottish philosopher of his times; Thomas Reid. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Reid rejected Hume's theories of perception and causation because of their skeptical consequences. Hume supposed that our perceptual experience was of impressions in our minds. He also maintained that causal relations do not exist in the future will world, but are rather posited in our minds when two events are constantly conjoined in experience. Such views, taken together, made it impossible to claim that our perceptual impressions are caused by objects in an external world. This would require that external objects themselves, and our impressions of them be conjoined in our experience, which is obviously impossible. Hume accepted that his belief in an external world was merely a matter of habit, custom, or instinct, and could not be like justified. Reid found this unacceptable, and supposed that our perceptual experience was directly of objects in the pastworld, just as everyday common sense tells us. He noted that such direct experience was no more mysterious than Hume's supposition that we directly experienced impressions in our mind. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]][[CiteRef::Reid (2007)|pp. 1-10]] Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume's supposition that the direct objects of perception were mental entities such as ideas, impressions, sensations, or sense data remained widely popular into the twentieth century, [[CiteRef::Hatfield (2004)]] but had been strongly challenged by the beginning of the twenty first century [[CiteRef::Warren (2005)]][[CiteRef::Thompson (2007)]]. By that time though, the relationship between this problem and that of external world skepticism had been substantially reconfigured.[[CiteRef::Clark (2017)]]
Within this argumentReid likewise rejected Hume's view of causality. He noted that a view of causality based on constant conjunctions in our experience could not give a causal account of unique events. Suppose, he posited, that an earthquake struck Mexico City for the premise assumes first time in its history, resulting in the conclusion and, as such, destruction of the argument is circularcity. In this senseUnder Hume's definition, we could not claim that the first example shows an irrational train earthquake caused the destruction of thoughtthe city, since the two events, being unique, are not constantly conjoined in experience. It seems thenHe further noted that night following day and day following night are constantly conjoined experiences, but we generally do not claim that Hume established there is no way that reason could be the connection between cause day causes night and effect. Thusnight causes day, Hume sought another connection between cause and effectbut rather that both are caused by Earth's rotation. He eventually recognized this connection to be custom or habit. This is more commonly known today as induction. As Reid proposes instead that two events have a causal relationship whenever they are conjoined by a person experiences something repeatedlylaw of nature, whether or not they grow to expect it to happen againare constantly conjoined in experience. However, despite being an adequate connectionUnlike Hume, Reid maintains that causes necessitate their effects even though he concedes that this solution forces the abandonment of reason within causal inferencenecessitation is not evident through perception alone. [[CiteRef:: DePierris Nichols and Yaffe (20062016)]] As previously mentioned, such James Beattie (1735-1803) drew heavily on Reid's ideas in a conclusion yields grave consequences for science book critical of the time, which was heavily dependent on causal inferences.Hume's philosophy that became a smash bestseller [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume McDermid (19752017)]]
==== Skepticism about theological knowledge ====|Criticism=Historically, due The German philosopher Immanuel Kant(1724-1824) sought to respond to the threatening nature of Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas Hume's skeptical challenge regarding cause and matters of facteffect, particularly to Newtonian physics, as well as in his problem ''Critique of induction there have been many critics of Hume. One of the Pure Reason'' (1781) and most prominent critics explicitly in his ''Prolegomena to criticize Hume on the account of his distinction between the types of propositions was [[Immanuel Kant]]Any Future Metaphysics'' (1783). Kant criticized sought to synthesize early modern rationalism with empiricism, and thereby avert Hume's skepticism. He did this by supposing that the world as we can experience it, seeking to validate Newton’s propositions about the sensible world which could never be meaningful under Hume’s distinction. Kant theorized that , is structured by the world was interpreted through sensory and intellect and thus there must exist some sort of ''a priori'' synthetic propositionforms of our cognitive faculties.4 The existence of such understanding is thus a proposition would of course result in a proposition that fit both categories prerequisite for experience. Possible human experience thus conforms to certain necessary laws, which we can know through our reason, independently of Hume’s distinctionexperience. Unfortunately, Kant’s For Kant this ''a priori'' synthetic proposition was debunked with structuring framework included Euclidean space and time, and cause and effect. Kant argued that by such means, the arrival idea of probabilistic determinismnecessary causal laws that human reason could know was restored. [[CiteRef::Rohlf (2016)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris and Friedman (2013)]]
As for criticisms on In the twentieth century, Karl Popper (1902-1994) challenged Hume's Problem of Induction, there are skepticism on quite a few casesdifferent grounds. One of the more notable cases was the critique [[Karl Popper]] had towards rejected Hume, stating 's Newtonian inductivism. Popper argued that induction is a mythnever actually used in science, since all observation is selective and theory-laden.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]]Popper argued advocated a '''hypothetico-deductive method''' for science, arguing that science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than by reference to the past, and that the main purpose of observations wasn’t to make inferences about the future but to refute present existing theories. Popper was committed to the idea believed that Hume had incorrectly orientated himself towards was mistaken in seeking a means of justifying to justify knowledge. Popper, instead, preferred to look for sought a process by which to reveal and correct errorsscientific error.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]]
[[Wesley Salmon]] responded The strongest criticisms directed against Hume were based on his skepticism about theological knowledge. Due to his religious views, he was never able to obtain an academic faculty appointment. His critics called him "The Great Infidel". Hume's arguments in the ''Dialogs'' did not put a stop to this criticism the claim that natural philosophy could find evidence of intelligent design in Hume’s placenature, stating theories still need predictions in part because Hume failed to be testedsupply an adequate alternative explanation for apparently purposeful complexity. When Popperians have multiple theoriesIn 1802, each sharing twenty three years after the same quantity publication of empirical contentHume's ''Dialogues'', William Paley (1743-1805), Popperians would choose an English clergyman, expounded the theories which were better corroborated but lack any justification design argument in this decisionhis ''Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity''. The Popperians either make Paley argued that the purposeful sophistication of biological "contrivances", such as the eye, were clear evidence of design by an inductive claimIntelligent Being. [[CiteRef::Ayala (2003)]][[CiteRef:: # A theory was reliable in Paley (1809)]] Among those who read and appreciated Paley's arguments were the naturalist Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In his ''Origin of Species'' (1859) Darwin argued that biological species were not separately created and are instead physically descended from pre-existing species, with all living things ultimately descended from a common ancestor. He explained Paley's contrivances by positing the pastprocess of natural selection, which he justified with extensive studies of animal breeding.# It will be reliable By explaining the appearance of design in living systems, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection dealt a severe blow to the future having survived falsificationdesign argument among natural scientists.Or they admit corroboration is not an indication Scientists [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] methodological naturalism, and theological propositions were no longer considered part of predictive powerthe [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]].[[CiteRef::Salmon Ruse (1999)]][[CiteRef::Ruse (19672003)]]|Page Status=Needs EditingEditor Approved
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|Brief=a Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist; he is widely considered the most important philosopher to write in the English language.|Summary=Hume’s contributions to our understanding of the processes of scientific knowledge change and the nature of scientific change knowledge come from his two major philosophical works: including ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' (1738) and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'' (1748). He is most noted for his skeptical views on a variety of topics including human identity, the powers of human reason, metaphysics, human identity, and the existence of God.[[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] He is perhaps best known, first, for rejecting Aristotle’s epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief and replacing it with his own distinction between matters of fact (which depend on the way the world is) and relations of ideas (that are discoverable by thought, such as mathematical truths). This new distinction is known as Hume's Fork. Secondly, he is known for questioning the justifiability of whether knowledge derived from inductive reasoningcan be justified. The problem he posed is known today as Hume's Problem of Induction. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] Thirdly, Hume questioned whether theological knowledge is possible,and played a substantial role in its removal from the scientific mosaic of the modern world. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] The impact of these skeptical fallibilist arguments is still felt to this day.|Historical Context=David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1711. His family had a modest estate and was socially connected, but not wealthy.[[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] They recognized that Hume was precocious, and sent him to Edinburgh University two years early (at the age of 10 or 11) with his older brother (who was 12). He studied Latin and Greek, read widely in history, literature, and ancient and modern philosophy, as well as some mathematics and natural philosophy. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Harris (2015)|p. 35-65]] Both at home and at the university, Hume was raised in the stern '''Calvinist faith''', with prayers and sermons as prominent features of his home and university life. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] Following the completion of his studies, Hume rejected his family's plan that he become a lawyer, and instead determined to become a scholar and philosopher, engaging in three years of intensive personal study.
By the Hume's time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of religious belief. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Aristotle]]'s (2016384 BC-322 BC)]] The term teleological account of causation had been rejected in favour of the '''atheismcorpuscular mechanistic''' was coined by Sir John Cheke almost two hundred years earlier in 1540view of causation. Derived from ancient atomism, to refer to a lack it held that material bodies are made of belief in divine providenceinvisibly small particles, called corpuscles. The term assumed its modern meaning only form of disbelief in the existence causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth centurybodies or their constituent corpuscles. [[CiteRef:: Hyman DePierris (20072006)]] Although Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, it was nonetheless a challenge Natural philosophers continued to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This methodology stressed the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of reliance on divine revelation and the text of the Bible. Descartes instead stressed the human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. Descartes' rationalist argument for Godaccept Aristotle's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of distinction between scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circularand belief. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It Scientific knowledge was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both taken to be knowledge of which stressed experience causes and observation as sources consisted of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire. It eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Though they held non-standard beliefs, both Newton and Locke were devoutly religious. Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they rejected traditional rationalist proofs of God's existence and instead espoused the ''demonstrations'design argument''', supposing that the experimental method could demonstrate that ; proving the universe was an artifact crafted by a cosmic Designer. Hume's ''Dialogues on Natural Theology'' (1779) was a response to such hopes, necessary connection between cause and was to raise devastating objections to themeffect. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in supported this view of knowledge and made the mid-eighteenth century, with popular notion of a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]|Major Contributions=Hume's main philosophical contributions were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise associated notion of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 a metaphysically necessary connection between cause and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. It was not a success in effect central to his own timesystem. Hume wrote He nonetheless recognized that the work fell "deadborn from the press", [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 4]] and he lamented that "I demonstrative knowledge was carry'd away by the Heat seldom attainable because of Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately So vast an Undertaking, plan’d before I was one and twenty, & compos’d before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times”. [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 25]] It is however, today regarded as a major and important work. Hume recast the material into two later publications, ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, ''concerning the Principles unobservability of Morals'' published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume had ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his deathcorpuscles. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown DePierris (20162006)]][[CiteRef:: Norton Kochiras (20092014)]]
By the time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, Hume uses had become skeptical of religious belief. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The term '''atheism''' was coined by Sir John Cheke (1514-1557) almost two hundred years earlier in 1540, to refer to a lack of belief in divine providence. The term assumed its modern meaning of disbelief in the existence of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth century. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]] In early modern Christian Europe, theological knowledge was deemed to derive from two sources. '''Natural religion''' attempted to demonstrate God's existence and nature through reason, logic, and observation of the natural world. '''Revealed religion''' was based on the premise that the text of the Bible was divinely inspired and thus a source of reliable theological knowledge. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, but it was also a challenge to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), which stressed the limitations of human reason, and the need to rely on Biblical revelation. Descartes instead claimed a human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. However, his rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire, and eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Both Newton and Locke were nevertheless devoutly religious, though they held non-standard beliefs. Newton authored an entire volume on Biblical prophesies. [[CiteRef::Mandelbrote (2004)]] Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they supported a form of natural religion that sought to use the experimental method to demonstrate that the universe exhibited the order and purposefulness of a designed artifact crafted by an all-powerful Intelligence. Hume doubted both revealed religion and natural religion as sources of knowledge, and published strong arguments against both. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]|Major Contributions=Hume was one of a number of eighteenth century British philosophers whose work was inspired primarily by Newton's physical theories and experimental philosophy. Hume and Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746) believed that the mind's operations could be studied by broadly Newtonian observational methods, and in both cases this led them to forms of local skepticism. Joseph Priestly (1733-1804) and David Hartley (1705-1757) applied Newtonianism to both the operations of the mind and to its substance, becoming materialists. George Turnbull (1698-1748) and his pupil Thomas Reid(1710-1796) sought to ground Newtonian empiricism in a common-sense understanding of the world, thus avoiding Hume's skepticism. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Hume's main philosophical contributions to matters relevant to scientific change were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. Since it sold poorly, Hume recast the material into two later publications, ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, and ''concerning the Principles of Morals'' published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume had ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his death. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)]] Here we first consider Hume's views on the mind, which are critical to understanding his views regarding scientific methodology and change. We then consider three issues of central importance to [[Scientific Change|scientific change]], types of knowledge, the status of inductive knowledge, and the status of theological knowledge within the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]. === Hume and The Science of Human Nature ===The basic goal of the first three of Hume's major works is indicated by the subtitle of the ''Treatise''; "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] Hume sought to extend Newton's experimental philosophy from natural philosophy into what was then called '''moral philosophy''', which he defined as the "science of human nature". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] The field of moral philosophy was much broader then than today, and included topics that we might classify as psychology or cognitive science, as well as epistemology. To Hume, an understanding of the workings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] His work in this area was thus critical to his ideas regarding scientific methodology and scientific change. Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, Hume maintained, had cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems". [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] He sought to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full of speculative metaphysical hypotheses and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He proposed an empiricist alternative to ''a priori'' metaphysics based on pure reason and the speculative belief systems to which it led. [[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] As a naturalist, Hume rejected any appeal to the supernatural in explanations of human nature. For such beliefs, and because he argued that we cannot justify many of our beliefs, he is noted as a skeptic. But Hume himself rejected skepticism. While skepticism can't be defeated by reason, he observed that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs (such as the belief that there is a world external to my mind of which my senses provide knowledge). He wrote that "it is fortunate that Nature eventually breaks the force of all skeptical arguments, keeping them from having much influence on our understanding". [[CiteRef::Hume (2017)]] It was these faculties of which he sought to give a positive descriptive account. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]][[CiteRef::Wright (2012)]] Hume sought to found an empirical science of the mind, based on experience and observation. He noted that the application of the experimental method to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophy, because it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, with premeditation" on such matters. Instead, knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation of human life...by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in pleasures". [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, with controlled experiments in the laboratory, would not make its appearance until the late 19th century. [[CiteRef::Leary (1979)]] Due in part to the works of Descartes and Locke, the notion that an idea was the primary sort of mental content dominated European philosophy by the time Hume started work on his ''Treatise''. Hume instead used the term ''''perceptions'''' to designate mental content of any sort. He supposes supposed there are two sorts of perceptions, '''impressions ''' and '''ideas''', which was a new distinction. Impressions include feelings we get from our senses, such as of a red tomato currently in front of me, as well as desires, emotions, passions, and sentiments, such as my current hunger for the tomato. Hume distinguishes distinguished impressions from ideas by their degree of vivacity or force. Thus, I have an impression of the tomato that is currently present, and an idea of a tomato I ate last yearweek. Hume supposes supposed our ideas are faint copies of our impressions. [[CiteRef::Owen (2009)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] Noting that there is a regular order to our thoughts, he asserts asserted that the mind has the power to associate ideas. Hume posits Hume’s concepts about the association of ideas were novel. He posited three associative principles; '''resemblance ''' (as when one recognizes I recognize that the tomato currently before me resembles the one in my garden), '''contiguity ''' in time and place, (as when I notice that the tomato is on the table to my left) and '''causation ''' (as when one recognizes cause and effectI notice that bumping the table causes the tomato to tumble to the floor). Hume believes believed that by thus anatomizing human nature, its laws of operation can could be discovered. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] [[CiteRef::Owen (2009)]] He argued that the mind could not be an immaterial substance, though he was also critical of materialism. Regarding personal identity, Hume wrote that “what we call a ''mind'' is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with perfect simplicity and identity”. [[CiteRef::McIntyre (2009) | p. 182]] It was Hume's careful analysis of the mind that led to his insights relevant to scientific methodology.
=== Hume and Scientific Methodology ===
==== Hume’s Fork ====
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