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|Brief=a Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist; he is widely considered the most important philosopher to write in the English language.|Summary=Hume’s contributions to our understanding of the processes of scientific knowledge change and the nature of scientific change knowledge come from his major philosophical works including ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' (1738) and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'' (1748). He is most noted for his skeptical views on a variety of topics including the powers of human reason, metaphysics, human identity, and the existence of God.[[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] He is perhaps best known, first, for rejecting Aristotle’s epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief and replacing it with his own distinction between matters of fact (which depend on the way the world is) and relations of ideas (that are discoverable by thought, such as mathematical truths). This new distinction is known as Hume's Fork. Secondly, he is known for questioning the justifiability of whether knowledge derived from inductive reasoningcan be justified. The problem he posed is known today as Hume's Problem of Induction. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] Thirdly, Hume questioned whether theological knowledge is possible,and played a substantial role in its removal from the scientific mosaic of the modern world. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] The impact of these skeptical fallibilist arguments is still felt to this day.|Historical Context=David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1711. His family had a modest estate and was socially connected, but not wealthy.[[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] They recognized that Hume was precocious, and sent him to Edinburgh University two years early (at the age of 10 or 11) with his older brother (who was 12). He studied Latin and Greek, read widely in history, literature, and ancient and modern philosophy, as well as some mathematics and natural philosophy. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Harris (2015)|p. 35-65]] Both at home and at the university, Hume was raised in the stern '''Calvinist faith''', with prayers and sermons as prominent features of his home and university life. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] Following the completion of his studies, Hume rejected his family's plan that he become a lawyer, and instead determined to become a scholar and philosopher, engaging in three years of intensive personal study.

Although little is known Following the completion of his activities during studies, Hume rejected his schooling and afterwards, family's plan that he would have spent the fourth year of the curriculum at Edinburgh studying natural philosophybecome a lawyer, and would have been exposed instead determined to experimental natural philosophybecome a scholar and philosopher, including engaging in three years of intensive personal study. Living in the aftermath of the theories acceptance of [[Isaac Newton]] 's(1643-1727). [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]] Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica'' (''Mathematical Principles revolutionary theories of Natural Philosophymotion and gravitation, eighteenth century thinkers proclaimed the '') in which he put forth his '''laws Age of motion''Enlightenment', '''law of universal gravitation''', and his inductive '''experimental expected philosophy''' more than thirty years earlier in 1687. [[CiteRef:: Westfall (1999which then included what we would call the natural and social sciences)]][[CiteRef::Janiak (2016)]] By about 1700 Newton's theory had become accepted in Britainto dramatically improve human life. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan Bristow (20152017)|p. 210]] Hume, like many of his times, revered Newton, calling him "the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of the species". [[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]] The works of other experimental philosophers were also available to the young Hume. The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume is known to have contributed, contained an extensive collection of the works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), the works of [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and [[John Locke]]'s (1632-1704) ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding''. This work, published in 1689, more than twenty years before Hume was born, propounded Locke's '''empiricist''' view of human knowledge. [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Boyle, Newton, and Locke were all associated with the '''Royal Society of London''', which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's birth, and sought to promote the experimental method and the new natural philosophy. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]][[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]

By Little is known of Hume's timeactivities during his schooling and afterwards. According to the curriculum then in place at Edinburgh, he would have spent his fourth year studying natural philosophy, and would have been exposed to experimental natural philosophy, including Newton's theories. [[AristotleCiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]]More than thirty years earlier, in 1687, Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica''s (384 BC-322 BC''Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy'') teleological account of causation had been rejected in favor which he put forth his '''laws of the motion'''corpuscular mechanistic, ''' view law of causation. Derived from ancient atomismuniversal gravitation''', it held that material bodies are made of invisibly small particles, called corpusclesand his inductive '''experimental philosophy'''. The only form of causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of bodies or their constituent corpuscles[[CiteRef:: Westfall (1999)]][[CiteRef::Janiak (2016)]] By about 1700 these theories had become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] in Britain. [[CiteRef::DePierris Barseghyan (20062015)|p. 210]] Natural The works of other experimental philosophers continued were also available to accept Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and beliefthe young Hume. Scientific knowledge was taken The natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume is known to be knowledge have contributed, contained an extensive collection of the works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), the works of causes [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and consisted of '[[John Locke]]'s (1632-1704) 'demonstration'Essay Concerning Human Understanding''; proving the necessary connection between cause and effect. This work, published in 1689, more than twenty years before Hume was born, propounded Locke supported this 's '''empiricist''' view of human knowledge and made the popular notion of a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the associated notion of a metaphysically necessary connection between cause and effect central to his system. He nonetheless viewed demonstrative knowledge as seldom attainable because of the unobservability of corpuscles. [[CiteRef::DePierris Harris (20062015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Kochiras Uzgalis (20142016)]] Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Boyle, Newton's theories , and Lockewere all associated with the '''Royal Society of London'''s empiricism to constitute a unified system, there which was a distinct tension between themfounded in 1663, which Hume recognized. Newton had been unable to explain his gravitational force in terms of a corpuscular mechanism. He saw his inductive method as an alternative to the demands of a corpuscularism that stood in the way of the acceptance of a mathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. almost 50 years before Hume's Newton inspired skepticism of speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to reject corpuscularismbirth, and his enthusiastic championing of Newton's inductive sought to promote the experimental method led him to challenge Locke's concept of causation, and Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge and opinion in favour of a new epistemic taxonomy and the new concept of causationnatural philosophy. [[CiteRef::Hume Uzgalis (19752016)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Rogers (20161982)]]

By the Hume's time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, Hume had become skeptical of religious belief. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Aristotle]]'s (2016384 BC-322 BC)]] The term teleological account of causation had been rejected in favour of the '''atheismcorpuscular mechanistic''' was coined by Sir John Cheke almost two hundred years earlier in 1540view of causation. Derived from ancient atomism, to refer to a lack it held that material bodies are made of belief in divine providenceinvisibly small particles, called corpuscles. The term assumed its modern meaning only form of disbelief in the existence causation is mechanical, by direct physical contact of God, as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in the seventeenth centurybodies or their constituent corpuscles. [[CiteRef:: Hyman DePierris (20072006)]] Although Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, it was nonetheless a challenge Natural philosophers continued to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This methodology stressed the limitations of human reason, and the necessity of reliance on divine revelation and the text of the Bible. Descartes instead stressed the human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. Descartes' rationalist argument for Godaccept Aristotle's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of distinction between scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circularand belief. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It Scientific knowledge was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources taken to be knowledge of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire. It eschewed metaphysics causes and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Though they held non-standard beliefs, both Newton and Locke were devoutly religious. Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they rejected traditional rationalist proofs consisted of God's existence and instead espoused the '''design argumentdemonstrations''', supposing that the experimental method could demonstrate that ; proving the universe was an artifact crafted by a cosmic Designer. Hume's ''Dialogues on Natural Theology'' (1779) was a response to such hopes, necessary connection between cause and was to raise devastating objections to themeffect. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in supported this view of knowledge and made the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2011)]]|Major Contributions=Hume's main philosophical contributions were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise popular notion of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. It sold poorly, a hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and Hume lamented that the work fell "deadborn from the press". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 4]] It is however, today regarded as associated notion of a major metaphysically necessary connection between cause and important workeffect central to his system. Hume recast He nonetheless recognized that demonstrative knowledge was seldom attainable because of the material into two later publications, ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, and ''concerning the Principles unobservability of Morals'' published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume had ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his deathcorpuscles. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown DePierris (20162006)]][[CiteRef:: Norton Kochiras (20092014)]]

=== Hume Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and Moral Philosophy ===The basic goal of the first three of these works is indicated by the subtitle of the Locke''Treatise''; "an attempt s empiricism to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] An admirer of the Newtonian experimental philosophyconstitute a unified system, Hume sought to extend it from natural philosophy into what there was then called '''moral philosophy'''a distinct tension between them, which he defined Hume recognized. Newton had been unable to explain his gravitational force in terms of a corpuscular mechanism. He saw his inductive method as an alternative to the demands of a corpuscularism that stood in the "science way of human nature"the acceptance of a mathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] The field Hume's Newton inspired skepticism of moral philosophy was much broader then than todayspeculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to reject corpuscularism, and included topics that we might classify as psychology or cognitive science, as well as epistemology. To Hume, an understanding his enthusiastic championing of the workings of the mind was the key Newton's inductive method led him to establishing the foundations challenge Locke's concept of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophycausation, and Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] Natural philosophers, like Newton Aristotle's taxonomy of knowledge and Boyle, he maintains, had cured themselves opinion in favour of their "passion for hypotheses a new epistemic taxonomy and systems"new concept of causation. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown Hume (20161975)|p. 8-9]] Hume sought to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full of speculative metaphysical hypotheses and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He proposed an empiricist alternative to ''a priori'' metaphysics and its speculative belief systems. He was a naturalist who rejected any appeal to the supernatural in explanations of human nature. For such beliefs, and because he argued that we cannot justify many of our beliefs, he is noted as a skeptic. But he also observed that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs (such as the belief that there is a world external to my mind of which my senses provide knowledge), and it is these faculties of which he wishes to give a positive descriptive account. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]]

Hume sought to found an empirical science of By the mind, based time he started work on experience and observation. He noted that ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the application age of the experimental method to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophy23, because it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, with premeditation". Instead, knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation Hume had become skeptical of human life..religious belief.[[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The term '''atheism''' was coined by men's behaviour Sir John Cheke (1514-1557) almost two hundred years earlier in company1540, to refer to a lack of belief in affairsdivine providence. The term assumed its modern meaning of disbelief in the existence of God, and as divine non-existence emerged as a disquieting possibility in pleasures"the seventeenth century. [[CiteRef::Biro Hyman (20092007)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the In early modern senseChristian Europe, theological knowledge was deemed to derive from two sources. '''Natural religion''' attempted to demonstrate God's existence and nature through reason, with controlled experiments in logic, and observation of the natural world. '''Revealed religion''' was based on the premise that the laboratory, would not make its appearance until text of the late 19th centuryBible was divinely inspired and thus a source of reliable theological knowledge. [[CiteRef::Leary Fieser (19792016)]]

By the time Hume started work on his Descartes'rationalism had a proof of God'Treatise'' the notion that an idea s existence at its foundation, but it was also a challenge to the primary sort of mental content dominated European philosophytheological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), due in part to which stressed the works limitations of Descartes human reason, and Lockethe need to rely on Biblical revelation. Hume Descartes instead used the term ''''perceptions'''' claimed a human capacity to designate mental content of any sortknow God and nature through reason alone. He supposed there are two sorts of perceptionsHowever, his rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It was supplanted by Newton''impressions''' s experimental philosophy and Locke'''ideas'''s empiricism, both of which was a new distinction. Impressions include feelings we get from our senses, such stressed experience and observation as sources of a red tomato currently in front of me, as well as desires, emotions, passionsthe limited knowledge to which humans could aspire, and sentimentseschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Both Newton and Locke were nevertheless devoutly religious, such as my current hunger for the tomatothough they held non-standard beliefs. Hume distinguished impressions from ideas by their degree of vivacity or forceNewton authored an entire volume on Biblical prophesies. Thus[[CiteRef::Mandelbrote (2004)]] Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, I have an impression they supported a form of natural religion that sought to use the tomato experimental method to demonstrate that is currently present, the universe exhibited the order and an idea purposefulness of a tomato I ate last weekdesigned artifact crafted by an all-powerful Intelligence. Hume supposed our ideas are copies doubted both revealed religion and natural religion as sources of our impressionsknowledge, and published strong arguments against both. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Owen Hyman (20092007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784). [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Morris Bristow (2017)]]|Major Contributions=Hume was one of a number of eighteenth century British philosophers whose work was inspired primarily by Newton's physical theories and experimental philosophy. Brown Hume and Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746) believed that the mind's operations could be studied by broadly Newtonian observational methods, and in both cases this led them to forms of local skepticism. Joseph Priestly (1733-1804) and David Hartley (20161705-1757) applied Newtonianism to both the operations of the mind and to its substance, becoming materialists. George Turnbull (1698-1748) and his pupil Thomas Reid(1710-1796)]]sought to ground Newtonian empiricism in a common-sense understanding of the world, thus avoiding Hume's skepticism. [[CiteRef::Biro Nichols and Yaffe (20092016)]]

Hume's main philosophical contributions to matters relevant to scientific change were made via several works. The first was ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' published in three volumes in 1739 and 1740, when Hume was 29 years old. Since it sold poorly, Hume recast the material into two later publications, ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1748, and ''concerning the Principles of Morals'' published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume had ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in 1779, three years after his death. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)]] Here we first consider Hume's views on the mind, which are critical to understanding his views regarding scientific methodology and change. We then consider three issues of central importance to [[Scientific Change|scientific change]], types of knowledge, the status of inductive knowledge, and the status of theological knowledge within the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]. === Hume and The Science of Human Nature ===The basic goal of the first three of Hume's major works is indicated by the subtitle of the ''Treatise''; "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] Hume sought to extend Newton's experimental philosophy from natural philosophy into what was then called '''moral philosophy''', which he defined as the "science of human nature". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] The field of moral philosophy was much broader then than today, and included topics that we might classify as psychology or cognitive science, as well as epistemology. To Hume, an understanding of the workings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] His work in this area was thus critical to his ideas regarding scientific methodology and scientific change. Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, Hume maintained, had cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems". [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] He sought to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full of speculative metaphysical hypotheses and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He proposed an empiricist alternative to ''a priori'' metaphysics based on pure reason and the speculative belief systems to which it led. [[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] As a naturalist, Hume rejected any appeal to the supernatural in explanations of human nature. For such beliefs, and because he argued that we cannot justify many of our beliefs, he is noted as a skeptic. But Hume himself rejected skepticism. While skepticism can't be defeated by reason, he observed that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs (such as the belief that there is a world external to my mind of which my senses provide knowledge). He wrote that "it is fortunate that Nature eventually breaks the force of all skeptical arguments, keeping them from having much influence on our understanding". [[CiteRef::Hume (2017)]] It was these faculties of which he sought to give a positive descriptive account. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]][[CiteRef::Wright (2012)]] Hume sought to found an empirical science of the mind, based on experience and observation. He noted that the application of the experimental method to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophy, because it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, with premeditation" on such matters. Instead, knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation of human life...by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in pleasures". [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, with controlled experiments in the laboratory, would not make its appearance until the late 19th century. [[CiteRef::Leary (1979)]] Due in part to the works of Descartes and Locke, the notion that an idea was the primary sort of mental content dominated European philosophy by the time Hume started work on his ''Treatise''. Hume instead used the term ''''perceptions'''' to designate mental content of any sort. He supposed there are two sorts of perceptions, '''impressions''' and '''ideas''', which was a new distinction. Impressions include feelings we get from our senses, such as of a red tomato currently in front of me, as well as desires, emotions, passions, and sentiments, such as my current hunger for the tomato. Hume distinguished impressions from ideas by their degree of vivacity or force. Thus, I have an impression of the tomato that is currently present, and an idea of a tomato I ate last week. Hume supposed our ideas are faint copies of our impressions. [[CiteRef::Owen (2009)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] Noting that there is a regular order to our thoughts, he asserted that the mind has the power to associate ideas. Hume’s concepts about the association of ideas were novel. He posited three associative principles; '''resemblance''' (as when I recognize that the tomato currently before me resembles the one in my garden), '''contiguity''' in time and place (as when I notice that the tomato is on the table to my left) and '''causation''' (as when I notice that bumping the table causes the tomato to tumble to the floor). Hume believed that by thus anatomizing human nature, its laws of operation could be discovered. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] [[CiteRef::Owen (2009)]] Hume He argued that the mind could not be an immaterial substance, though he was also critical of materialism. Regarding personal identity, he Hume wrote that “what we call a ''mind'' is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supos’d, tho’ falslyfalsely, to be endow’d with perfect simplicity and identity”. [[CiteRef::McIntyre (2009) | p. 182]] It was Hume's careful analysis of the mind that led to his insights relevant to scientific methodology.

Hume took Newton’s opposition to demonstrative science much further, questioning the idea of a necessary mechanical connection between cause and effect. “Present "Let an object be presented to a man whose skill of ever so strong natural reason and intelligence are as great as you likeabilities;” " he wrote, “if the "if that object is of a kind that is be entirely new to him, no amount of studying he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its perceptible sensible qualities will enable him , to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam [the Biblical first man], even if though his reasoning abilities were rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect from the start, couldn’t could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water , that it could drown would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire , that it could burn would consume him. The No object ever discovers, by the qualities of an object that which appear to the senses never reveal , either the causes that , which produced the object it, or the effects that , which will arise from it will have; nor can our reason, unaided unassisted by experience, ever draw any conclusion about inference concerning real existence and matters matter of fact.” " [[CiteRef:: Hume (17481975) |p. 12109-110]] The connection between a cause and its effect was learned by observation and experience, and could not be shown by demonstrative argument. [[CiteRef:: Bell (2009)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]]

Having rejected demonstrative knowledge for the natural world, Hume recast Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and opinion as a distinction between '''Relations relations of ideas''' and '''Matters matters of fact'''. [[CiteRef::Hume(17841975)| ppp. 11108-113]] Relations of ideas are ''a priori'' truths that are discoverable independent of experience, and can be shown with certainty by demonstration or intuition. Because they must be true in any world, they cannot provide any new information about our own world. Relations of ideas are confined to the formal sciences of mathematics, geometry, and logic. Examples of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees', '1 + 1 = 2', or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations of ideas can not be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in their very definition. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume (17841975)| ppp. 11108-113]] Matters of fact, by contrast, are ''a posteriori'' statements based on knowledge obtained from the world through observation or experience. Examples of such statements include 'the sky is blue', or 'water is odourless'. Note that the contrary of a matter of fact is not something impossible. The claim that ‘the sun will not rise tomorrow’ is just as intelligible as, and no more contradictory than the claim that ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’. The two claims are only distinguishable by observation and experience. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume 1784(1975)| ppp. 11]] Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds and cannot be established by demonstration. They can never be known with certainty. Hume’s new categories of knowledge made it clear that natural philosophy, since it relied on knowledge of matters of fact, could never aspire to the kind of certainty that Aristotle supposed for scientific knowledge, and should be content with the modest sort of knowledge available through Newton’s inductive method. [[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]]

1) "•I I have found that such and such an object has alwayshad such and been attended with such an effect..."

•I 2) "I foresee , that other objects , which appear are in appearance, similar , willhave be attended with similar effects." [[CiteRef:: Hume (17481975) |p. 16114]]

Newton supposed that the use of such inductive arguments could be justified by supposing an appeal to the uniformity of nature. [[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]] Hume however, found a fundamental problem in rationally justifying inductive arguments. Consider the following argument, which might seem to justify our reliance on induction:

• 1) In the past, the future has been like the past.

• 2) Therefore, the future will be like the past.

But this argument itself relies on induction, ; the very mode of argument it seeks to justify. As Hume put it: "According to my account, all arguments about existence are based on the relation of cause and effect; our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and in drawing conclusions from experience we assume that the future will be like the past. So if we try to prove this assumption by probable arguments, i.e. arguments regarding existence, we shall obviously be going in a circle, taking for granted the very point that is in question." [[CiteRef::Hume (17482008)| p. 16]] He concluded that "the conclusions we draw from experience are not based on reasoning or on any process of understanding". [[CiteRef:: Hume (17482008) |p. 15]] But induction is necessary for the conclusions that we draw, not only in Newtonian science, but also in our daily lives, which would not be possible without it. Hume concludes that we are compelled to use induction by a powerful natural instinct, or more specifically his principles of association. "All these operations" he wrote, "are species of natural instincts, which no reasoning… is able either to produce or prevent". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| p. 46-47]] Humans must, Hume concludes, rely on "the ordinary wisdom of nature", which insures that we form beliefs "by some instinct or mechanical tendency", rather than trusting "the fallacious deductions of our reason". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975) |p. 55]] In keeping with this naturalistic conclusion, Hume devotes an entire section of the ''Enquiry'' to an argument that non-human animals also learn by induction. He writes that "it seems evident that animals, like men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same outcomes will always follow the same causes". [[CiteRef::Hume (17482008)| p. 53]] Hume’s conclusion was a radical challenge to the central role assigned by rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz to reason in the production of our knowledge, and is seen today as a step towards modern ideas in cognitive science and neuroscience.[[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]]

In the early modern periodChristian Europe, theology and natural philosophy were not deemed foreign to one another, but coexisted rather seen as part compatible parts of an integrated [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of knowledge. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 65]] Isaac NewtonTheological knowledge derived from observations of nature and its supposed design, for examplethe supposed divine revelation of the Bible, authored a volume on Biblical prophesiesand supposed miraculous events where God had intervened directly in human affairs. [[CiteRef::Mandelbrote Fieser (20042016)]] By the eighteenth century As a thoroughgoing empiricist, Hume questioned all these sources of knowledge, and rejected theological knowledge as impossible. In a letter to Henry Home (1696-1782) published in 1737, Hume confessed that he intended to include a skeptical discussion of miracles in his ''a prioriTreatise'' rational arguments but left it out for fear of offending readers. Critics of religion in eighteenth century Europe faced the existence risk of Godfine, imprisonment,or worse. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Hume did later publish his critique in the ''Enquiry'' in 1748. He wrote that sought "A wise man...proportions his belief to demonstrate God's existence with mathematical certainty the evidence" [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. 56]] and drew the conclusion that "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and because firm and without appeal to unalterable experiencehas established these laws, were widely recognized the case against a miracle is- just because it is a miracle- as complete as problematicany argument from experience can possibly be imagined to be....No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless it is of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact it tries to establish...When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately ask myself whether it is more probable that this person either deceives or has been deceived or that what he reports really has happened. Descartes argument..If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event he relates, for examplethen he can claim to command my belief or opinion, had been exposed as circularbut not otherwise". [[CiteRef::Cottingham Hume (19922008)| p. 58-59]] A dominant progressive strain The claim that a dead man was restored to life is, of theological thought, largely associated with the British Royal Societycourse, instead sought central to demonstrate GodChristian theology. Hume's existence with probability arguments have gained a relevance beyond theological knowledge, and have been espoused as a [[methodology]] for evaluating other sorts of extraordinary or surprising claims, such as claims of paranormal occurrences or of extraterrestrial intelligence. They are succinctly summarized by showing that the universe possesses maxim, popularized by the order and purposefulness twentieth century astronomer Carl Sagan (1934-1996), that "extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence". [[CiteRef::Sagan (1979)| p. 62]][[CiteRef:: Deming (2016)]] In 1757, Hume published an essay entitled ''The Natural History of a designed artifact Religion'' which was the first systematic attempt to explain religious belief solely in terms of an all-powerful Intelligencewhat we would call psychological and sociological factors. In [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Having called revealed religion into question by doubting miraculous events, Hume turned his attention to natural theology in his ''Dialogues concerning Natural Religion'', which he arranged to have published posthumously because of its inflammatory nature. In it, Hume raised devastating objections to this the claim that the universe showed evidence of purposeful design by an Intelligent Creator. This claim was then widely popular among natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] The ''Dialogues'' is written as a conversation between three characters; ''Cleanthes'', a proponent of the design argument, ''Demea'', a mystic, and ''Philo'', a religious skeptic generally supposed to be Hume's spokesperson. Philo argues that the analogy between the universe and a designed artifact is weak. For example, we experience only one universe and have nothing to compare it to. We recognize human artifacts by contrast with non-artifacts such as rocks. He also notes that we have no experience of the origin of the universe, and that causal inference requires a basis in experienced constant conjunction between two things. For the origin of the universe we have nothing of the sort. ''Demea'' deems ''Cleanthes'' concept of God as cosmic designer to be anthropomorphic and limiting. By the end, Hume's characters' arguments lead the reader to the conclude, with ''Philo'', that God's nature seems inconceivable, incomprehensible, and indefinable and therefore the question of God's existence is rendered meaningless. [[CiteRef::Hume (2007)]][[CiteRef::Oppy (1996)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]]|Criticism=Hume's skeptical arguments were troubling to many, and received a good deal of criticism. He was criticized, notably, by a fellow Scottish philosopher of his times; Thomas Reid. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Reid rejected Hume's theories of perception and causation because of their skeptical consequences. Hume supposed that our perceptual experience was of impressions in our minds. He also maintained that causal relations do not exist in the world, but are rather posited in our minds when two events are constantly conjoined in experience. Such views, taken together, made it impossible to claim that our perceptual impressions are caused by objects in an external world. This would require that external objects themselves, and our impressions of them be conjoined in our experience, which is obviously impossible. Hume accepted that his belief in an external world was merely a matter of habit, custom, or instinct, and could not be justified. Reid found this unacceptable, and supposed that our perceptual experience was directly of objects in the world, just as everyday common sense tells us. He noted that such direct experience was no more mysterious than Hume's supposition that we directly experienced impressions in our mind. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]][[CiteRef::Reid (2007)|pp. 1-10]] Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume's supposition that the direct objects of perception were mental entities such as ideas, impressions, sensations, or sense data remained widely popular into the twentieth century, [[CiteRef::Hatfield (2004)]] but had been strongly challenged by the beginning of the twenty first century [[CiteRef::Warren (2005)]][[CiteRef::Thompson (2007)]]. By that time though, the relationship between this problem and that of external world skepticism had been substantially reconfigured. [[CiteRef::Clark (2017)]] Reid likewise rejected Hume's view of causality. He noted that a view of causality based on constant conjunctions in our experience could not give a causal account of unique events. Suppose, he posited, that an earthquake struck Mexico City for the first time in its history, resulting in the destruction of the city. Under Hume's definition, we could not claim that the earthquake caused the destruction of the city, since the two events, being unique, are not constantly conjoined in experience. He further noted that night following day and day following night are constantly conjoined experiences, but we generally do not claim that day causes night and night causes day, but rather that both are caused by Earth's rotation. Reid proposes instead that two events have a causal relationship whenever they are conjoined by a law of nature, whether or not they are constantly conjoined in experience. Unlike Hume, Reid maintains that causes necessitate their effects even though he concedes that this necessitation is not evident through perception alone. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] James Beattie (1735-1803) drew heavily on Reid's ideas in a book critical of Hume's philosophy that became a smash bestseller [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::McDermid (2017)]]

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant(1724-1824) sought to respond to Hume''Dialogues'' is written as a conversation between three characters; ''Cleanthess skeptical challenge regarding cause and effect, in his '', a proponent Critique of the design argument, Pure Reason''Demea'', a mystic, (1781) and most explicitly in his ''PhiloProlegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'' a religious skeptic generally supposed (1783). Kant sought to be synthesize early modern rationalism with empiricism, and thereby avert Hume's spokespersonskepticism. Philo argues He did this by supposing that the analogy between the universe and a designed artifact is weak. For example, world as we can experience only one universe and have nothing to compare it to. We recognize human artifacts by contrast with non-artifacts such as rocks. He also notes that we have no experience of , the origin of the universesensible world, and that causal inference requires a basis in experienced constant conjunction between two things. For the origin of the universe we have nothing of is structured by the sort. ''Demea'a priori' deems ''Cleanthes'' concept forms of God as cosmic designer to be anthropomorphic and limitingour cognitive faculties. In The understanding is thus a discussion of the prerequisite for experience. Possible human conditionexperience thus conforms to certain necessary laws, which we can know through our reason, independently of experience. For Kant this ''Philoa priori'' asks why an infinitely wise, powerfulstructuring framework included Euclidean space and time, and good God would permit human sufferingcause and effect. By the end, Hume's characters arguments lead the reader to the conclude, with ''Philo'', Kant argued that God's nature seems inconceivable, incomprehensibleby such means, and indefinable and therefore the question idea of God's existence is rendered meaninglessnecessary causal laws that human reason could know was restored. [[CiteRef::Hume Rohlf (2015)]][[CiteRef::Oppy (19962016)]][[CiteRef::Morris De Pierris and Brown Friedman (20162013)]]|Criticism=Historically, due to the threatening nature of Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, particularly to Newtonian physics, as well as his problem of induction there have been many critics of Hume. One of the most prominent critics to criticize Hume on the account of his distinction between the types of propositions was [[Immanuel Kant]]. Kant criticized Hume, seeking to validate Newton’s propositions about the world which could never be meaningful under Hume’s distinction. Kant theorized that the world was interpreted through sensory and intellect and thus there must exist some sort of ''a priori'' synthetic proposition.4 The existence of such a proposition would of course result in a proposition that fit both categories of Hume’s distinction. Unfortunately, Kant’s ''a priori'' synthetic proposition was debunked with the arrival of probabilistic determinism.

As for criticisms on In the twentieth century, Karl Popper (1902-1994) challenged Hume's Problem of Induction, there are skepticism on quite a few casesdifferent grounds. One of the more notable cases was the critique [[Karl Popper]] had towards rejected Hume, stating 's Newtonian inductivism. Popper argued that induction is a mythnever actually used in science, since all observation is selective and theory-laden.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]]Popper argued advocated a '''hypothetico-deductive method''' for science, arguing that science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than by reference to the past, and that the main purpose of observations wasn’t to make inferences about the future but to refute present existing theories. Popper was committed to the idea believed that Hume had incorrectly orientated himself towards was mistaken in seeking a means of justifying to justify knowledge. Popper, instead, preferred to look for sought a process by which to reveal and correct errorsscientific error.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]]

[[Wesley Salmon]] responded The strongest criticisms directed against Hume were based on his skepticism about theological knowledge. Due to his religious views, he was never able to obtain an academic faculty appointment. His critics called him "The Great Infidel". Hume's arguments in the ''Dialogs'' did not put a stop to this criticism the claim that natural philosophy could find evidence of intelligent design in Hume’s placenature, stating theories still need predictions in part because Hume failed to be testedsupply an adequate alternative explanation for apparently purposeful complexity. When Popperians have multiple theoriesIn 1802, each sharing twenty three years after the same quantity publication of empirical contentHume's ''Dialogues'', William Paley (1743-1805), Popperians would choose an English clergyman, expounded the theories which were better corroborated but lack any justification design argument in this decisionhis ''Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity''. The Popperians either make Paley argued that the purposeful sophistication of biological "contrivances", such as the eye, were clear evidence of design by an inductive claimIntelligent Being. [[CiteRef::Ayala (2003)]][[CiteRef:: # A theory was reliable in Paley (1809)]] Among those who read and appreciated Paley's arguments were the naturalist Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In his ''Origin of Species'' (1859) Darwin argued that biological species were not separately created and are instead physically descended from pre-existing species, with all living things ultimately descended from a common ancestor. He explained Paley's contrivances by positing the pastprocess of natural selection, which he justified with extensive studies of animal breeding.# It will be reliable By explaining the appearance of design in living systems, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection dealt a severe blow to the future having survived falsificationdesign argument among natural scientists.Or they admit corroboration is not an indication Scientists [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] methodological naturalism, and theological propositions were no longer considered part of predictive powerthe [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]].[[CiteRef::Salmon Ruse (1999)]][[CiteRef::Ruse (19672003)]]|Page Status=Needs EditingEditor Approved