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|SummaryBrief='''David Hume''' (1711-1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, and essayist.[[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] As one of ; he is widely considered the first most important philosophers philosopher to write in the English, Hume was a skeptic. language|Summary=Hume’s two largest contributions to our understanding of the processes of scientific change and the field nature of philosophy lie within scientific knowledge come from his major philosophical works: including ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' (1738) and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding''(1748). He is perhaps most well known noted for his interpretation skeptical views on a variety of topics including the powers of human reason, metaphysics, human identity, and the existence of God.[[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] He is perhaps best known, first, for rejecting Aristotle’s causation in terms of epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief and replacing it with his own distinction between matters of fact (which depend on the way the world is) and relations of ideas(that are discoverable by thought, such as mathematical truths). This new distinction is known as Hume's Fork. Secondly, and he is known for questioning the rationality behind inductionwhether knowledge derived from inductive reasoning can be justified. The problem he posed is known today as Hume's Problem of Induction.[[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (20012016)]] These are known as Hume’s Fork Thirdly, Hume questioned whether theological knowledge is possible,and played a substantial role in its removal from the scientific mosaic of the modern world. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] The Problem impact of Induction respectively. These skeptical these fallibilist arguments posed a challenge is still felt to many great philosophical minds and continue to challenge philosophers todaythis day.|Historical Context=David Hume is one of the most notable skeptics was born in all of history thanks to his skepticism of causationEdinburgh, Scotland in 1711. His family had a modest estate and necessary connectionwas socially connected, but not wealthy. Within a historical context[[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] They recognized that Hume was precocious, philosophers and sent him to Edinburgh University two years early (at the age of the time were concerned 10 or 11) with proving axiomatic schemeshis older brother (who was 12). He studied Latin and Greek, heavily relying on causation. Diverging from this reliance on causationread widely in history, Hume would go to show irrationality within such a connection. More specificallyliterature, within scientific changeand ancient and modern philosophy, Hume’s arguments are most notably used against infallibilismas well as some mathematics and natural philosophy. [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Harris (2015)|p. Famously35-65]] Both at home and at the university, Hume is often associated with was raised in the terms stern '''The Problem of InductionCalvinist faith''' , with prayers and '''Hume’s Fork'''. Hume creates most sermons as prominent features of his arguments for skepticism within his two texts ''A Treatise of Human Nature (1738)'' home and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding (1748)''university life.[[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (20012016)]]

At Following the time, modern philosophers had strived away from Aristotle’s account completion of causation. In this rejectionhis studies, they thought themselves revolutionary. Aristotle’s account of causation consisted of material, formal, efficientHume rejected his family's plan that he become a lawyer, and final causes. The philosophers of the middle agesinstead determined to become a scholar and philosopher, only retained some semblance engaging in three years of efficient causes intensive personal study. Living in their deferral. They instead chose to categorize causes as primary or secondary efficient causes. Primary causes were the source aftermath of being the acceptance of a particular thing, while secondary causes were the beginnings [[Isaac Newton]]'s(1643-1727) revolutionary theories of motion or change. Albeit digressing from Aristotle’s model of causation, those same philosophers kept Aristotle’s distinction between scientific knowledge and belief. This distinction helped to hold propositions which were scientific vs. those which were not. Scientific knowledge consisted of propositions which could be demonstratedgravitation, i.e. they could prove to have a necessary connection between cause and effect independent eighteenth century thinkers proclaimed the ''''Age of experience. Beliefs were just statements of opinion based on experience. Descartes Enlightenment'''' and Malebranche, for instance, kept this distinction in that they were certain of demonstrative scientific knowledge. Locke, on expected philosophy (which then included what we would call the other hand, was more interested in asserting natural philosophy by appealing and social sciences) to the rationality of beliefdramatically improve human life.[[CiteRef::Morris Bristow (20012017)]] Hume, like many of his times, revered Newton, calling him "the greatest and rarest genius that ever arose for the ornament and instruction of the species". [[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]]

Little is known of Hume took a different approach's activities during his schooling and afterwards. He divided that same distinction between scientific explanation According to the curriculum then in place at Edinburgh, he would have spent his fourth year studying natural philosophy, and belief into relations would have been exposed to experimental natural philosophy, including Newton's theories. [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]] More than thirty years earlier, in 1687, Newton had published his ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica'' (''Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy'') in which he put forth his '''laws of motion''', '''law of ideas universal gravitation''', and matters his inductive '''experimental philosophy'''. [[CiteRef:: Westfall (1999)]][[CiteRef::Janiak (2016)]] By about 1700 these theories had become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] in Britain. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 210]] The works of factother experimental philosophers were also available to the young Hume. The distinction natural philosophy library at Edinburgh, to which Hume is known to have contributed, contained an extensive collection of the works of Robert Boyle(1627-1691), the works of [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and [[John Locke]]'s (1632-1704) ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding''. This work, published in 1689, more than twenty years before Hume was still based on Aristotleborn, propounded Locke's '''empiricist''' view of human knowledge and belief. [[CiteRef::Harris (2015)|p. 38-40]][[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Boyle, but it translated slightly differently. Similar to Aristotle’s distinctionNewton, Hume’s distinction agreed that and Locke were all propositions could be exclusively divided into one category or associated with the other. Different '''Royal Society of London''', which was founded in 1663, almost 50 years before Hume's birth, and sought to Aristotle’s distinction however, it provided a different account for promote the experimental method and the two types of propositions. This distinction is commonly referred to as Hume’s Forknew natural philosophy.[[CiteRef::Hume Uzgalis (2016)]][[CiteRef::Rogers (19751982)]]

Along with this distinction By Hume also strongly disagreed with his predecessors that reason or any other rational means of understanding are behind causal inferences. Instead's time, Hume believed that causal inferences were caused by some other means, particularly, induction. Induction is the process by which a person makes assumptions about the future based on their experiences [[Aristotle]]'s (384 BC-322 BC) teleological account of the past. This process is, causation had been rejected in favour of course, not a rational activity, and the majority '''corpuscular mechanistic''' view of the discourse on induction is explaining thiscausation. This argument is famously known as Hume’s Problem Derived from ancient atomism, it held that material bodies are made of Inductioninvisibly small particles, and is Hume’s largest contribution to skepticismcalled corpuscles. It is through the problem of induction that Hume can be seen to conflict with modern philosophers’ accounts The only form of causation. Because effects could no longer be rationally correlated to their causesis mechanical, philosophers who built axiomatic schemes around such cases were no longer justified in by direct physical contact of bodies or their beliefsconstituent corpuscles.[[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]] Philosophers would no longer be able Natural philosophers continued to claim inference from experience as a rational activity. This argument continues to be used today as a main criticism of infallibilism.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]|Major Contributions==== Hume’s Fork ===In Hume’s entrance to the debate of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean accept Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and belief into his own terms. These are:* Relations Scientific knowledge was taken to be knowledge of ideas. * Matters causes and consisted of fact. Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain through either demonstration or purely through intuition. They are ''a priori'demonstrations''', in that they are discoverable independent of experience. This categorization does not necessitate ideas to carry information dependent on ; proving the world necessary connection between cause and thus ideas falling into effect. Locke supported this category are independent view of any existing thing. They are universal constants in that they hold true in all worlds. It should be noted, relations of ideas cannot provide any new information about knowledge and made the world. These types popular notion of propositions are simply a means used to help understand more complex ideas. They can be thought hypothetical hidden corpuscular microstructure and the associated notion of as symbols or a series of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex idea. Common examples usually include geometry or math as formal sciences fall within this categorization. Examples of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up metaphysically necessary connection between cause and effect central to 360 degrees' or '1 + 1 = 2'his system. Alternatively, a worded proposition may look something like 'when you run, you move your body,' or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations He nonetheless recognized that demonstrative knowledge was seldom attainable because of ideas can never be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in the very definition unobservability of the terms within the propositioncorpuscles.[[CiteRef::Hume DePierris (2006)]][[CiteRef::Kochiras (19752014)]]

Matters of fact are the complete opposite of relations of ideas. Matters of fact are Although many early eighteenth century thinkers regarded Newton's theories and Locke's empiricism to constitute a unified system, there was a posteriori'' statements and thus based on experiencedistinct tension between them, which Hume recognized. Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true Newton had been unable to explain his gravitational force in all possible worlds. The contrary terms of matters of fact imply no contradiction and such statements cannot be established by demonstrationa corpuscular mechanism. Matters He saw his inductive method as an alternative to the demands of fact can show new information about a corpuscularism that stood in the world but rely on way of the experience acceptance of the worlda mathematically lawful gravitational force on its own terms. Examples Hume's Newton inspired skepticism of such statements include 'the sky is blue'speculative metaphysical hypotheses led him to reject corpuscularism, or and his enthusiastic championing of Newton'water is odourlesss inductive method led him to challenge Locke's concept of causation, or 'all guitars have 6 frets.and Aristotle' It should be noted that false statements, such as the last example, can still be matters s taxonomy of fact. The level knowledge and opinion in favour of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this sense, contrasting statements are, too, matters a new epistemic taxonomy and new concept of factscausation.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]]

The reason behind this distinction was simple; it was to provide criteria by which to organize scientific statements. Through this distinctionBy the time he started work on ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' at the age of 23, all statements were categorized into either matters of fact or relations Hume had become skeptical of ideasreligious belief. This also ultimately meant that there [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The term '''atheism''' was no type of idea which was certain and provided information about the world. In the case of matters of factcoined by Sir John Cheke (1514-1557) almost two hundred years earlier in 1540, propositions are reliant on senses and due to the fallibility refer to a lack of the senses, have no certaintybelief in divine providence. In the case The term assumed its modern meaning of relations of ideas, propositions can be proven with absolute certainty through disbelief in the use of other relations existence of ideas. UnfortunatelyGod, however, these statements cannot give any new information about the world. This distinction was often taken by the scientific community as divine non-existence emerged as a strike at Newton’s theory of motiondisquieting possibility in the seventeenth century. [[CiteRef::Kant Hyman (2007)]] Such a distinction has large consequences in the fields of scienceIn early modern Christian Europe, theological knowledge was deemed to derive from two sources. '''Natural religion''' attempted to demonstrate God's existence and nature through reason, logic, and even philosophy due to its prevention observation of certain real the natural world statements. As an example this distinction would make useless '''Revealed religion''' was based on the premise that the text of the attempt to try to prove non physical entities as matters Bible was divinely inspired and thus a source of factreliable theological knowledge. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]]

# α is Descartes' rationalism had a proof of God's existence at its foundation, but it was also a challenge to the theological methodology established by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), which stressed the limitations of human reason, and the need to rely on Biblical revelation. Descartes instead claimed a human capacity to know God and nature through reason alone. However, his rationalist argument for God's existence and guarantorship of the certainty of scientific knowledge was soon rejected as circular. [[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Cottingham (1992)]] It was supplanted by Newton's experimental philosophy and Locke's empiricism, both of which stressed experience and observation as sources of the limited knowledge to which humans could aspire, and eschewed metaphysics and speculative hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Both Newton and Locke were nevertheless devoutly religious, though they held non-physical entitystandard beliefs.# It has no observable effect Newton authored an entire volume on Biblical prophesies. [[CiteRef::Mandelbrote (2004)]] Like many natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society, they supported a form of natural religion that sought to use the world experimental method to demonstrate that the universe exhibited the order and its not made up purposefulness of a physical thingdesigned artifact crafted by an all-powerful Intelligence. Hume doubted both revealed religion and natural religion as sources of knowledge, and published strong arguments against both. Unlike Locke, Hume saw that empiricism must place God's existence among those speculative questions to be eschewed. [[CiteRef::Hyman (2007)]] Doubts about God's existence also arose among French intellectuals in the mid-eighteenth century, with the first to openly proclaim himself an atheist being Denis Diderot (1713-1784).[[CiteRef:: Hyman (2007)]][[CiteRef::Bristow (2017)]]# α is |Major Contributions=Hume was one of a relation number of ideaseighteenth century British philosophers whose work was inspired primarily by Newton's physical theories and experimental philosophy.# Relations Hume and Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746) believed that the mind's operations could be studied by broadly Newtonian observational methods, and in both cases this led them to forms of local skepticism. Joseph Priestly (1733-1804) and David Hartley (1705-1757) applied Newtonianism to both the operations of ideas are just assigned symbols helping the mind and to explain more complex symbolsits substance, becoming materialists.# The statement ‘α exists’ proven or otherwise doesn’t say anything about George Turnbull (1698-1748) and his pupil Thomas Reid(1710-1796) sought to ground Newtonian empiricism in a common-sense understanding of the world; it is just a play on words, thus avoiding Hume's skepticism.[[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]]

Much akin Hume's main philosophical contributions to the reasoning the analytic/synthetic distinction uses, it is impossible, according matters relevant to Hume, for a proposition not to fall within the distinctionscientific change were made via several works. In Hume’s eyes, such a proposition would be completely meaningless The first was ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' published in that it would simply not be a rational or reasonable endeavour. It is three volumes in this binary categorization1739 and 1740, that this distinction is historically importantwhen Hume was 29 years old. Philosophers at Since it sold poorly, Hume recast the time were heavily reliant on innate meaningful ideas (synthetic material into two later publications, ''a prioriEnquiries concerning Human Understanding'' statements), but Hume’s distinction of published in 1748, and ''concerning the types Principles of proposition did not allow for such ideasMorals'' published in 1751. Because of its controversial nature, Hume believed that innate ideas cannot be meaningful had ''Dialogs concerning Natural Religion'' published posthumously in that they never contain real world statements. This meant most axiomatic schemes were immediately broken down with Hume’s skepticism1779, three years after his death. [[CiteRef::DePierris Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef:: Norton (20062009)]]Here we first consider Hume's views on the mind, which are critical to understanding his views regarding scientific methodology and change. We then consider three issues of central importance to [[Scientific Change|scientific change]], types of knowledge, the status of inductive knowledge, and the status of theological knowledge within the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]].

=== Problem Hume and The Science of Induction Human Nature ===The problem basic goal of induction stems from the reasoning behind causal inference. This first three of Hume's major works is a very important problem Hume brings up because indicated by the methodology subtitle of the time ''Treatise''; "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] Hume sought to extend Newton's experimental philosophy from natural philosophy into what was then called for axiomatic schemes'''moral philosophy''', which he defined as the "science of human nature". These schemes were based largely on causal inferences[[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p. As such8]] The field of moral philosophy was much broader then than today, Hume’s Problem and included topics that we might classify as psychology or cognitive science, as well as epistemology. To Hume, an understanding of Induction threatened science at the time as it proved causal inferences were irrationalworkings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] His work in this area was thus critical to his ideas regarding scientific methodology and scientific change.

Given Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, Hume maintained, had cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems". [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] He sought to work the previous distinction between relations same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full of ideas speculative metaphysical hypotheses and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He proposed an empiricist alternative to ''a priori'' metaphysics based on pure reason and matters of factthe speculative belief systems to which it led. [[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] As a naturalist, Hume rejected any appeal to the connection within causal inference should fall under one supernatural in explanations of those categorieshuman nature. With this in mindFor such beliefs, Hume found and because he argued that causal inference we cannot justify many of our beliefs, he is noted as a skeptic. But Hume himself rejected skepticism. While skepticism can't be defeated by reason, he observed that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs (such as the belief that there is a relation world external to my mind of which my senses provide knowledge). He wrote that "it is fortunate that Nature eventually breaks the force of ideasall skeptical arguments, and so must be keeping them from having much influence on our understanding". [[CiteRef::Hume (2017)]] It was these faculties of which he sought to give a matter of factpositive descriptive account. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]][[CiteRef::Wright (2012)]]

The reason he came Hume sought to this conclusion was that each cause is independent found an empirical science of its effect. The two are not associated with each other. For example, never having seen an anti-bioticthe mind, based on experience and without being told observation. He noted that the application of the experimental method to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its effectsuse in natural philosophy, would a person be able because it was impossible to establish its effect through sole means of reasoning and senses? Quite simplyconduct experiments "purposely, nowith premeditation" on such matters. Without experienceInstead, a person knowledge would have no understanding to what the purpose be gained "from cautious observation of the medicine ishuman life...by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, or that it is medicine at alland in pleasures". [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)|p. And herein42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, Hume concludes, since ''a priori'' reasoning cannot be with controlled experiments in the source of connection between causes and effectslaboratory, would not make its appearance until the inference must be a matter of factlate 19th century.[[CiteRef::Hume Leary (19751979)]]

Describing causal inferences as a matter Due in part to the works of Descartes and Locke, the notion that an idea was the primary sort of fact provides leeway mental content dominated European philosophy by the time Hume started work on his ''Treatise''. Hume instead used the term ''''perceptions'''' to use experience to determine the effects designate mental content of any sort. He supposed there are two sorts of perceptions, '''impressions''' and '''ideas''', which was a causenew distinction. Using the example Impressions include feelings we get from beforeour senses, if that same person had tried anti-biotics such as of a red tomato currently in the past front of me, as well as desires, emotions, passions, and had been curedsentiments, they begin to infer such as my current hunger for the reason for tomato. Hume distinguished impressions from ideas by their getting better was degree of vivacity or force. Thus, I have an impression of the anti-biotictomato that is currently present, and an idea of a tomato I ate last week. Grasping this chain Hume supposed our ideas are faint copies of events Hume attempts to formulate that person’s argument for their inference our impressions. [[CiteRef::Owen (2009)]][[CiteRef::Morris and states it as suchBrown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]]

# In Noting that there is a regular order to our thoughts, he asserted that the past x mind has resulted the power to associate ideas. Hume’s concepts about the association of ideas were novel. He posited three associative principles; '''resemblance''' (as when I recognize that the tomato currently before me resembles the one in my garden), '''contiguity''' in ytime and place (as when I notice that the tomato is on the table to my left) and '''causation''' (as when I notice that bumping the table causes the tomato to tumble to the floor).# ThereforeHume believed that by thus anatomizing human nature, in its laws of operation could be discovered. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] [[CiteRef::Owen (2009)]] He argued that the mind could not be an immaterial substance, though he was also critical of materialism. Regarding personal identity, Hume wrote that “what we call a ''mind'' is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with perfect simplicity and identity”. [[CiteRef::McIntyre (2009) | p. 182]] It was Hume's careful analysis of the future x will result in ymind that led to his insights relevant to scientific methodology.

Here however, === Hume notices and Scientific Methodology ======= Hume’s Fork ====Aristotle drew a gap categorical distinction between '''scientific knowledge''' or ''scientia'' and '''belief''', or ''opinio''. Scientific knowledge was knowledge of causes and proceeded through '''demonstration''', in logicwhich a necessary connection between a cause and its effect was proven using premises that were intuitively obvious independently of experience. Corpuscularists retained this demonstrative ideal of scientific explanation. How does [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (12016) infer (2)? Hume sees ]] Descartes supposed that a mechanical cause is necessarily related to its effect. A demonstrative reasoning cannot fill this gapscience was thus possible, because a complete contrast where x does not result at least in y implies no contradiction within the inference. Hereinprinciple, it seems that there is an underlying assumption within because the first premise: general principles of physical nature could be deduced from mathematical principles concerning the future will be like shape, size, position, motion, and causal interaction among the pastultimate corpuscular particles of matter. This assumption is more commonly known as the uniformity principleThe Aristotelian categories of knowledge were thus still accepted by Hume’s contemporaries. Using such an assumption would fill the logical gap within the current argumentHowever, Newton's method, however before it can be usedin which general principles are derived inductively from observation and experiment, it must be established that did not mesh well with this demonstrative view of science. Newton came to oppose the purely hypothetical explanations of the principle is either intuitive or demonstrable. Nonethelessmechanical philosophy, because they stood in the only way to formulate an argument of his inductive arguments for the principle is to rely on the principle itselfuniversal gravitation.[[CiteRef::Hume De Pierris (19752006)]] With reliance on the uniformity principle the full argument would follow like this:

# In Hume took Newton’s opposition to demonstrative science much further, questioning the idea of a necessary mechanical connection between cause and effect. "Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities;" he wrote, "if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam [the Biblical first man], though his rational faculties be supposed, at the pastvery first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the future has been like fluidity and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the pastlight and warmth of fire, that it would consume him.# ThereforeNo object ever discovers, by the future qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes, which produced it, or the effects, which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact." [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)|p. 109-110]] The connection between a cause and its effect was learned by observation and experience, and could not be like the pastshown by demonstrative argument.[[CiteRef:: Bell (2009)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]][[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]]

Within this argumentHaving rejected demonstrative knowledge for the natural world, the premise assumes the conclusion Hume recast Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and, opinion as such, the argument is circular. In this sense, the first example shows an irrational train a distinction between '''relations of ideas''' and '''matters of thoughtfact'''. It seems then, that [[CiteRef::Hume established there is no way (1975)| pp. 108-113]] Relations of ideas are ''a priori'' truths that reason could be the connection between cause and effect. Thusare discoverable independent of experience, Hume sought another connection between cause and effect. He eventually recognized this connection to can be custom shown with certainty by demonstration or habitintuition. This is more commonly known today as induction. As a person experiences something repeatedlyBecause they must be true in any world, they grow cannot provide any new information about our own world. Relations of ideas are confined to expect it the formal sciences of mathematics, geometry, and logic. Examples of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up to happen again. However360 degrees', '1 + 1 = 2', despite being an adequate connectionor, this solution forces the abandonment 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations of reason within causal inferenceideas can not be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in their very definition. [[CiteRef:: DePierris Morris and Brown (20062016)]] As previously mentioned, such a conclusion yields grave consequences for science of the time, which was heavily dependent on causal inferences.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. 108-113]]|Criticism=Historically, due to the threatening nature of Hume’s distinction between relations of ideas and matters Matters of fact, particularly to Newtonian physicsby contrast, as well as his problem of induction there have been many critics of Humeare ''a posteriori'' statements based on knowledge obtained from the world through observation or experience. One Examples of such statements include 'the most prominent critics to criticize Hume on sky is blue', or 'water is odourless'. Note that the account contrary of his distinction between a matter of fact is not something impossible. The claim that ‘the sun will not rise tomorrow’ is just as intelligible as, and no more contradictory than the types of propositions was claim that ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’. The two claims are only distinguishable by observation and experience. [[Immanuel KantCiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]][[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| pp. Kant criticized Hume11]] Unlike relations of ideas, seeking to validate Newton’s propositions about the world which could matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds and cannot be established by demonstration. They can never be meaningful under known with certainty. Hume’s distinction. Kant theorized new categories of knowledge made it clear that the world was interpreted through sensory and intellect and thus there must exist some sort natural philosophy, since it relied on knowledge of ''a priori'' synthetic proposition.4 The existence matters of such a proposition would fact, could never aspire to the kind of course result in a proposition certainty that fit both categories of Hume’s distinction. UnfortunatelyAristotle supposed for scientific knowledge, Kant’s ''a priori'' synthetic proposition was debunked and should be content with the arrival modest sort of probabilistic determinismknowledge available through Newton’s inductive method. [[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]]

As for criticisms on Hume's Problem ==== Hume’s problem of Inductioninduction ====While championing Newton’s inductive method, there are quite a few casesHume also exposed its limitations by showing that conclusions drawn by inductive reasoning could not be rationally justified. One As discussed above, Hume argued that knowledge of cause and effect comes only from the more notable cases was constant conjunction of particular phenomena in experience, which allows the critique [[Karl Popper]] had towards Hume, stating that use of induction is a mythto draw conclusions about cause and effect.[[CiteRef::Popper Morris and Brown (19592016)]] Popper argued science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than reference to the past, and that the main purpose of observations wasn’t to make inferences about the future but to refute present existing theories. Popper was committed to the idea that Hume had incorrectly orientated himself towards a means of justifying knowledge. Popper, instead, preferred to look for a process by which to correct errors.[[CiteRef::Popper De Pierris (19632006)]]Hume envisions such an inductive argument as follows:

1) "I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect..." 2) "I foresee, that other objects, which are in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects." [[Wesley SalmonCiteRef:: Hume (1975) |p. 114]] responded  Newton supposed that the use of such inductive arguments could be justified by an appeal to this criticism the uniformity of nature. [[CiteRef::De Pierris (2006)]] Hume however, found a fundamental problem in Hume’s placerationally justifying inductive arguments. Consider the following argument, stating theories still need predictions which might seem to justify our reliance on induction: 1) In the past, the future has been like the past. 2) Therefore, the future will be testedlike the past. When Popperians have multiple theories But this argument itself relies on induction; the very mode of argument it seeks to justify. As Hume put it: "According to my account, each sharing all arguments about existence are based on the same quantity relation of cause and effect; our knowledge of empirical contentthat relation is derived entirely from experience; and in drawing conclusions from experience we assume that the future will be like the past. So if we try to prove this assumption by probable arguments, Popperians i.e. arguments regarding existence, we shall obviously be going in a circle, taking for granted the very point that is in question." [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. 16]] He concluded that "the conclusions we draw from experience are not based on reasoning or on any process of understanding". [[CiteRef:: Hume (2008) |p. 15]] But induction is necessary for the conclusions that we draw, not only in Newtonian science, but also in our daily lives, which would choose not be possible without it. Hume concludes that we are compelled to use induction by a powerful natural instinct, or more specifically his principles of association. "All these operations" he wrote, "are species of natural instincts, which no reasoning… is able either to produce or prevent". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975)| p. 46-47]] Humans must, Hume concludes, rely on "the theories ordinary wisdom of nature", which insures that we form beliefs "by some instinct or mechanical tendency", rather than trusting "the fallacious deductions of our reason". [[CiteRef::Hume (1975) |p. 55]] In keeping with this naturalistic conclusion, Hume devotes an entire section of the ''Enquiry'' to an argument that non-human animals also learn by induction. He writes that "it seems evident that animals, like men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same outcomes will always follow the same causes". [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. 53]] Hume’s conclusion was a radical challenge to the central role assigned by rationalists like Descartes and Leibniz to reason in the production of our knowledge, and is seen today as a step towards modern ideas in cognitive science and neuroscience. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]] ==== Hume's skepticism about theological knowledge ====In the early modern Christian Europe, theology and natural philosophy were better corroborated not deemed foreign to one another, but rather seen as compatible parts of an integrated [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of knowledge. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 65]] Theological knowledge derived from observations of nature and its supposed design, the supposed divine revelation of the Bible, and supposed miraculous events where God had intervened directly in human affairs. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] As a thoroughgoing empiricist, Hume questioned all these sources of knowledge, and rejected theological knowledge as impossible. In a letter to Henry Home (1696-1782) published in 1737, Hume confessed that he intended to include a skeptical discussion of miracles in his ''Treatise'' but lack left it out for fear of offending readers. Critics of religion in eighteenth century Europe faced the risk of fine, imprisonment, or worse. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Hume did later publish his critique in the ''Enquiry'' in 1748. He wrote that "A wise man...proportions his belief to the evidence" [[CiteRef::Hume (2008)| p. 56]] and drew the conclusion that "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and because firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the case against a miracle is- just because it is a miracle- as complete as any justification in argument from experience can possibly be imagined to be....No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless it is of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact it tries to establish...When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately ask myself whether it is more probable that this decisionperson either deceives or has been deceived or that what he reports really has happened...If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event he relates, then he can claim to command my belief or opinion, but not otherwise". [[CiteRef:: Hume (2008)| p. 58-59]] The Popperians either make claim that a dead man was restored to life is, of course, central to Christian theology. Hume's arguments have gained a relevance beyond theological knowledge, and have been espoused as a [[methodology]] for evaluating other sorts of extraordinary or surprising claims, such as claims of paranormal occurrences or of extraterrestrial intelligence. They are succinctly summarized by the maxim, popularized by the twentieth century astronomer Carl Sagan (1934-1996), that "extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence". [[CiteRef::Sagan (1979)| p. 62]][[CiteRef:: Deming (2016)]] In 1757, Hume published an essay entitled ''The Natural History of Religion'' which was the first systematic attempt to explain religious belief solely in terms of what we would call psychological and sociological factors. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Having called revealed religion into question by doubting miraculous events, Hume turned his attention to natural theology in his ''Dialogues concerning Natural Religion'', which he arranged to have published posthumously because of its inflammatory nature. In it, Hume raised devastating objections to the claim that the universe showed evidence of purposeful design by an inductive Intelligent Creator. This claimwas then widely popular among natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)]] The ''Dialogues'' is written as a conversation between three characters; ''Cleanthes'', a proponent of the design argument, ''Demea'', a mystic, and ''Philo'', a religious skeptic generally supposed to be Hume's spokesperson. Philo argues that the analogy between the universe and a designed artifact is weak. For example, we experience only one universe and have nothing to compare it to. We recognize human artifacts by contrast with non-artifacts such as rocks. He also notes that we have no experience of the origin of the universe, and that causal inference requires a basis in experienced constant conjunction between two things. For the origin of the universe we have nothing of the sort. ''Demea'' deems ''Cleanthes'' concept of God as cosmic designer to be anthropomorphic and limiting. By the end, Hume's characters' arguments lead the reader to the conclude, with ''Philo'', that God's nature seems inconceivable, incomprehensible, and indefinable and therefore the question of God's existence is rendered meaningless. [[CiteRef::Hume (2007)]][[CiteRef::Oppy (1996)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]]# A theory |Criticism=Hume's skeptical arguments were troubling to many, and received a good deal of criticism. He was criticized, notably, by a fellow Scottish philosopher of his times; Thomas Reid. [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Reid rejected Hume's theories of perception and causation because of their skeptical consequences. Hume supposed that our perceptual experience was reliable of impressions in our minds. He also maintained that causal relations do not exist in the pastworld, but are rather posited in our minds when two events are constantly conjoined in experience. Such views, taken together, made it impossible to claim that our perceptual impressions are caused by objects in an external world. This would require that external objects themselves, and our impressions of them be conjoined in our experience, which is obviously impossible.# It will Hume accepted that his belief in an external world was merely a matter of habit, custom, or instinct, and could not be reliable justified. Reid found this unacceptable, and supposed that our perceptual experience was directly of objects in the future having survived falsificationworld, just as everyday common sense tells us. He noted that such direct experience was no more mysterious than Hume's supposition that we directly experienced impressions in our mind. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]][[CiteRef::Reid (2007)|pp. 1-10]] Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume's supposition that the direct objects of perception were mental entities such as ideas, impressions, sensations, or sense data remained widely popular into the twentieth century, [[CiteRef::Hatfield (2004)]] but had been strongly challenged by the beginning of the twenty first century [[CiteRef::Warren (2005)]][[CiteRef::Thompson (2007)]]. By that time though, the relationship between this problem and that of external world skepticism had been substantially reconfigured.[[CiteRef::Clark (2017)]] Or Reid likewise rejected Hume's view of causality. He noted that a view of causality based on constant conjunctions in our experience could not give a causal account of unique events. Suppose, he posited, that an earthquake struck Mexico City for the first time in its history, resulting in the destruction of the city. Under Hume's definition, we could not claim that the earthquake caused the destruction of the city, since the two events, being unique, are not constantly conjoined in experience. He further noted that night following day and day following night are constantly conjoined experiences, but we generally do not claim that day causes night and night causes day, but rather that both are caused by Earth's rotation. Reid proposes instead that two events have a causal relationship whenever they are conjoined by a law of nature, whether or not they admit corroboration are constantly conjoined in experience. Unlike Hume, Reid maintains that causes necessitate their effects even though he concedes that this necessitation is not evident through perception alone. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] James Beattie (1735-1803) drew heavily on Reid's ideas in a book critical of Hume's philosophy that became a smash bestseller [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::McDermid (2017)]] The German philosopher Immanuel Kant(1724-1824) sought to respond to Hume's skeptical challenge regarding cause and effect, in his ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (1781) and most explicitly in his ''Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'' (1783). Kant sought to synthesize early modern rationalism with empiricism, and thereby avert Hume's skepticism. He did this by supposing that the world as we can experience it, the sensible world, is structured by the ''a priori'' forms of our cognitive faculties. The understanding is thus a prerequisite for experience. Possible human experience thus conforms to certain necessary laws, which we can know through our reason, independently of experience. For Kant this ''a priori'' structuring framework included Euclidean space and time, and cause and effect. Kant argued that by such means, the idea of necessary causal laws that human reason could know was restored. [[CiteRef::Rohlf (2016)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris and Friedman (2013)]] In the twentieth century, Karl Popper (1902-1994) challenged Hume's skepticism on quite different grounds. Popper rejected Hume's Newtonian inductivism. Popper argued that induction is never actually used in science, since all observation is selective and theory-laden. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]][[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]]Popper advocated a '''hypothetico-deductive method''' for science, arguing that science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than by reference to the past. Popper believed that Hume was mistaken in seeking a means to justify knowledge. Popper, instead sought a process to reveal and correct scientific error.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]] The strongest criticisms directed against Hume were based on his skepticism about theological knowledge. Due to his religious views, he was never able to obtain an indication academic faculty appointment. His critics called him "The Great Infidel". Hume's arguments in the ''Dialogs'' did not put a stop to the claim that natural philosophy could find evidence of intelligent design in nature, in part because Hume failed to supply an adequate alternative explanation for apparently purposeful complexity. In 1802, twenty three years after the publication of Hume's ''Dialogues'', William Paley (1743-1805), an English clergyman, expounded the design argument in his ''Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity''. Paley argued that the purposeful sophistication of biological "contrivances", such as the eye, were clear evidence of design by an Intelligent Being. [[CiteRef::Ayala (2003)]][[CiteRef::Paley (1809)]] Among those who read and appreciated Paley's arguments were the naturalist Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In his ''Origin of Species'' (1859) Darwin argued that biological species were not separately created and are instead physically descended from pre-existing species, with all living things ultimately descended from a common ancestor. He explained Paley's contrivances by positing the process of natural selection, which he justified with extensive studies of predictive poweranimal breeding.By explaining the appearance of design in living systems, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection dealt a severe blow to the design argument among natural scientists. Scientists [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] methodological naturalism, and theological propositions were no longer considered part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]. [[CiteRef::Ruse (1999)]][[CiteRef::Salmon Ruse (19672003)]]|Page Status=Editor Approved