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Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 19:44, 24 February 2023
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|Description=<blockquote>The traditional version of comparativism holds that when two theories are compared it doesn’t make any difference which of the two is currently accepted. In reality, however, the starting point for every theory assessment is the current state of the mosaic. Every new theory is basically an attempt to modify the mosaic by inserting some new elements into the mosaic and, possibly, by removing some old elements from the mosaic. Therefore, what gets decided in actual theory assessment is whether a proposed modification is to be accepted. In other words, we judge two competing theories not in a vacuum, as the traditional version of ''comparativism'' suggests, but only in the context of a specific mosaic. It is this version of the comparativist view that is implicit in the laws of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 184]] </blockquote>
Theory assessment is an assessment of a proposed modification of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] by the [[Method|method]] employed at the time. By [[The First Law|the first law]], a [[Theory|theory]] already in the mosaic is no longer appraised. By [[The Second Law|the second law]], it is only assessed when it first enters the mosaic(see the detailed deduction below).[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 185-196]] Barseghyan does note the following: "if, for whatever reason, we need to compare two competing theories disregarding the current state of the mosaic, we are free to do so, but we have to understand that in actual scientific practice such abstract comparisons play no role whatsoever. Any theory assessment always takes into account the current state of the mosaic".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 186]]
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
|Prehistory=The phenomenon of context dependence in science has been described and emphasized by many authors, notably by [[Helen Longino]].[[CiteRef::Longino (1990)]]
By the traditional ''comparativist'' account of theory appraisal, explains Barseghyan, "all that we need for a theory assessment is two competing theories, some method of assessment, and some relevant evidence. Yet, if we refer to the laws of scientific change, we will see that this list is incomplete. What is missing from this list is the scientific mosaic of the time. What the traditional version of ''comparativism'' doesn’t take into account is that, in reality, all theory assessment takes place within ''a specific historical context'', i.e. within the ''scientific mosaic'' of the time".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 184]]
In fact, Barseghyan notes that "as early as in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper points out that it is the modifications of a theoretical system that should be assessed, not the system itself. Surely, the central requirement of Popper’s system – the requirement of falsifiability – is applicable to an individual theory ... yet, Popper realizes that falsifiability alone doesn’t allow distinguishing between two competing theories when both are falsifiable and, thus, he formulates additional rules of theory appraisal which are essentially comparative".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 186]] Although Popper thus subscribes to the aforementioned ''comparativist'' view, Barseghyan believes he "inches towards ''the contextual appraisal view'' when he devises a rule that applies only to theory modifications: he prescribes that a theoretical system should be modified in such a fashion that the overall empirical content of the system is not diminished". And, continues Barseghyan, Popper "comes even closer to ''the contextual appraisal view'' in his Conjectures and Refutations, where he concedes that in any experimental situation scientists “rely if only unconsciously on… a considerable amount of background knowledge”.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|p. 322]]".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 186]]
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