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|Summary='''David Hume''' (1711-1776) was a Scottish historian and essayist.[[CiteRef::Fieser, James. "David Hume." ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. University of Tennessee at Martin, (2016. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. )]] As one of the first important philosophers to write in English, Hume was a skeptic. Hume’s two largest contributions to the field of philosophy lie within his major philosophical works: ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding''. He is perhaps most well known for his interpretation of Aristotle’s causation in terms of matters of fact and relations of ideas, and for questioning the rationality behind induction.[[CiteRef::Morris, William Edward. "David Hume." ''Stanford University''. Stanford University, 26 Feb. (2001. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. )]] These are known as Hume’s Fork and The Problem of Induction respectively. These skeptical arguments posed a challenge to many great philosophical minds and continue to challenge philosophers today.|Historical Context=Hume is one of the most notable skeptics in all of history thanks to his contributions to his theories on causation, and necessary connection. More specifically, within scientific change, Hume’s arguments are most notably used against infallibilism. Famously, Hume is often associated with the terms '''The Problem of Induction''' and '''Hume’s Fork'''. Hume creates most of his arguments for skepticism within his two texts ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' and ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding''. At the time, modern philosopher’s had strived away from Aristotle’s account of causation. In this rejection, they thought themselves revolutionary. Still, those same philosophers kept Aristotle’s distinction between knowledge and belief. Descartes and Malebranche, for instance, were certain of demonstrative scientific knowledge. Locke, on the other hand, was more interested in showing belief is rational enough to assert natural philosophy.[[CiteRef::Morris, William Edward. "David Hume." ''Stanford University''. Stanford University, 26 Feb. (2001. Web. 10 Nov. 2016. )]]

Hume took a different approach. He divided that same distinction between scientific explanation and belief into relations of ideas and matters of fact. The distinction was still based on knowledge and belief one, but it translated slightly differently. Similar to Aristotle’s distinction, Hume’s distinction agreed that all propositions could be exclusively divided into one category or the other. Different to Aristotle’s distinction it provided a different account for the two types of propositions. This distinction is commonly referred to as Hume’s Fork.[[CiteRef::Hume, David, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch. "4.1.1." ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals.'' Oxford: Clarendon, (1975) p. 25. Print.]]

Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain through either demonstration or purely through intuition. They are a priori, in that they are discoverable independent of experience. This term does not necessitate the ideas carry information dependent on the world and are thus independent of any existing thing. They are universal constants in that they hold true in all worlds. However, relations of ideas cannot provide any new information about the world. Relations of ideas are simply a means used to help understand more complex ideas. They can be thought of as symbols or a series of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex idea. Most such statements are usually associated with geometry such as a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees or 1+1 = 2, but other examples can be brought up. For example, when you run, you move your body or all bachelors are unmarried. Relations of ideas can never be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in the very definition of the terms within the proposition.[[CiteRef::Hume, David, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch. "4.1.1." ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals.'' Oxford: Clarendon, (1975) p. 25. Print. 33]]

Matters of fact are the complete opposite of relations of ideas. Matters of fact are a posteriori statements and thus based on experience. They are, for this reason, not independent of worldly experience. Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds. The contrary of matters of fact imply no contradiction and such statements cannot be established by demonstration. Matters of fact can show new information about the world but rely on the experience of the world. Examples of such statements include the sky is blue, or water is odourless, or all guitars have 6 frets. It should be noted that false statements can still be matters of fact. The level of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this sense, contrasting statements are, too, matters of facts.[[CiteRef::Hume, David, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch. "4.1.1." ''Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals.'' Oxford: Clarendon, (1975) p. 25. Print. 34]]