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Hume took a different approach. He divided that same distinction between scientific explanation and belief into relations of ideas and matters of fact. The distinction was still based on Aristotle's knowledge and belief, but it translated slightly differently. Similar to Aristotle’s distinction, Hume’s distinction agreed that all propositions could be exclusively divided into one category or the other. Different to Aristotle’s distinction however, it provided a different account for the two types of propositions. This distinction is commonly referred to as Hume’s Fork.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
Along with this distinction Hume also strongly disagreed with his predecessors that reason or any other rational means of understanding are behind causal inferences. Instead, Hume believed that causal inferences were caused by some other means, particularly, induction. Induction is the process by which a person makes assumptions about the future based on their experiences of the past. This process is, of course, not a rational activity, and the majority of the discourse on induction is explaining this. This argument is famously known as Hume’s Problem of Induction, and is Hume’s largest contribution to skepticism. This argument continues to be used today as a main criticism of infallibilism.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
|Major Contributions==== Hume’s Fork ===
In Hume’s entrance to the debate of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean distinction between scientific knowledge and belief into his own terms. These are:
