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|Question=Is the theory of scientific change applicable to theories construed as sets of models, or in ways that reject their purely formal characterization?
|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Description=The theory of scientific change currently defines theories as sets of descriptive or normative propositions. This definition is most closely aligned with the syntactical view of theories promulgated by logical empiricists early in the twentieth century. [[CiteRef::Winther (2016)]]. Two other competing views of the nature of scientific theories have since been proposed. The semantic view of theories holds that they should be seen as sets of models, as models were defined by Alfred Tarski. The pragmatic view rejects a purely formal characterization of theories and holds them to include sentences, models, problems, examples, skills, practices, analogies, and metaphors, some of which necessarily resist formalization. [[CiteRef::Winther (2016)]][[CiteRef::Mormann (2008)]] Is the theory of scientific change compatible with these more recent and broader views of theories?|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Theory Acceptance
|Formulated Year=2017
|Academic Events=Scientonomy Seminar 2017,