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In Hume’s entrance to the debate of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean distinction between scientific knowledge and belief into his own terms. These are:
* Relations of ideas.
* Matters of fact.
Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain through either demonstration or purely through intuition. They are ''a priori'', in that they are discoverable independent of experience. This categorization does not necessitate ideas to carry information dependent on the world and thus ideas falling into this category are independent of any existing thing. They are universal constants in that they hold true in all worlds. It should be noted, relations of ideas cannot provide any new information about the world. These types of propositions are simply a means used to help understand more complex ideas. They can be thought of as symbols or a series of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex idea. Common examples usually include geometry or math as formal sciences fall within this categorization. Examples of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees' or '1 + 1 = 2'. Alternatively, a worded proposition may look something like 'when you run, you move your body,' or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations of ideas can never be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in the very definition of the terms within the proposition.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
Matters of fact are the complete opposite of relations of ideas. Matters of fact are ''a posteriori'' statements and thus based on experience. Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds. The contrary of matters of fact imply no contradiction and such statements cannot be established by demonstration. Matters of fact can show new information about the world but rely on the experience of the world. Examples of such statements include 'the sky is blue', or 'water is odourless', or 'all guitars have 6 frets.' It should be noted that false statements, such as the last example, can still be matters of fact. The level of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this sense, contrasting statements are, too, matters of facts.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
The reason behind this distinction was simple; it was to provide criteria by which to organize scientific statements. Through this distinction, all statements were categorized into either matters of fact or relations of ideas. This also ultimately meant that there was no type of idea which was certain and provided information about the world. In the case of matters of fact, propositions are reliant on senses and due to the fallibility of the senses, have no certainty. In the case of relations of ideas, propositions can be proven with absolute certainty through the use of other relations of ideas. Unfortunately, however, these statements cannot give any new information about the world. This distinction was often taken by the scientific community as a strike at Newton’s theory of motion. [[CiteRef::Kant (2007)]] Such a distinction has large consequences in the fields of science, religion, and even philosophy due to its prevention of certain real world statements. As an example this distinction would make useless the attempt to try to prove non physical entities as matters of fact.
# α is a non-physical entity.
# It has no observable effect on the world and its not made up of a physical thing.
# α is a relation of ideas.
# Relations of ideas are just assigned symbols helping to explain more complex symbols.
# The statement ‘α exists’ proven or otherwise doesn’t say anything about the world; it is just a play on words.
Much akin to the reasoning the analytic/synthetic distinction uses, it is impossible, according to Hume, for a proposition not to fall within the distinction. In Hume’s eyes, such a proposition would be completely meaningless in that it would simply not be a rational or reasonable endeavour. It is in this binary categorization, that this distinction is historically important. Philosophers at the time were heavily reliant on innate meaningful ideas (synthetic ''a priori'' statements), but Hume’s distinction of the types of proposition did not allow for such ideas. Hume believed that innate ideas cannot be meaningful in that they never contain real world statements. This meant most axiomatic schemes were immediately broken down with Hume’s skepticism. [[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]]
==== Problem of Induction ====
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=== Hume and Scientific Methodology ===
==== Hume’s Fork The Problem of Induction ====Aristotle drew a categorical distinction between '''scientific knowledge''' or ''scientia'' and '''belief''', or ''opinio''. Scientific knowledge was a knowledge of causes. Scientific explanation consisted of '''demonstration''', in which a necessary connection between a cause and its effect was proven using intuitively obvious premises independently of experience. Descartes and other corpuscularists maintained retained this demonstrative ideal of scientific explanation. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] Descartes supposed that a mechanical cause is intrinsically and necessarily related to its effect. A demonstrative science was thus possible, because the general principles of physical nature could be deduced from mathematical principles concerning the shape, size, position, motion, and causal interaction among the ultimate corpuscular particles of matter. Newton's inductive method, in which general principles are derived inductively from observation and experiment, was not compatible with
The problem of induction stems from the reasoning behind causal inference. This is a very important problem Hume brings up because the methodology of the time called for axiomatic schemes. These schemes were based largely on causal inferences. As such, Hume’s Problem of Induction threatened science at the time as it proved causal inferences were irrational.
Within this argument, the premise assumes the conclusion and, as such, the argument is circular. In this sense, the first example shows an irrational train of thought. It seems then, that Hume established there is no way that reason could be the connection between cause and effect. Thus, Hume sought another connection between cause and effect. He eventually recognized this connection to be custom or habit. This is more commonly known today as induction. As a person experiences something repeatedly, they grow to expect it to happen again. However, despite being an adequate connection, this solution forces the abandonment of reason within causal inference. [[CiteRef:: DePierris (2006)]] As previously mentioned, such a conclusion yields grave consequences for science of the time, which was heavily dependent on causal inferences.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
=== Hume's Fork ===
In Hume’s entrance to the debate of causation, Hume translates the Aristotelean distinction between scientific knowledge and belief into his own terms. These are:
* Relations of ideas.
* Matters of fact.
Relations of ideas are ideas that are absolutely certain through either demonstration or purely through intuition. They are ''a priori'', in that they are discoverable independent of experience. This categorization does not necessitate ideas to carry information dependent on the world and thus ideas falling into this category are independent of any existing thing. They are universal constants in that they hold true in all worlds. It should be noted, relations of ideas cannot provide any new information about the world. These types of propositions are simply a means used to help understand more complex ideas. They can be thought of as symbols or a series of simpler ideas describing a larger more complex idea. Common examples usually include geometry or math as formal sciences fall within this categorization. Examples of such statements include 'a square’s sides add up to 360 degrees' or '1 + 1 = 2'. Alternatively, a worded proposition may look something like 'when you run, you move your body,' or, 'all bachelors are unmarried'. Relations of ideas can never be denied as their denial would imply a contradiction in the very definition of the terms within the proposition.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
Matters of fact are the complete opposite of relations of ideas. Matters of fact are ''a posteriori'' statements and thus based on experience. Unlike relations of ideas, matters of fact do not hold true in all possible worlds. The contrary of matters of fact imply no contradiction and such statements cannot be established by demonstration. Matters of fact can show new information about the world but rely on the experience of the world. Examples of such statements include 'the sky is blue', or 'water is odourless', or 'all guitars have 6 frets.' It should be noted that false statements, such as the last example, can still be matters of fact. The level of coherence within false statements or contrary statements remains the same as within true statements despite being incorrect. In this sense, contrasting statements are, too, matters of facts.[[CiteRef::Hume (1975)]]
The reason behind this distinction was simple; it was to provide criteria by which to organize scientific statements. Through this distinction, all statements were categorized into either matters of fact or relations of ideas. This also ultimately meant that there was no type of idea which was certain and provided information about the world. In the case of matters of fact, propositions are reliant on senses and due to the fallibility of the senses, have no certainty. In the case of relations of ideas, propositions can be proven with absolute certainty through the use of other relations of ideas. Unfortunately, however, these statements cannot give any new information about the world. This distinction was often taken by the scientific community as a strike at Newton’s theory of motion. [[CiteRef::Kant (2007)]] Such a distinction has large consequences in the fields of science, religion, and even philosophy due to its prevention of certain real world statements. As an example this distinction would make useless the attempt to try to prove non physical entities as matters of fact.
# α is a non-physical entity.
# It has no observable effect on the world and its not made up of a physical thing.
# α is a relation of ideas.
# Relations of ideas are just assigned symbols helping to explain more complex symbols.
# The statement ‘α exists’ proven or otherwise doesn’t say anything about the world; it is just a play on words.
Much akin to the reasoning the analytic/synthetic distinction uses, it is impossible, according to Hume, for a proposition not to fall within the distinction. In Hume’s eyes, such a proposition would be completely meaningless in that it would simply not be a rational or reasonable endeavour. It is in this binary categorization, that this distinction is historically important. Philosophers at the time were heavily reliant on innate meaningful ideas (synthetic ''a priori'' statements), but Hume’s distinction of the types of proposition did not allow for such ideas. Hume believed that innate ideas cannot be meaningful in that they never contain real world statements. This meant most axiomatic schemes were immediately broken down with Hume’s skepticism. [[CiteRef::DePierris (2006)]]
==== Skepticism about theological knowledge ====
