Open main menu

Changes

478 bytes removed ,  19:38, 19 December 2017
no edit summary
Reid likewise rejected Hume's view of causality. He noted that a view of causality based on constant conjunctions in our experience could not give a causal account of unique events. Suppose, he posited, that an earthquake struck Mexico City for the first time in its history, resulting in the destruction of the city. Under Hume's definition, we could not claim that the earthquake caused the destruction of the city, since the two events, being unique, are not constantly conjoined in experience. He further noted that night following day and day following night are constantly conjoined experiences, but we generally do not claim that day causes night and night causes day, but rather that both are caused by Earth's rotation. Reid proposes instead that two events have a causal relationship whenever they are conjoined by a law of nature, whether or not they are constantly conjoined in experience. Unlike Hume, Reid maintains that causes necessitate their effects even though he concedes that this necessitation is not evident through perception alone. [[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] James Beattie (1735-1803) drew heavily on Reid's ideas in a book critical of Hume's philosophy that became a smash bestseller [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]][[CiteRef::McDermid (2017)]]
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant(1724-1824) sought to respond to Hume's skeptical challenge regarding cause and effect, in his ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (1781) and most explicitly in his ''Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics'' (1783). Kant sought to synthesize early modern rationalism with empiricism, and thereby avert Hume's skepticism. He did this by supposing that the world as we can experience it, the sensible world, is structured by the ''a priori'' forms of our cognitive faculties. Experience requires the The understanding as its is thus a prerequisitefor experience. Possible human experience thus conforms to certain necessary laws, which we can know through our reason, independently of experience. For Kant this ''a priori'' structuring framework included Euclidean space and time, and cause and effect. The Kant argued that by such means, the idea of necessary causal laws that human reason could know was thus restored. [[CiteRef::Rohlf (2016)]][[CiteRef::De Pierris and Friedman(2013)]]
In the twentieth century, Karl Popper (1902-1994) challenged Hume's skepticism on quite different grounds. Popper rejected Hume's Newtonian inductivism. Popper argued that induction is never actually used in science, since all observation is selective and theory-laden . [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]][[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]]
Popper advocated a '''hypothetico-deductive method''' for science, arguing that science is created by conjecture and criticism rather than by reference to the past. Popper believed that Hume was mistaken in seeking a means to justify knowledge. Popper, instead sought a process to reveal and correct scientific error.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)]]
The strongest criticisms directed against Hume were based on his skepticism about theological knowledge. Due to his religious views, he was never able to obtain an academic faculty appointment. His critics called him "The Great Infidel". In a criticism of Hume's essay on miracles, William Adams (1706-1789), Master of Pembroke College, Oxford, argued that only divine intervention could account for the sophistication of ancient Jewish religion. "Whence", he asked "could the religion and laws of this people [i.e., the Jews] so far exceed those of the wisest Heathens, and come out at once, in their first infancy, thus perfect and entire; when all human systems are found to grow up by degrees, and to ripen, after many improvements; into perfection". [[CiteRef::Fieser (2016)]] Hume's arguments in the ''Dialogs'' did not put a stop to the claim that natural philosophy could find evidence of intelligent design in nature, in part because Hume failed to supply an adequate alternative explanation for apparently purposeful complexity. In 1802, twenty three years after the publication of Hume's ''Dialogues'', William Paley (1743-1805), an English clergyman, expounded the design argument in his ''Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity''. Paley argued that the purposeful sophistication of biological "contrivances" , such as the eye, were clear evidence of design by an Intelligent Being. [[CiteRef::Ayala (2003)]][[CiteRef::Paley (1809)]] Among those who read and appreciated Paley's arguments were the naturalist Charles Darwin (1809-1882). In his ''Origin of Species'' (1859) Darwin argued that biological species were not separately created and are instead physically descended from pre-existing species, with all living things ultimately descended from a common ancestor. He explained Paley's contrivances by positing the process of natural selection, which he justified with extensive studies of animal breeding. By explaining the appearance of design in living systems, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection dealt a severe blow to the design argument among natural scientists. Scientists [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] methodological naturalism, and theological propositions were banished from the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]. [[CiteRef::Ruse (1999)]][[CiteRef::Ruse (2003)]]
|Page Status=Needs Editing
}}
2,020

edits