Changes

For most of the history of western science and philosophy, human individuals were treated as the sole or primary epistemic agents. The question of how to explain and justify the capacities of human individuals as epistemic agents has long been of interest. In the early modern period, [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650) [[CiteRef::Descartes (2004)]][[CiteRef::Descartes (2017)]] and [[John Locke]] (1711-1776) [[CiteRef::Locke (2015)]] produced classic works on these matters. Their theory of ideas maintained that all of our experiences were of ideas in our own minds, some of these ideas being caused by our senses. Descartes maintained that he could show through reason alone that our senses, being the gifts of an omnibenevolent God, were reliable sources of knowledge about an external world of material objects.    Descartes maintained that he could show through reason alone that our senses were reliable sources of knowseeking to explain and justify the capacities of human individuals as epistemic agents. Discussion of the role of social interaction in the production of knowledge was confined largely to discussion of when one should accept the testimony of others. This took place, for example, in the works of [[David Hume]] (1711-1776) and [[Thomas Reid]] (1710-1796).[[CiteRef::Goldman and Blanchard (2016)]] Beginning in the nineteenth century, the concept that groups of interacting human individuals can function collectively as epistemic agents with a role distinct from their individual parts began to receive increasing attention.