Changes

|Description=In principle, the process of scientific change can concern many different types of entities. One important question is to establish the most fundamental units that undergo scientific change. Over the years, it has been argued that the fundamental units of scientific change include theories ([[Karl Popper|Popper]]), paradigms ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]]), research programmes ([[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]]), research traditions (early [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]]), methods ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], [[Dudley Shapere|Shapere]], later [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]]), and values ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], later [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]]). This is not surprising, as any theory of scientific change needs to establish a basic ''ontology'' of scientific change.

|Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change

|Formulated Year=2015

|Prehistory=[[Karl Popper]]’s theory of scientific change took theories to be the basic units of scientific change. According to Popper, as well as many other philosophers of science of the pre-Kuhnian era, it is theories that become accepted and rejected during the process of scientific change. [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]

[[Larry Laudan]] also proposed a theory of scientific change, namely his reticulated model,[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] wherein there are scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. In this model, the epistemic elements are theories, methods, and values, and this model posits that the values of the community are reflected in the methods, and the methods determine which theories become accepted. However, he also notes that the accepted theories influence which methods the community will employ, and can equally change the values of the community. In this respect, the reticulated model is a fully dynamic, covariant theory of scientific change wherein all epistemic elements influence one another. This was notably one of the first attempts at a theory of scientific change that included a dynamic method and acknowledged that such a dynamic method could itself be influenced by the theories that become accepted under it.

|History=Initially, the ontology of scientific change was posited in the ''Metatheory'' of ''[[Barseghyan (2015)|the LSC]]'' through the ''[[:Category:Definitional Topic|definition]]'' of [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] as a set of all accepted theories and employed methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] Towards the end of 2016, it gradually became clear that the ontology of a field cannot and should not be postulated via definitions. What constitutes the elements of a certain ontology must be established by empirical research and, thus, is not a matter of definitions. In other words, the question of what constitutes the ontology of a certain field is a ''[[:Category:Descriptive Topic|descriptive question]]'', not definitional. Indeed, what sort of elements change during the process of scientific change is not something that should be decided by a definition, but should be formulated as a descriptive theory that says "Such-and-such elements undergo scientific change".

|Page Status=Needs Editing

|Editor Notes=The prehistory needs editorial input

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{{Acceptance Record

|Acceptance Indicators=The question was tacitly accepted even before its explicit formulation in 2017. Thus, it has the same acceptance date as the rest of the original TSC.

|Still Accepted=Yes

|Accepted Until Approximate=No

}}