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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=[[Karl Popper]]’s theory of scientific change took theories to be the basic units of scientific change. According to Popper, as well as many other philosophers of science of the pre-Kuhnian era, it is theories that become accepted in accordance to and rejected during the quantity process of empirical content they present, and based on how many confirmed novel predictions they makescientific change.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
[[Thomas Kuhn]]'s theory of scientific change identified the ontological units of scientific change as frameworks which he referred to as ''paradigms'', which can be defined as a characteristic set of beliefs and preconceptions held by a scientific community including instrumental, theoretical, and metaphysical commitments all together.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]][[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)|pp. 293-319]] Kuhn himself confessed that he had confusingly used the term in several different senses.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)|pp. 293-294]] In an attempt to clarify matters he sought to replace his broadest definition of the paradigm, given above, with the concept of ''disciplinary matrices'', defined as those shared elements that account for the relatively unproblematic professional communication and relative unanimity of professional judgment within a scientific community.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977a)|p. 297]] For Kuhn, then, a theory of scientific change ought to deal with disciplinary matrices and their changes over time.
|History=Initially, the ontology of scientific change was posited in the ''Metatheory'' of ''[[Barseghyan (2015)|the LSC]]'' through the ''[[:Category:Definitional Topic|definition]]'' of [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] as a set of all accepted theories and employed methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] Towards the end of 2016, it gradually became clear that the ontology of a field cannot and should not be postulated via definitions. What constitutes the elements of a certain ontology must be established by empirical research and, thus, is not a matter of definitions. In other words, the question of what constitutes the ontology of a certain field is a ''[[:Category:Descriptive Topic|descriptive question]]'', not definitional. Indeed, what sort of elements change during the process of scientific change is not something that should be decided by a definition, but should be formulated as a descriptive theory that says "Such-and-such elements undergo scientific change".
|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change,
|Page Status=Needs Editing|Editor ApprovedNotes=The prehistory needs editorial input
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{{Acceptance Record
