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The epistemic stance that an epistemic agent can take towards methods of theory assessment is limited to employment. So, a method can only be either employed or not employed by an epistemic agent [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 31]].
On the contrary, there are three epistemic stances that an epistemic agent can take towards a theory, namely, use, acceptance and pursuit. Now, taking a stance on a particular theory does not preclude the epistemic agent from simultaneously taking any of the other stances on that theory [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 31-33]]. For example, in the 19th century, the Newtonian Physics was both accepted and used by the scientific community. Therefore, it is the case that a theory might be used even if it is the theory not accepted by the scientific community. For example, after the acceptance of General Relativity (1916), Newtonian Physics was no longer the accepted theory but it is still used [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 38]].
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|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Description=[[Epistemic Agents|Epistemic agents]] (e.g. individual scientists, [[Epistemic Community|scientific communities]]) can take different epistemic stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') towards different [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] (e.g. ''theories'', ''methods''). In principle, the types of stances that can be taken towards a [[Theory|theory]] may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards [[Method|methods]] of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]]. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type.
|Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=In the early twentieth century, many [[Rudolf Carnap|logical positivists]] supported a confirmationist view of theory assessment, in which theories are assessed on the basis of the balance of confirming and disconfirming evidence. In 1945, [[Carl Hempel]], a logical empiricist and confirmationist, argued that, on such grounds, an agent might take one of three stances towards a theory, ''accepting'' it, ''rejecting'' it, or ''withholding judgment''. [[CiteRef::Losee (2001)|p. 167-168]][[CiteRef::Hempel (1945)]]
In his ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'' (1959), [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] [[Karl Popper]] argued for a falsificationist scientific methodology, but a relatively similar set of possible stances towards theories. Scientific ideas gained ''acceptance'' when they had survived strong tests in which their unexpected novel predictions were verified, and where ''rejected'' when they failed to survive such tests. [[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]][[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p. 57-74]]
[[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' (1963) used a number of equally vague terms to refer to stances a community might take towards a theory, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed to''. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 10-13]]
In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances that epistemic agents might take toward research programs. They could be deemed either ''progressive'' or ''degenerating''. A research program was progressive if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts. It was degenerating if it failed to make successful bold predictions, and if its theories were intentionally fashioned so as to accommodate already known facts. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]
[[Larry Laudan]]'s reticulated model of scientific change involved scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. Methods could change along with theories, and thus epistemic agents could take stances with respect to them both. For Laudan, a theory would be regarded as ''accepted'' by an agent if that agent accepted its truth, or ''rejected'' if deemed by the agent to be false. He also proposed a new stance, that of ''pursuit''. To pursue a theory is to work with it or explore it without committing to a belief that it is true. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)|pp. 108-114]]|History=|Current View=|Related Topics=Epistemic Agents, Epistemic Elements,
|Page Status=Editor Approved
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{{Acceptance Record
|Acceptance Indicators=While, in this general form, the question wasn't clearly stated in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], it was implicit in a more specific question of [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories]].
|Still Accepted=Yes
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|Accepted Until Approximate=No
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