Difference between revisions of "Immanuel Kant"
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| − | Immanuel Kant is best remembered for his attempts to combine | + | Immanuel Kant is best remembered for his attempts to combine classical empiricism and classical apriorism into a unified method of scientific change. His numerous distinctions, between analytic and synthetic propositions, between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and between noumena and phenomena (i.e. between the unknowable state in which things are in actuality, and the observed state as filtered by the human mind), would become central points of discussion for decades, changing the understanding of scientific change irrevocably. |
== Historical Context == | == Historical Context == | ||
<div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"> | <div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"> | ||
| − | Before Kant’s ideas would come to the fore of epistemology | + | Before Kant’s ideas would come to the fore of the epistemology, the prevailing philosophy of his time was a form of classical apriorism or rationalism, such as that proposed by Gottfried Leibniz (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2006). In brief, the prevailing form of rationalism held that reasoning from the human mind was the only source of true knowledge, in opposition to the empirical belief in the sensory basis of knowledge. It was believed that the rationalist philosopher could come to prove, with the absolute certainty of a mathematician or logician, the existence and nature of the world around them. A philosopher could arrive at absolute certainty by starting with the fundamental analytic propositions that were assumed to inherently exist in the human mind, independent of any experience, and then applying rigorous use of deductive logic until the desired proof was thus elucidated. |
</div> | </div> | ||
== Main Contributions to the Philosophy of Scientific Change == | == Main Contributions to the Philosophy of Scientific Change == | ||
| − | + | Kant's primary contribution to epistemology is his attempt to merge facets of the two opposing views of the time - classical empiricism and the then-contemporary rationalism - into a singular theory on the nature of knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). In order to do so, he had to distinguish key concepts which had not previously been made explicit. These distinctions, alongside his efforts to amalgamate rationalism and empiricism, left lasting impressions and opened new fields of inquiry in epistemology as well as other branches of philosophy.
| |
'''Analytic and Synthetic Propositions''' | '''Analytic and Synthetic Propositions''' | ||
| − | Immanuel Kant | + | Immanuel Kant was not satisfied with rationalism as the commonly accepted method of justifying human knowledge. In the introduction of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1929), Kant defines analytic propositions as those which could be arrived at independently from an initial set of definitions; synthetic propositions are those which could not (p. 48). In other words, to Kant, a given proposition is analytic if it does not introduce information beyond that present in its very definition. By contrast, a given proposition is synthetic if it does. To illustrate the analytic-synthetic distinction, Kant makes statements on the physical properties of matter: |
If I say, for instance, ‘All bodies are extended’, this is an analytic judgment. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with ‘body’ in order to find extension as bound up with it… But when I say, ‘All bodies are heavy’, the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment. (p. 48-49) | If I say, for instance, ‘All bodies are extended’, this is an analytic judgment. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with ‘body’ in order to find extension as bound up with it… But when I say, ‘All bodies are heavy’, the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment. (p. 48-49) | ||
| − | According to | + | According to Kant's example, it is inherent to the definition of ‘body’ that it be extended, that is, occupy space; likewise, it is not inherent that it should carry considerable mass, as ‘heavy’ implies. Hence the latter statement is synthetic. Kant’s distinction made clear that empiricists up until then had tried, without success, to justify the knowledge of the natural sciences despite the problems of justifying the synthetic propositions of these sciences. There were two problems in particular: one Kant’s contemporary, David Hume, had identified as a fatal flaw to the method of inductive reasoning, known simply as the problem of induction, and the other, the problem of sensation, had been well-known since at least the time of the ancient Greeks. Synthetic propositions, and classical empiricism as a whole, rely upon both the method of inductive reasoning as well as on the senses. Yet Kant found that classical empiricists had regularly employed synthetic propositions without recognizing their errors. Meanwhile, the rationalists had avoided both problems entirely in their belief that justifying scientific knowledge could avoid the use of synthetic propositions altogether. While it may seem as though the analytic-synthetic distinction supports the tenets of rationalism, they are in fact undermined in the Critique of Pure Reason in the following way: since no new knowledge can be encompassed by propositions which are bound strictly to their definitions, there can be no way to demonstrate that one concept can be connected to any other concept that lies outside either concept’s definitions; being unable to connect one concept to another precludes causality (p. 50-51). As such, since rationalism cannot state that one idea can cause another, no purely rational statement can make any specific observations about any specific phenomena. Thus it is reasoned that rationalism on its own is inadequate to providing justification for the knowledge of the natural sciences, as these sciences pertain to making statements with a degree of certainty.
|
'''A Priori and A Posteriori''' | '''A Priori and A Posteriori''' | ||
Kant continued in Critique of Pure Reason to make another classification of propositions, independent of his distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge. His distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is, simply put, whether or not a proposition can be known independent of any experience (a priori) or is dependent on experience (a posteriori) (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). | Kant continued in Critique of Pure Reason to make another classification of propositions, independent of his distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge. His distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is, simply put, whether or not a proposition can be known independent of any experience (a priori) or is dependent on experience (a posteriori) (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). | ||
| − | Kant crossed | + | Kant crossed the a priori-a posteriori division with the analytic-synthetic classification to produce four possible categories a proposition could belong to: a posteriori analytic; a priori analytic; a posteriori synthetic; and a priori synthetic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013). Regarding the a posteriori analytic category, Kant had little to say except that it is not possible, as a posteriori is, by definition, empirical and thus not analytic. Of the other three categories, since synthetic a posteriori propositions are empirical, and analytic a priori propositions are purely rational, Kant regarded proving the existence of synthetic a priori propositions as being vital to his justification of scientific knowledge, as it could be the only category left that could avoid the problems inherent to both classical empiricism and pure rationalism.
|
'''Transcendental Idealism''' | '''Transcendental Idealism''' | ||
| − | Kant’s attempt to prove the existence of synthetic a priori propositions is manifested in his theory of “transcendental idealism”, whereby he stated that only phenomena can be experienced and not the world as a “thing-in-itself” (noumenon) (Schopenhauer, 1818/1886). Following this, he reasoned in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) that | + | Kant’s attempt to prove the existence of synthetic a priori propositions is manifested in his theory of “transcendental idealism”, whereby he stated that only phenomena can be experienced and not the world as a “thing-in-itself” (noumenon) (Schopenhauer, 1818/1886). Following this, he reasoned in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) that experience of the outside world through sensations is not possible “after the fact” or a posteriori, thus it must be a priori; yet, considering that the forms these phenomena take cannot be controlled by the observer, Kant deduced that there must exist some elements of perception that are a priori, yet independent of phenomena.
In essence, Kant argued that there are two components to one’s ability to perceive phenomena. Firstly, there exists the world as a “thing-in-itself”, which one does not experience and thus cannot know about, from which phenomena are perceived, and for which no preconceptions exist. Secondly, the phenomena are received by one’s senses and made cognizant through a priori concepts. Such a priori concepts can be thought of as empty forms through which phenomena must be processed for one to perceive them as they do. That these phenomena are not known beforehand, but rather, must be processed, is the justification for the synthetic nature of “synthetic a priori propositions”. It is through this process that Kant justified the existence of knowledge in the natural sciences.
|
| − | + | Kant's explanation of the theory of transcendental idealism is not without a degree of vagueness. Later philosophers are divided on their interpretations of his theory, especially with regard to the idea of the world as a “thing-in-itself”. It may be interpreted that there are two distinct forms: of the world as a thing-in-itself and of phenomena. Only one of such forms is perceivable, while the other is unknowable to the senses. This is the two-objects interpretation. Alternatively, there may be only one object, with two aspects, for which only one aspect of the same object can be perceived (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). Part of the reason for these different interpretations lies in the fact that Kant himself seems to have wavered in his own stance, or at least, was not precise enough in his writing. In any case, either interpretation is not without criticism. | |
== Criticisms & New Directions == | == Criticisms & New Directions == | ||
| − | In the | + | In the centuries after Kant introduced his ideas, there have been a number of notable criticisms of his philosophy, such as those of Karl Popper. Popper and others highlighted some of Kant’s underlying assumptions, such as the ideas of absolute certainty and infallibility. Criticisms were laid, too, on Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, as well as towards his two-object interpretation of transcendental idealism. |
| − | Even regarding these later criticisms, the analytic-synthetic distinction is just one of those effects that still frequent contemporary dialogue. As one of the earliest philosophers to frame a scientific method that addressed the problems presented by both Hume and Pyrrho, as well as one of the prime philosophers behind the movement to end of pure rationalism, the significance of Kant’s work is not only historically evident, but also realized | + | Even regarding these later criticisms, the analytic-synthetic distinction is just one of those effects that still frequent contemporary dialogue. As one of the earliest philosophers to frame a scientific method that addressed the problems presented by both Hume and Pyrrho, as well as one of the prime philosophers behind the movement to end of pure rationalism, the significance of Kant’s work is not only historically evident, but also realized in the present: Kant’s framework around the problems of induction and sensation remain workable models for current theories of scientific methods, and his writings provide some of the arguments against pure rationalism for later philosophers to employ. Thus it can be said that the effect of the conceptual framework derived from Kant’s work on the epistemology of scientific change can still be felt to the present day. |
== Related Articles == | == Related Articles == | ||
Revision as of 15:06, 3 March 2016
Immanuel Kant is best remembered for his attempts to combine classical empiricism and classical apriorism into a unified method of scientific change. His numerous distinctions, between analytic and synthetic propositions, between a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and between noumena and phenomena (i.e. between the unknowable state in which things are in actuality, and the observed state as filtered by the human mind), would become central points of discussion for decades, changing the understanding of scientific change irrevocably.
Contents
Historical Context
Before Kant’s ideas would come to the fore of the epistemology, the prevailing philosophy of his time was a form of classical apriorism or rationalism, such as that proposed by Gottfried Leibniz (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2006). In brief, the prevailing form of rationalism held that reasoning from the human mind was the only source of true knowledge, in opposition to the empirical belief in the sensory basis of knowledge. It was believed that the rationalist philosopher could come to prove, with the absolute certainty of a mathematician or logician, the existence and nature of the world around them. A philosopher could arrive at absolute certainty by starting with the fundamental analytic propositions that were assumed to inherently exist in the human mind, independent of any experience, and then applying rigorous use of deductive logic until the desired proof was thus elucidated.
Main Contributions to the Philosophy of Scientific Change
Kant's primary contribution to epistemology is his attempt to merge facets of the two opposing views of the time - classical empiricism and the then-contemporary rationalism - into a singular theory on the nature of knowledge (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). In order to do so, he had to distinguish key concepts which had not previously been made explicit. These distinctions, alongside his efforts to amalgamate rationalism and empiricism, left lasting impressions and opened new fields of inquiry in epistemology as well as other branches of philosophy.
Analytic and Synthetic Propositions
Immanuel Kant was not satisfied with rationalism as the commonly accepted method of justifying human knowledge. In the introduction of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1929), Kant defines analytic propositions as those which could be arrived at independently from an initial set of definitions; synthetic propositions are those which could not (p. 48). In other words, to Kant, a given proposition is analytic if it does not introduce information beyond that present in its very definition. By contrast, a given proposition is synthetic if it does. To illustrate the analytic-synthetic distinction, Kant makes statements on the physical properties of matter: If I say, for instance, ‘All bodies are extended’, this is an analytic judgment. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with ‘body’ in order to find extension as bound up with it… But when I say, ‘All bodies are heavy’, the predicate is something quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of body in general; and the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment. (p. 48-49) According to Kant's example, it is inherent to the definition of ‘body’ that it be extended, that is, occupy space; likewise, it is not inherent that it should carry considerable mass, as ‘heavy’ implies. Hence the latter statement is synthetic. Kant’s distinction made clear that empiricists up until then had tried, without success, to justify the knowledge of the natural sciences despite the problems of justifying the synthetic propositions of these sciences. There were two problems in particular: one Kant’s contemporary, David Hume, had identified as a fatal flaw to the method of inductive reasoning, known simply as the problem of induction, and the other, the problem of sensation, had been well-known since at least the time of the ancient Greeks. Synthetic propositions, and classical empiricism as a whole, rely upon both the method of inductive reasoning as well as on the senses. Yet Kant found that classical empiricists had regularly employed synthetic propositions without recognizing their errors. Meanwhile, the rationalists had avoided both problems entirely in their belief that justifying scientific knowledge could avoid the use of synthetic propositions altogether. While it may seem as though the analytic-synthetic distinction supports the tenets of rationalism, they are in fact undermined in the Critique of Pure Reason in the following way: since no new knowledge can be encompassed by propositions which are bound strictly to their definitions, there can be no way to demonstrate that one concept can be connected to any other concept that lies outside either concept’s definitions; being unable to connect one concept to another precludes causality (p. 50-51). As such, since rationalism cannot state that one idea can cause another, no purely rational statement can make any specific observations about any specific phenomena. Thus it is reasoned that rationalism on its own is inadequate to providing justification for the knowledge of the natural sciences, as these sciences pertain to making statements with a degree of certainty.
A Priori and A Posteriori
Kant continued in Critique of Pure Reason to make another classification of propositions, independent of his distinction between analytic and synthetic knowledge. His distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is, simply put, whether or not a proposition can be known independent of any experience (a priori) or is dependent on experience (a posteriori) (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Kant crossed the a priori-a posteriori division with the analytic-synthetic classification to produce four possible categories a proposition could belong to: a posteriori analytic; a priori analytic; a posteriori synthetic; and a priori synthetic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013). Regarding the a posteriori analytic category, Kant had little to say except that it is not possible, as a posteriori is, by definition, empirical and thus not analytic. Of the other three categories, since synthetic a posteriori propositions are empirical, and analytic a priori propositions are purely rational, Kant regarded proving the existence of synthetic a priori propositions as being vital to his justification of scientific knowledge, as it could be the only category left that could avoid the problems inherent to both classical empiricism and pure rationalism.
Transcendental Idealism
Kant’s attempt to prove the existence of synthetic a priori propositions is manifested in his theory of “transcendental idealism”, whereby he stated that only phenomena can be experienced and not the world as a “thing-in-itself” (noumenon) (Schopenhauer, 1818/1886). Following this, he reasoned in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) that experience of the outside world through sensations is not possible “after the fact” or a posteriori, thus it must be a priori; yet, considering that the forms these phenomena take cannot be controlled by the observer, Kant deduced that there must exist some elements of perception that are a priori, yet independent of phenomena. In essence, Kant argued that there are two components to one’s ability to perceive phenomena. Firstly, there exists the world as a “thing-in-itself”, which one does not experience and thus cannot know about, from which phenomena are perceived, and for which no preconceptions exist. Secondly, the phenomena are received by one’s senses and made cognizant through a priori concepts. Such a priori concepts can be thought of as empty forms through which phenomena must be processed for one to perceive them as they do. That these phenomena are not known beforehand, but rather, must be processed, is the justification for the synthetic nature of “synthetic a priori propositions”. It is through this process that Kant justified the existence of knowledge in the natural sciences. Kant's explanation of the theory of transcendental idealism is not without a degree of vagueness. Later philosophers are divided on their interpretations of his theory, especially with regard to the idea of the world as a “thing-in-itself”. It may be interpreted that there are two distinct forms: of the world as a thing-in-itself and of phenomena. Only one of such forms is perceivable, while the other is unknowable to the senses. This is the two-objects interpretation. Alternatively, there may be only one object, with two aspects, for which only one aspect of the same object can be perceived (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). Part of the reason for these different interpretations lies in the fact that Kant himself seems to have wavered in his own stance, or at least, was not precise enough in his writing. In any case, either interpretation is not without criticism.
Criticisms & New Directions
In the centuries after Kant introduced his ideas, there have been a number of notable criticisms of his philosophy, such as those of Karl Popper. Popper and others highlighted some of Kant’s underlying assumptions, such as the ideas of absolute certainty and infallibility. Criticisms were laid, too, on Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, as well as towards his two-object interpretation of transcendental idealism. Even regarding these later criticisms, the analytic-synthetic distinction is just one of those effects that still frequent contemporary dialogue. As one of the earliest philosophers to frame a scientific method that addressed the problems presented by both Hume and Pyrrho, as well as one of the prime philosophers behind the movement to end of pure rationalism, the significance of Kant’s work is not only historically evident, but also realized in the present: Kant’s framework around the problems of induction and sensation remain workable models for current theories of scientific methods, and his writings provide some of the arguments against pure rationalism for later philosophers to employ. Thus it can be said that the effect of the conceptual framework derived from Kant’s work on the epistemology of scientific change can still be felt to the present day.
Related Articles
Notes
Baehr, J.S. A priori and a posteriori. (n.d.). In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy online. Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/ Immanuel Kant. (2006, June 2). In Encyclopaedia Britannica online. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/biography/Immanuel-Kant Immanuel Kant. (2010, May 20). In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/#CriEnl Kant, I. (1997). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics. (J. Fieser, Trans.). (Original work published in 1783). Kant, I. (1929). Critique of pure reason. (N. Kemp Smith, Trans.). Palgrave Macmillan. (Original work published in 1781). Schopenhauer, A. (1886). The world as will and idea (Vol . 2). (R.B. Haldane & J. Kemp, Trans.). Trübner & Company: London. (Original work published in 1818). The analytic/synthetic distinction. (2013, August 30). In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/#ProDis Transcedental idealism. (2015). In Encyclopaedia Britannica online. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/topic/transcendental-idealism
Authors
Donna Lee, 2015
References
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- ^ Belot, Gordon. (2001) The Principle of Sufficient Reason. Journal of Philosophy 97, 55-74.
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- ^ Friedman, Michael. (2002) Kant, Kuhn and the Rationality of Science. Philosophy of Science 69 (2), 171-190.
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