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|First Name=John
|Last Name=Locke
|DOB Era=CE
|DOB Year=1632
|DOB Month=August
|DOB Day=26
|DOB Approximate=No
|DOD Era=CE
|DOD Year=1704
|DOD Month=October
|DOD Day=28
|DOD Approximate=No
|Brief=A British philosopher who championed empiricism, arguing that all knowledge was derived from experience|Summary='''John Locke (1632-1704)''' was a British philosopher, writer, political activist, medical researcher, Oxford academic, and government official|Summary=Locke was a champion of '''empiricism''', arguing that all knowledge was derived from experience. Among his most notable works is ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'', which provides a defense defence of empiricism and the origins of ideas and understanding. In this work, Locke rejects the idea of innate principles, and argues that all knowledge comes from experience. Locke also wrote on religious toleration and social contract theory. He opposed authoritarianism and argued that individuals should use reason to discover the truth.|Historical Context=Locke was born into a an English Puritan family of modest means, but was able to obtain an excellent education by way of his father's connections. [[CiteRef::Dunn (2003)]] In 1647, at the age of fifteen, he began studies at Westminster School, considered London's best. At twenty, he began studies at Christ Church College, Oxford. His studies focused on logic, metaphysics, and languages taught within the framework of '''Aristotelian scholasticism''', for which he developed an intense dislike. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)| pp. 3-4]][[CiteRef::Milton (1994)]] This was more than a century after Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543) had posited his '''heliocentric cosmology''' in 1543, more than a century earlier. Forty and forty years earlier, after Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) published his observations with the telescope in 1610. These developments had cast Aristotelianism into doubt. [[CiteRef::Westfall (1980)|p. 6]] Like many ambitious students of the time, Locke sought alternative resources outside the formal curriculum, which and such resources were abundant at Oxford. He became involved with a discussion group organized by John Wilkins (1614-1672)and was exposed to the '''experimental philosophy''' and the ideas of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who argued for an '''inductive methodology''' for science. The Wilkins group was the nucleus of what would later become the 'Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge', known simply as the '''Royal Society'''. The Royal Society became a formal institution in the 1660's and England's main society for the promotion of natural philosophy, the Royal Society became a formal institution in the 1660's. The society would set itself in opposition to the Aristotelian scholasticism of the universities, advocating the study of nature rather than of ancient texts. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)|p. 4]] Locke's notebooks indicate a strong interest in medicine and chemistry. He attended the lectures of the great anatomist Thomas Willis (1621-1675) and took careful notes. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)|p. 217]][[CiteRef::Anstey (2011)|p. 6]]
After Locke received his bachelor's degree in 1656, he remained at Oxford to study medicine. He worked closely with Dr. Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689), renown for his pioneering work in the treatment of infectious diseases. [[CiteRef::Dunn (2003)]] Robert Boyle (1627-1691) succeeded John Wilkins as the leader of the scientific group at Oxford, and became Locke's scientific tutor. Boyle ascribed to the '''corpuscular mechanistic philosophy''' associated with [[Rene Descartes]] (1596-1650), and was noted for his physical experiments. The corpuscular philosophy held that the visible properties of the natural world were due to interactions between invisibly small particles or corpuscles. Locke read Boyle's and Descartes works, as well as those of Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), who emphasized the role of the senses in knowledge. He learned from his experimentalist associates and from the writings of Gassendi, to be skeptical of Descartes' '''rationalism'''. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]][[CiteRef::Dunn (2003)]][[CiteRef::Fisher (2014)]] He accepted Descartes' corpuscular view of matter, his dualistic view that mind and matter were separate substances, and believed the world to contain genuine causal interactions between physical objects. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]
Locke became personal physician to Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621-1683) (Lord Ashley), a leading English political figure during the 1670's and 1680's. [[CiteRef::Dunn (2003)]] He was an early member of the Royal Society and knew most of the major English natural philosophers, including [[Isaac Newton]] (1643-1727) and some continental ones as well. This community was concerned with arguing for the reliability of observation and experiment as a means of acquiring knowledge as opposed to Aristotelian intuition or Cartesian rationalism. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)|p. 4]] Locke's most important contribution to this argument was his ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'', published in 1689. Locke and Newton became directly acquainted while Locke was finishing this work. When Locke read Newton's ''Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica'', published in 1687, he found epistemological views similar to his own. Both had absorbed the views current in the Royal Society. Locke's essay received its warmest reception from the members of the society, and can be deemed an expression of their collective understanding of scientific methodology. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]
|Major Contributions==== Locke's Empiricism ===
In the first book of his ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding'' Locke argues begins by arguing that there are no principles or ideas that are innate in the human beingsmind. In seventeenth century England, such principles were widely held to exist and to be necessary to the stability of religion and morality. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] "Nothing is more commonly taken for granted" he wrote, "than that certain principles both speculative and practical are accepted by all mankind. Some people have argued that because these principles are (they think) universally accepted, they must have been stamped into the souls of men from the outset." [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|p. 3]] He denies that we hold speculative such innate principles, including innate ideas of God, identity, or impossibility. If This criticism was aimed widely, but was directed, in part, at Cartesians, who held, among other things, that we have an innate idea of substance. [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]] Locke maintained that if there were such innate principles, he supposes, they would be known to everyone, even ‘children "children, idiots, savages, and idiots’illiterate people", which was clearly not the case. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|p. 8]] Mathematical truths, likewise cannot be innate, as these must be discovered by reason. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]]
In the second book, Locke begins his positive account of how people acquire knowledge. "Let us suppose", he writes, "the mind to have no ideas in it, to be like ''white paper'' with nothing written on it. How then does it come to be written on?...To this I answer, in one word, from ''experience''". Locke's belief that all knowledge comes from sense experience is '''empiricism'''.[[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 18]] Unlike Descartes, Locke does not seriously entertain the possibility that his senses are fundamentally unreliable. He writes that, "We certainly find that pleasure or pain follows upon the application to us of certain objects whose existence we perceive (or dream we perceive!) through our senses; and this certainly is as great as we need for practical purposes, which are the only purposes we ought to have". [[CiteRef::Locke (2015d)|p. 202]] When our senses are applied to particular perceptible objects, they convey into the mind perceptions of those things. This '''sensation''' is the source of most of our ideas. We can also perceive the workings of our own mind within us, which gives us ideas of the mind's own operations such as "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different things our minds do", a process which Locke calls '''reflection'''. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 18]] Simple ideas produced by these processes can be grouped into complex ideas, such as those of substances and modes. '''Substances''' are independently existing things like God, angels, humans, animals, plants, and constructed things. '''Modes''' are dependently existing things like mathematical and moral ideas, which form the content of religion, politics, and culture. Note that while Locke does not believe that we are born with ideas, he believes we are born with faculties to receive and manipulate them. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)]] Locke rejected Descartes contention that thinking was an inherent property of the mind. He wrote that "To ask, at what time a Man has first any ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having ideas, and perception being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body; which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a man's ideas, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of his soul". [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)]]
     by setting up reasons, as well as responses, to why he believes there are no innate notions or principles of the speculative (descriptive) or practical (moralAs a corpuscularist, prescriptive) kinds. Locke treats innateness—the theory that there are innate notions—as a hypothesis and proceeds took all observable bodies to provide arguments against it. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)|p. 15]] He first rejects the argument from universal consent: "Nothing is more commonly taken for granted than that certain principles … are accepted by all mankind. Some people have argued that because these principles are … universally accepted, they must have been stamped into the souls of men from the outset." [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|p. 3]] identifying the defect wherein that universal agreement does not entail innateness, as well as the fact that the argument from universal consent can be turned into evidence for a lack composed of innateness. Locke states that speculative principles cannot be innate simply because ‘children and idiots’ are not aware of them. He considers it a contradiction that there would be certain truths imprinted in a person that said person could not understand. He regards ‘imprinting’ as ‘perception.’ He entertains a response that innate propositions could be capable of being perceived under certain circumstances, and until those circumstances occurred, the propositions would remain unperceived. However, Locke responds that this account fails to distinguish between innate propositions and any other propositions that a person may come to know. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)|p. 16]] Locke also considers the account that people "know and assent to these truths when they come to the use of reason," [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|pinvisibly small material particles called corpuscles. 5]] and that this is sufficient to prove those truths innate. He considers two version of the phrase, “use of reason” and argues how both are incorrect. Firstly, he takes it to mean that people use reason to discover innate propositions. He argues against Such particles interacted primarily by showing how this definition fails to distinguish between mathematical theorems and axiomsdirect physical contact, where axioms are supposed to be innate, and theorems not. However, if both axioms and theorems are to be discovered by reason, then there is no way to separate the two. Second, he takes “use of reason” to mean that people come to understand innate propositions once they are able to use reason, without using reason to understand those innate propositionswhich could convey motion. Locke says thishowever, too, is incorrect, as “we observe ever so many instances of the use did accept Issac Newton's concept of reason in children long before they have any knowledge of [innate propositions].” [[CiteRef::Locke (2015a)|p. 5]] In additiongravitation, even if believing this interpretation of “use of reason,” were true, Locke says it still would not entail that said propositions were innate. Regarding practical (moral, prescriptive) innate propositions, there are additional arguments Locke makes against innateness. First, practical propositions are not self-evident like speculative propositions—one could question why practical propositions could hold, and receive attraction at a response. This, says Locke makes them even less likely distance to be innate. Moreover, because practical propositions can be broken by someone, somewhere—and because obedience a special property added to them can be worn down matter by exposure to customs and education—they cannot be innate. Locke states that innate principles prevent inquiry and exempted lazy people from the efforts of further researchGod. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis Kochiras (20162014)|p. 18]] ==== Locke on Sensation and Reflection ==== In Book Two of Material bodies had certain '''primary qualities'Essay''including size, Locke discusses how it is that people come to have knowledgeshape, and from whence their ideas originate. He holds that the mind is a blank sheet of papertexture, and it comes to be written on through experiencemotion, and people’s understandings derive from their observations.[[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 18]] Experience, according which were impossible to Locke, comes separate from sensation and reflectionthem. They also had '''Sensationsecondary qualities''' is when a person’s senses are applied to specific perceptible objects, where which were the senses convey an object’s qualities into the mind. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 18]] object'''Reflection''' occurs when a person is able s abilities to perceive the operations produce sensations of their own mind from within their own mindcolor, sound, taste, and smell in a way that produces ideas which could not come from external objects. Reflection is human beings when they interact with bodies or particles with the mind is aware of what it is doingappropriate primary qualities. [[CiteRef::Locke Kochiras (2015b2014)|p. 18]] While Unlike Descartes, Locke holds allowed that it was possible that the mind is a blank slate regarding content, he believes that people are born with faculties with which to manipulate said contentsoul might be material. Through sensation and reflection, the mind can, first, organize simple ideas into complex ideas—the independent existences In book IV of substances and the dependent existences of modes. The mind can also combine simple and complex ideas and regard them together without uniting the two—what Locke calls relations. Furthermorehis Essay, the mind can produce general ideas by extracting particulars in order to limit the application of he wrote that idea. Sensation and reflection can also give rise "anyone who will allow himself to other ideas like: numbers, space, time, power and moral relationsthink freely. [[CiteRef::Uzgalis (2016)|p. 19]] ==== Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities ==== Also in Book Two, Locke also distinguishes between two kinds of qualities that objects or substances can have. “Whatever the mind perceives in itself—whatever the immediate object of perception, thought, will hardly find reason directing him firmly for or understanding—I call an idea; and against the power to produce an idea in our mind I call a quality if the thing that has that powersoul's materiality".” [[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 28]] The first kind of qualities an object may have are primary qualities. These are qualities He argued that are impossible to separate from the object, no matter how finely one divides it. Locke gathers that these '''primary qualities''' are how people can observe materiality of the simple ideas such as occupying space (extension), having shape, being in motion or at rest, and having texture. The second types of qualities an object may have are called '''secondary qualities'''; these, according to Locke, are objects’ abilities to produce in people sensations that occur through people’s interactions soul was consistent with "the objects’ primary qualities. These sensations consist great ends of: color, sound, taste religion and smell.  Locke also discerns a third kind of quality: tertiary qualities, which is defined as object or substance’s power to affect another objectmorality", like fire melting wax.[[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)]] He maintains that objects produce ideas in since God might effect the minds material resurrection of people through physical impact upon them, through small particles—corpuscles—that travel from the object to the mind of the persondead on Judgment Day.[[CiteRef::Locke (2015b)|p. 29205]]
=== Locke on Scientific Methodology ===
The Aristotelian scholastic approach to knowledge saw scientific knowledge as certain knowledge of necessary truths, with conclusions deduced from premises that were self-evident. Like many others of his times, Locke did not believe that this sort of knowledge was generally possible in natural philosophy, though he continued to hold it as an ideal. He sought to replace such stringent demands with ones more compatible with the new experimental science, such as that practiced by the Royal Society. He took knowledge to be "nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and incompatibility, of any of our ideas", with our ideas derived ultimately from sensations. [[CiteRef::Locke (2015d)|p. 196]][[CiteRef::Kochiras (2014)]] Locke distinguished between two sorts of knowledge, knowledge of '''nominal essences''' which are the set of observable qualities we use to classify a thing, and knowledge of '''real essences''' which are the causal grounds of a substance's perceivable qualities. It was this latter sort of knowledge that Locke thought was, for the most part, beyond human reach.[[CiteRef::Osler (1970)]]
The Aristotelian conception For Locke, knowledge of scientific knowledge prevailed prior to Locke’s work stated that scientific knowledge concerned certain knowledge the real essences of material substances and the necessary truths. Locke, upon realization that this demand connections of scientific knowledge these essences to qualities flowing from them was too strict for the experimental science deepest sort of his timeknowledge one might, developed a new conception that was more appropriatein principle, while retaining the Aristotelian scientific knowledge as an idealhave in natural philosophy.[[CiteRef::Kochiras (2014)|p. 4]] According He imagined this to Lockebe knowledge of the corpuscles that make up matter and their sizes, there are two kinds of scientific knowledgeshapes, and they differ in their degree of certaintyarrangements. Intuition is Given such fundamental knowledge understood instantly, and demonstration is knowledge understood after a set of intermediate steps. Both intuition and demonstration are forms we could deduce the tertiary qualities of substances; their powers to produce certain knowledgeeffects in other substances.[[CiteRef::Kochiras (2014)|p. 8]] Locke’s conception of scientific knowledge concerned certain kinds of objects: real essences and the connections Just as a locksmith knows that flowed between them. Locke drew a distinction between real particular key opens one lock but not another, we could know that opium produces sleep, and nominal essences. While '''nominal essences''' consisted in the observable qualities used to describe hemlock causes death and organize a thing, the '''real essence''' is what makes the thing what it isreasons why.[[CiteRef::Kochiras Locke (20142015d)|p. 9212]] To Locke, people have scientific knowledge of a thing if they know both its real essence and the necessary connections between the real essence and other qualities.[[CiteRef::Kochiras (2014)|p. 10]] This also holds for scientific knowledge in natural philosophy. However, says Locke, accessing either is impossible for people, due to the fact that real essences escape them. Later, Locke saw that this conception, too, was strict, so he relaxed his condition that knowledge must be absolutely certain, and held that although genuine knowledge was absolutely certain, lack of certainty did not entail ignorance. When knowing truth via intuition or demonstration is not possible, people can still judge it true or false.[[CiteRef::Osler (1970)|p. 15]] === Locke's Influence ===
Locke’s ''Essay'' posited an argument But Locke supposed that such knowledge was, for rejecting the oldermost part, scholastic model beyond human faculties because corpuscles are too small to be discerned by human senses. He wrote that "But while we lack senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of knowledge bodies and to give us ideas of their fine structure, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and science ways of operation, being assured only of what we can learn from a few experiments. And what we can learn for sure in favor that way is limited indeed." [[CiteRef::Locke (2015d)|p. 212]][[CiteRef::Anstey (2011)|pp. 31-45]] In making this case about the limits of our knowledge of his empirical onea corpuscular world, Locke nonetheless felt confident in relying on the corpuscular hypothesis itself "because that’s the theory that is thought to go furthest in intelligibly explaining those qualities of bodies; and I fear that the human understanding hasn’t the power to replace it was very successful..." [[CiteRef::Uzgalis Locke (20162015d)|p. 77208]] Although Locke’s ''Essay'' contained much While knowledge of Cartesian thoughtreal essences, was, for the most part, inaccessible to humans, Locke’s work Locke imagined that it was seen not inaccessible to other epistemic agents with different or more acute senses, such as refutation of DescartesGod, the angels, and moved philosophy toward thatthe inhabitants of other planets.[[CiteRef::Chappell Kochiras (2014)]][[CiteRef::Locke (19942015d)|p. 261211]]
Locke’s arguments against innate ideas Locke supposed that human knowledge was limited to what he called '''sensitive knowledge'''; knowledge of nominal essences that comes every day within the notice of our senses. [[CiteRef::Kochiras (2014)]][[CiteRef::Osler (1970)]] Like Francis Bacon, he maintained that an important part of his support the methodology of natural philosophy is the construction of natural histories giving systematic accounts of phenomena. Hypotheses played only a minor role in natural philosophy, though he did accept the value of the importance theories expressed in Newton's ''Principia''. [[CiteRef::Anstey (2011)|p. 70]] He wrote that "We should not take up any one [hypothesis] ''too hastily'' ... till we have very well examined particulars and made several experiments in that thing we would explain by our hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all". [[CiteRef::Rogers (1982)|p. 231]] Like Newton, he supposed that knowledge could be obtained by observation, experiment, and inductive generalization. Locke’s ''Essay'' came to be considered the start of “free '''British empiricism''', with contributions by subsequent Anglophone thinkers including Berkeley, Hume, Mill, Russell and autonomous inquiry”Ayer. [[CiteRef::Chappell (Ed.) (1994)|p. 261]]|Criticism=In some quarters, Locke’s ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'' was heavily criticized. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) responded, point-by-point, to Locke’s work in a book length rebuttal, ''New Essays on Human Understanding'', which he finished in 1704, but wasn't published until sixty years later. [[CiteRef::Look (2017)]] Leibniz rejected Locke's claim that the senses were the ultimate goal was source of all our ideas and that there were no innate ideas. He wrote that "Experience is necessary...if the soul...is to show his readers take heed of the ideas that they are within us. But how could be experience and the senses provide the ideas? Does the soul have windows? Is it similar to writing tablets or wax? Clearly, those who take this view of the soul are treating it as fundamentally corporeal", a possibility that Locke was willing to countenance, but Leibniz found abhorrent. [[CiteRef::Look (2017)|p. 40]]
"free from Leibniz rejected Locke's claim that the burden mind was initially devoid of tradition and authorityideas, like a blank sheet of paper, because this would make new minds identical, both in theology and knowledgebut separate, a possibility ruled out by showing his Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.[[CiteRef::Look (2017)]] Although he allowed that contingent truths might be learned with the entire grounds assistance of our right conduct in the world can be secured by senses, logically necessary principles, like the truths of pure mathematics, logic, and some areas of metaphysics and ethics could not come from the experience senses because no number of specific experiences could demonstrate their necessity. [[theyCiteRef::Look (2017)]] may gain by Therefore, he concluded that, "the proof of them can only come from inner principles, which are described as innate faculties and powers ". [[theyCiteRef::Leibniz (2017a)|p. 3]] are born withTo explain why everyone doesn't have access to these innate ideas, he wrote that "It would indeed be wrong to think that we can easily read these eternal laws of reason in the soul...without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that they can be discovered inside us if we give them our attention: the senses provide the prompt, and the results of experiments also serve to corroborate reason, rather as checking procedures in arithmetic help us to avoid errors of calculation in long chains of reasoning". [[CiteRef::Chappell Leibniz (19942017a)|p. 2523]] Leibniz's criticisms of Locke touched off a prolonged debate between empiricists, who maintained, with Locke, that all knowledge derives from experience, and rationalists like Leibniz, who maintained that some knowledge is derived by means other than experience, and must therefore be innate. [[CiteRef::Markie (2015)]]
Locke’s George Berkeley (1685-1753) questioned Locke and Descartes'conception of a corpuscular mechanistic material world. Drawing on Locke'Essay'' was also considered the start of British empiricisms distinction between mind-dependent secondary qualities and mind-independent primary qualities, which became the preferred mode of philosophy among future Anglophone thinkers he questioned whether primary qualities such as Berkeleysize, Humeshape, Milltexture and motion were, Russell and Ayer.[[CiteRef::Chappell (1994)|p. 261]]|Criticism=Locke’s ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'' was heavily criticized. Gottfried Leibniz respondedindeed, pointmind-by-pointindependent. Denying the existence of material substance, Berkeley attributed intersubjective agreement about the perceived world and its apparent stability to Locke’s work in his rebuttal, ''New Essays on Human Understanding'', where he disagreed with Locke’s rejection of innate ideas. Leibniz writes that there is no way all our ideas could come from experience since there are no real causal interactions between substances. In addition, Locke’s claim that the mind was a blank paper at birth violated Leibniz’s Principle action of God rather than to the Identity properties of Indiscerniblesinvisible material corpuscles.[[CiteRef::Cook Downing (2013)]] Fellow empiricist George Berkeley was also critical of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities—Berkeley claimed that primary qualities as well as secondary qualities were a product of the human mind, and not a part of the object.[[CiteRef::Berkeley (1957)]]Berkeley's criticism of corpuscular matter had a strong influence on subsequent thinkers, including David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).|Page Status=Needs EditingEditor Approved
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