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|Brief=a 19th century British philosopher, political economist , and civil servant. His writings on scientific change cover topics ranging from the nature of scientific reasoning to theory-ladenness and scientific progress|Summary=Although Mill's writings primarily covered topics unrelated to science and scientific change, he was a passionate interlocutor in the mid-19th century debates on science. Developing his notions mostly as a response to other philosophers, Mill wrote on the primacy of induction in scientific reasoning, advocated for the use of logic in scientific justification instead of the study of history, and construed science as being a part of embedded in the greater social context. His principal work on these ideas is presented in his 1843 book, [[Mill (1974a)|''A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive'']].
|Historical Context=Mill was an active participant in the debates surrounding epistemology of science in the mid-19th century. In order to properly contextualize his contributions, it is important to understand some of the major ideas that preceded him, and the most topical issues of his day.
One of the most prominent ideas that many philosophers prior to and during Mill’s time believed in was the ‘uniformity of nature.’ This concept was usually nature’, which often served as the uncritical starting assumption of many philosophers, including Mill himself. The principle of the ‘uniformity of nature’ states that the natural phenomenon behaves in a uniform, law-like fashion. The universe was thought to be governed by general and immutable laws that were considered immutable. This idea is also sometimes characterized described as the ‘law of causation’ - “it is a law that there is a law for everything.”[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)|p.348]]
Most influential philosophers of the past few centuries strongly adhered to this concept. Rationalist philosophers such as Leibniz and Descartes, and as well as their followers maintained adhered to this principle. Kant himself , too, ardently believed in the principle of the ‘uniformity of nature.’ Though Mill, and some British empiricists generally, tried to disassociate themselves from rationalist and Kantian doctrines, they nonetheless believed in this principle. Given this widespread acceptance, Mill too also implicitly agreed assented to it, and later used it to justify his claims in support inductive inferences.[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)]]
Another important concept that Mill inherited is Hume’s ‘problem of induction.’ The primary idea is that due to we make universal generalizations based on our finite and limited set of particular experiences we generalize the results, thereby thinking that the future will resemble the past. However, since our experience is limited, but while the future universalization is infinite, there is no justification that the future will resemble the past. Take a classic example: one One may observe million swans all of whom are white. Accordingly, one can make the universal conclusion that, given our large set of data, “all swans are white.” Importantly, this conclusion makes an assertion about the future: all All swans that will be observed in the future will also be whitejust as those (white) swans observed in the past. However, no matter how many singular observational instances of white swans there may be, it cannot be guaranteed that a future instance may not refute the past. That is, we : We cannot necessarily claim that there will never be a non-white swan (e.g., a black swan). This is Hume’s ‘problem of induction,’ which plagues all empirical sciencessince the limited data is used to support the supposedly universal laws of nature. Inheriting the British empiricist tradition, Mill had to, broadly speaking, justify provide a justification for induction andthat would, in particularturn, provide a sound justificatory grounding for empirical sciences as well. The As such, the ‘problem of induction’ provided the context within which Mill workeddeveloped his ideas.
Mill entered the debate on the epistemology of science through the publication of his book “A System of Logic” in 1843. Most of his work was in response to the William Whewell's 1837 book , “History of Inductive Sciences .” by William Whewell that was published in 1837. Mill’s book, which expressed his “difference of opinion” [[CiteRef::Strong (1955)|p.209]] with Whewell, was proved popular among the British empiricists. One of the reasons that the intellectual community disregarded Whewell’s ideas on science was his departure from the British empiricist tradition of British empiricist such as Locke and Berkeley. Instead, Whewell had aligned himself with continental philosophers such as Kant. This contention, however, was more than a mere divide between rationalist and empiricist traditions. Whewell approached science through its history, whereas Mill thought that using logic was more appropriate.[[CiteRef::Strong (1955)]]
Like his predecessor Whewell, Mill thought that one of the essential tasks of the philosophy of science was to formulate a method of evaluation for scientific theories. Unlike most philosophers before them, both Whewell and Mill alike were cognizant that the history of science and philosophy of science are intimately connected. Yet, they differed in their approaches for what provides, or is the source of justification for , the evaluative criteria for scientific theories and laws. On one hand, Whewell took what could appropriately be termed as the ‘historicist’ approach: he thought that the The study of history of science provides us with the evaluative criteria. Specifically, Whewell’s historical survey led him to conclude that the evaluative criteria are ‘distilled from’ and derive their justification out of the historical record. Hence, Whewell’s somewhat unqualified historicist approach not only ‘finds’ the scientific criteria by studying history of science, but also provides its justification based on scientific history.[[CiteRef::Losee (1983)]] In particular, Whewell showed that the historical survey of the development of a given science reveals that the leading ideas become ‘clarified’ through progressive criticism. These leading, fundamental ideas are not construed as being ‘accidental‘accidental’,’ as it is precisely these idea that lead to the development of the said branch of science around which the science then organizes itself.[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)]] It was this historicist approach against which Mill primarily argued.
Another issue in Mill’s day pertained to the justification being necessarily true, as opposed to being true only contingently. Philosophers such as Kant and Whewell, who was heavily influenced by Kant’s work, were deductive necessitarians: they They held that deductive reasoning is necessarily true, meaning that the conclusion of a deductive argument is universal and necessary. ContrarilyThey maintained that inductive reasoning, for themon the contrary, inductive reasoning lead to conclusions that were inevitably fallible, showing thus implying that Whewell and Kant were critically aware of Hume’s problem. Deviating from Whewellapproach, Mill’s empiricism favors favored inductive reasoning. Although Mill employs employed terminology such as “invariable” and “unconditionality” when describing logic of scientific justification, he is not a necessitarian as he lived in a post-Humean context. There is ongoing debate to this day whether Mill’s notions can ultimately be reduced to ones requiring a ‘necessary connection.’ If that is so, Mill would be rendered an inductive necessitarian.[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)]]
|Major Contributions====Mill’s Empiricism===
Mill is an empiricist who believes that all our ideas are gained through sense perception. Departing from the rationalist doctrines, which hold reason as the primary source of knowledge, Mill follows a long line of British empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The ‘source’ of ideas primarily refers to where the ideas come from, as opposed to denying the role that reason plays. As such, Mill holds that the mind is furnished with ideas through experience, and ''then'' reason can use these ideas. His empiricism is thoroughgoing: there is no source other than experience and observation that provides us with our ideas.[[CiteRef::Macleod (2016)]] His empiricism is quite radical: in fact, it is phenomenalistic. Drawing upon the works of earlier empiricist idealists such as Berkeley, Mill thinks that the mind-dependent reality is all we have access to. That is, there is nothing other than the ideas provided by sensations that the mind has access to. Unlike some earlier empiricists like Locke, Mill thinks that the external objects (if any) are not perceivable. Whereas Locke believed that the objects' primary qualities and the ideas invoked by them resemble each other, Mill is more prudent in arguing that the only thing we can perceive is “a set of appearances.”[[CiteRef::Mill (1974b)]] Mill’s position that we cannot know anything about how things are in-themselves, but only know how they appear to us is called the “Relativity of Human Knowledge.”[[CiteRef::Mill (1979)]]
