Changes

In the early 1980s, Laudan comes to realize that there is no such thing as a universal and unchangeable method of science. One early indication of this transition is found in the discussion of [[Dudley Shapere]]'s [[Shapere (1980)|''The Character of Scientific Change (1980)'']]. In that paper, Shapere defended the idea that methods of science change as our theories about the world change. In his comment on Shapere paper, Laudan seems to appreciate that methods of science are changeable while still arguing that there must exist "persistent metacriteria for the choice of criteria".[[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)|p. 247]]. However, in his [[Laudan (1984)|''Science and Values (1984)'']], Laudan presents his '''reticulated model''' which is an attempt to explain how methods of science change in a rational fashion. At the time, this view was against the commonly held belief that some core methods of science remain unchangeable. This lead to an important debate with [[John Worrall]] (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]).

Paradoxically, in the famous VPI project that resulted in [[Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|''Scrutinizing Science (1988)'']], Laudan appears to be tacitly subscribing to the idea that there is after all a universal and unchangeable method of science. While not openly articulated, this tacit premise underlies the whole exercise of trying to test different methodological dicta suggested by the likes of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan himself against the historical record. If not restricted to any particular community, time period, or discipline, such a testing would only make sense if the criteria of theory assessment were the same in all communities, all time periods, and all disciplines. Since Laudan and other members of the VPI project didn't restrict themselves to a specific community, time period, or discipline, they tacitly assumed that the same method would be employed in all communities/time periods/disciplines. Clearly, this goes against Laudan's own views stated a few years prior in his [[Laudan (1984)|''Science and Values (1984)'']]. Interestingly, in his famous debate with [[John Worrall]] in 1988-89, he returned to his 1984 position that methods of science change through time (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]). This mysterious inconsistency in Laudan's position remains to be explained.

|Criticism=In 1988 John Worrall responded to Laudan’s [[Laudan (1984)|''Science and Values'']] in a paper titled [[Worrall (1988)|''The Value of Fixed Methodology'']]. Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that there is after all a core unchangeable method of theory evaluation. According to Worrall, Laudan's alleged historical examples of changes in methods are all examples of changes in explicitly stated methodologies. Implicit criteria that scientists actually employ in theory assessment, according to Worrall, remain static. Thus, according to Worrall Laudan's reticulated fails as it tries to explain something that doesn't really exist, i.e. changes in the implicit method of science.[[CiteRef::Worrall (1988)]]

Laudan replied to Worrall’s criticism in 1989 in his [[Laudan (1989)|''If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it'']]. Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1989)]]

Worrall's final reply cape in his [[Worrall (1989)|''Fix it be Damned: A Reply to Laudan'']]. Worrall claims that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science. [[CiteRef::Worrall (1989)]]