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Paradoxically, in the famous VPI project that resulted in [[Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|''Scrutinizing Science (1988)'']], Laudan appears to be tacitly subscribing to the idea that there is after all a universal and unchangeable method of science. While not openly articulated, this tacit premise underlies the whole exercise of trying to test different methodological dicta suggested by the likes of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan himself against the historical record. If not restricted to any particular community, time period, or discipline, such a testing would only make sense if the criteria of theory assessment were the same in all communities, all time periods, and all disciplines. Since Laudan and other members of the VPI project didn't restrict themselves to a specific community, time period, or discipline, they tacitly assumed that the same method would be employed in all communities/time periods/disciplines. Clearly, this goes against Laudan's own views stated a few years prior in his [[Laudan (1984)|''Science and Values (1984)'']]. Interestingly, in his famous debate with [[John Worrall]] in 1988-89, he returned to his 1984 position that methods of science change through time (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]). This mysterious inconsistency in Laudan's position remains to be explained.  ====The Covariance Fallacy (TODO find a proper place for this seection)====The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that it, “[…] assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, in the Kuhnian tradition, each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are in different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe.Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.